The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 have led to radical changes in American society, new laws and governmental agencies, new wars, and new ways of seeing the world. The U.S. military has invaded and now occupies two (formerly) sovereign nation-states; a war on terror is being waged around the world, with covert operations, secret prison facilities, and detention camps in which those designated enemy combatants have languished for years in defiance of international law; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, formed in response to the 9/11 attacks, has grown into a massive bureaucracy whose authority reaches from immigration and naturalization policies to border patrol, customs regulation, and airport security; and the USA PATRIOT Act has given the U.S. government immense leeway to infringe on civil liberties of American citizens in its fight against terrorism. Many of these developments are now taken for granted, have become part of history, and have even become part of our daily lives, shedding in the process much of the ominous novelty that once characterized them.

This book intervenes in the post-9/11 process of normalization, slowing it down to enable careful analysis and clear understanding. We create this effect by taking a close look at the lives of Arab Americans, a population whose post-9/11 experiences have been especially traumatic. Our focus is greater Detroit, home to some of the oldest, largest, and politically most
prominent Arab and Arabic-speaking communities in North America. Through a careful analysis of systematic data collected on these communities and on the general population in the same region, we hope to make two contributions. First, we aim to insert accurate, objective information into the vigorous and often misinformed public discourse about Arab Americans. Our topics include basic demographic patterns, the 9/11 backlash, attitudes about civil liberties, social identities, religion and religious practices, values, social capital, political beliefs, and attitudes about U.S. foreign policy. Second, we intend to contribute to contemporary debates about citizenship. Citizenship has become an increasingly prominent theme in the social sciences, legal studies, and the humanities, as well as politically contested terrain in the lives of ordinary and influential people alike. We will argue that political crisis intensifies citizenship debates, making them a focus of public concern and political action, all the while revealing deep-seated contradictions in American society. By analyzing this dynamic against the backdrop of 9/11 and its effects on Arab Americans in Detroit, our goal is to make sense of the new regimes of citizenship and security that are reshaping American society.

In this chapter, we introduce our conceptual framework. We consider two key themes in the discourse about citizenship: citizenship as rights and citizenship as multiculturalism. We argue that, for Arab and Muslim Americans, citizenship has been shaped by crisis in historically specific ways, most of which predate the so-named war on terror. After explaining how this particular history can help us think about citizenship in more critical and comparative ways, we provide an overview of our chief sources of data—the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS) and the Detroit Area Study (DAS). We then preview the chapters in the book, describing how each contributes to our understanding of citizenship as rights and as multiculturalism in an age of crisis. A brief account of Arab Detroit and some of its distinguishing features puts the context in which this study was undertaken into perspective.

ARAB DETROIT: AN INITIAL PORTRAIT
Detroit and its suburbs are home to a large, diverse population of Arab immigrants and their descendants. Population estimates vary widely—from 125,000 to 475,000—but even the most sober calculations suggest a population that, by 2010, will approach 200,000. Arbs in greater Detroit tend to settle in the city’s inner and outer suburbs. The most visible con-
centration is in Dearborn, where Lebanese, Yemenis, Iraqis, and Palestinians, most of them Muslim, have built a vibrant array of mosques, ethnic business districts, social service agencies, political action committees, village clubs, Islamic schools, and neighborhood associations. A more modest concentration of Yemenis is in Hamtramck, a working-class municipality surrounded by the City of Detroit. Another enclave, located along Seven Mile Road in Detroit, is home to Iraqi immigrants, almost all of them Chaldean Catholics, a Syriac and Arabic-speaking minority from northern Iraq. The Seven Mile neighborhood is small, and its population has shrunk radically over the last decade. Few new immigrants settle there, and most of the area’s Chaldean families have moved to the northern and eastern suburbs, where they and other Arabic-speaking immigrants are widely recognized as an influential business and professional community. Detroit’s grocery and liquor store trade is dominated by Iraqis. Lebanese, meanwhile, have specialized in gas stations and convenience stores. According to figures generated by the American Arab Chamber of Commerce, there are more than 5,000 Arab and Chaldean-owned businesses in greater Detroit. Despite obvious success in the small business sector, most Arabs in greater Detroit are not entrepreneurs; they can be found in all sectors of the local economy and at all income levels.

In addition to new immigrants, whose numbers have increased steadily since the 1970s, many well-established first- and second- (and even third- and fourth-) generation Arab Americans also live in metropolitan Detroit. Immigrants from Ottoman Syria had established small enclaves in the city by the 1890s. Mostly Christians from what is today Lebanon, these early arrivals worked as peddlers and shopkeepers. Detroit became a magnet for other Syrians in 1914, when Henry Ford began paying his factory workers five dollars a day. Restrictive immigration laws reduced the number of new arrivals from the Arab world between 1925 and 1965, but political turmoil in the Middle East and economic opportunity in the United States continued to draw new immigrants to Detroit for much of the twentieth century. The most significant recent wave of immigration was precipitated by the Lebanese civil war, which began in 1975. Between 1983 and 1990, just after the war’s peak, more than 30,000 immigrants came to the United States from Lebanon, and nearly 4,000 of them settled immediately in greater Detroit (Schopmeyer 2000). The relationship between instability in Arab homelands and migration to Michigan holds for each of the nationalities that make up Arab Detroit.
Although Lebanese are the largest and most visible, the city also hosts the largest Iraqi and Yemeni communities in the United States, as well as sizable populations from Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. As we discuss in subsequent chapters of this book, the factors that bring immigrants from the Arab world to the United States often result directly from political and economic policies pursued by the U.S. government and its allies in the Middle East.

The Arab national groups that predominate in Detroit represent odd inversions of the demographics of their home countries, giving some indication of the forces that have made migration possible and necessary. For example, Christians make up less than 5 percent of the Arab world, but in Detroit more than half the community. Detroit’s Iraqi population is predominantly Catholic, yet Catholics are a small minority in Iraq. Detroit’s Palestinians, too, are disproportionately Christian. Detroit’s Lebanese, once overwhelmingly Christian, are increasingly Muslim, but Shi’a, a minority in Lebanon, greatly outnumber Detroit’s Lebanese Sunnis. If Arab Detroit appears culturally distinctive to members of the larger American society, it seems even more peculiar in comparison to the Arab world. The broad range of lifestyles, national backgrounds, and levels of assimilation found among Detroit’s Arab and Arabic-speaking population make it a difficult community to represent, both intellectually and politically. It is not simply an American ethnic constituency. Parts of this community make sense only in relation to economic development in the Yemeni highlands, conflict along the Lebanese-Israeli border, U.S. military interventions in Iraq, or the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Yet Arab Detroit is hardly an integral part of the Arab world. The city is home to thousands of Arabs who cannot speak Arabic and have never traveled to the Middle East.

Given Arab Detroit’s historical complexity and its diversity in the present, we cannot assume that its inhabitants experience American citizenship in similar ways, that the 9/11 backlash has affected them all alike, or that Arab Americans, in general, understand terms like citizenship and crisis in roughly the way other Americans do. Indeed, the meaning of these terms is constantly changing. Before we can arrive at a more precise sense of what they might signify in Detroit, we need to examine claims now being made, about citizenship in particular, among political theorists and social critics who, in discussing problems of inequality and cultural difference in contemporary society, depend increasingly on this term.
TWO THEMES OF CITIZENSHIP: RIGHTS AND MULTICULTURALISM

Like so many useful political ideas, “the concept of citizenship has become less clear as its relevance and prominence have increased” (Heisler 2005, 667). This trend reflects the growing range of problems citizenship is expected to solve, the divergent perspectives of those who invoke the term, and the changing political and economic conditions in which the meanings of this concept evolve. If citizenship is relevant to so many people, in so many ways, it is perhaps because the concept rests on a tension inherent to political life in contemporary nation-states. In theory, citizens of a state are—or ought to be—equal with respect to certain laws and official definitions of membership. In reality, this legal equivalence is difficult to attain and often considered undesirable. Nations are not as culturally uniform or politically unified as nationalists once thought they should be, and states cannot (and often do not wish to) devise legal systems that protect the rights and privileges of all citizens equally. Still, ideals of human equality and national community are firmly entrenched in modern political thought, and discourses about citizenship, failed or potentially put right, are now a popular medium in which to hash out inconsistencies in democratic governance.

To give our discussion of citizenship a sharper focus, we highlight two themes that pervade both popular and scholarly approaches to the subject. What we call the rights theme considers the shift from narrow, territorially defined citizenship to broad human rights models. The multiculturalism theme explores how diversity and value differences are reconciled with the need for national unity and shared conceptions of belonging. These themes overlap in theory and practice, but separating them analytically help us understand the situation of Arab Americans as both a problem of rights and a problem of identity, recognition, and belonging.

The Rights Theme

Modern theories of citizenship began with Thomas Marshall’s ([1950]1964) expanded definition of the term. Arguing that the traditional view of citizenship as a set of civil rights and obligations was too narrow, he defined it to include civil, political, and social rights. Civil rights include rights to speech, thought, religion, private property, contracts, and justice. Political rights include the right to participate as a member or voter in the governing political body.
And social rights cover a broad spectrum of guarantees, ranging from “a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1964, 94). Marshall’s definition extends the array of rights inherent in citizenship, but assumes that citizenship is coterminous with a territorially bounded nation-state. Globalization and transnational migration make this assumption problematic; each process has contributed to a crisis of the Westphalian model of state sovereignty, disrupting traditional notions of citizenship (Benhabib 2001, 2004). Economic globalization erodes national sovereignty (Sassen 1996), and migration disturbs “the sense of boundedness” (Heisler 2001) felt by people who live in countries with growing immigrant populations. For an increasing number of migrants, permanent residence in a single national homeland is becoming less the norm. In many ways,” John Solomos wrote, “the idea of diaspora as an unending sojourn across different lands better captures the reality of transnational networks and communities than the language of immigration and assimilation. Multiple, circular and return migrations, rather than a single great journey from one sedentary space to another, have helped transform transnational spaces” (2001, 209). Dual citizenship, a legal innovation developed to address these conditions, makes it even harder to define rights of citizenship in ways that privilege a single nationality (Carens 2000).

Rights-based responses to the challenges of citizenship are in abundant supply. Tomas Hammar, for example, argued that long-term immigrants in Europe who are not citizens are denizens with rights based on residency, not nationality (1989). Ranier Bauböck suggested that citizenship rights should be based on municipal residence instead of nationality because many immigrants have multiple countries of residence (2003). T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer recommended giving voting rights to long-settled immigrants who are not formal citizens to promote civic engagement and naturalization (2002). Yasemin Soysal proposed a “postnational” model of citizenship in which territorial boundaries are fluid (1994). Citizens of one nation may live and work in another, enjoying certain rights and privileges in the host nation. This model permits multiple statuses; for example, some migrant groups and citizens would receive more rights than others. Generally, the main task for policymakers and theorists who focus on the rights theme, Martin Heisler argued, is the “extension of at least large portions of, if not all, rights enjoyed by citizens to those who enter the domain of a democratic
state. These are immigrants, transnational migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees” (2005, 669).

The basic assumption driving these recommendations is that rights are the essence of citizenship. The rights of citizenship, however, are differentiated both within a nation-state and internationally. At the international level, there is a hierarchical system of nation-states. The United States is the sole occupant of the top tier, “globally dominant in military, economic, and political and cultural affairs” (Castles 2005, 690); at the bottom are states like Sudan and Iraq, which cannot provide security for their citizens, cannot prevent the encroachment of other states, and cannot supply basic economic and social services to their populations. On a world scale, U.S. citizens enjoy a wide array of formal rights, along with stable democratic structures and a strong legal system to ensure them. Within the United States, however, ethnoracial and religious minorities and women routinely experience exclusion and discrimination (Castles 2005, 691). Clearly citizenship, defined as a legal status with attendant rights and obligations, has dimensions that function apart from the strict legality of this status, and these dimensions produce systematic and pervasive inequalities. That one is a citizen of the United States, or Nigeria, or France, does not guarantee that one belongs to those national communities. The lived reality of citizenship, the everyday experience of belonging (or being excluded), is diversely conditioned by political, economic, and social factors that make individuals, and entire populations, distinctive. Whether citizenship can—ideally or in practice—be framed without an explicit recognition of these cultural differences and geopolitical hierarchies of power is now a matter of intense debate.

**The Multiculturalism Theme**

Societies have always used difference—birthplace, parentage, class, ethnicity, race, gender, religion, and so on—to draw symbolic boundaries around their members. These boundaries define insiders and outsiders, their rights and obligations, and the process (if any) by which outsiders may become insiders. Assimilationism, “the traditional American response to difference” (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005, 218), is a mode of incorporation in which the pressure to conform is intense and immigrants are converted to American values in a “rigid and uncompromising way” (Taylor 2001, 185). For example, in the early twentieth century, Chicago School scholars assumed immigrants would eventually lose their distinct cultures, blend into mainstream society, and
become American (Park and Miller 1921; Park 1950), though they disagreed to some extent about how this assimilation would occur (Warner and Srole 1945). The melting pot is the well-known metaphor for the process by which difference is dissolved into the social whole.

Multiculturalism and assimilationism are often thought of as opposite ends of the same spectrum. This unidimensional image creates theoretical confusion and makes the value of diversity in modern societies difficult to appreciate. Analysts who see multiculturalism as the opposite of assimilation consider diversity a threat to their conception of the ideal society, which is culturally homogeneous and unified. Arthur Schlesinger, for example, portrayed multiculturalism as the “disuniting of America” (1991). In this perspective, multicultural society is a “collection of discrete and presumably divided ethnic and racial communities” (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005, 220). These communities, Samuel Huntington argued, either resist assimilation or are considered “indigestible” by mainstream society, tendencies he considered exemplified in Mexican immigrants in America and Muslim minorities in predominately non-Muslim societies (2004, 187–89). Others have argued that the United States “has thrived not because of its efforts at cultural homogenization, but despite them” (Flores and Benmayor 1997, 5). Worries about immigration as a threat to national unity or stability are overblown, according to Will Kymlicka, because most immigrants want to integrate and participate (1995). Polyethnic demands for group representation, for example, are evidence that minority groups want to be included in mainstream society, not separated from it. Likewise, rising religious diversity is not necessarily a harbinger of conflict, because Americans exhibit rising tolerance (and even a preference) for religious difference, and the religious beliefs and practices of immigrants have tended, over time, to become homogenized in the American context (Fischer, Hout, and Stiles 2006).

As we have already noted, globalization and transnational migration are rendering monocultural visions of society obsolete and steadily replacing them with new political understandings of human diversity. David Jacobson described how these changes are causing people to think of nationality and group membership in ways that contradict Benedict Anderson’s 1991 model of national community, which now seems overly contained: “The ‘imagined community’ of the nation-state was bounded, finite, and internally characterized by a deep, uniform, and horizontal comradeship. Other nations, beyond its borders, belong to the ‘foreign’ or the ‘alien.’ In the emerging order, we still have imagined communities—be they ethnic, religious, or in other forms—but instead
of being horizontal, territorial, and boundary oriented, they are transterritorial and centripetal. Boundaries are culturally (rather than politically or physically) meaningful” (Jacobson 1996, 133).

Some scholars have proposed the concept of cultural citizenship to accommodate expanded, multicultural conceptions of political belonging (see, for example, Ong 1996; Pakulski 1997; Turner 2001). Cultural citizenship allows minority groups to establish special communities in which they feel safe and at home, “while still situating themselves in the broad context of continental American society” (Flores and Benmayor 1997, 13). Cultural citizenship produces cultural rights, freedom from marginalization, and acceptance of difference (Pakulski 1997). Blanca Silvestrini separated cultural citizenship from legal citizenship, the former representing unity and connectedness whereas the latter represents homogeneity and the absence of culture in the public sphere (1997). Renato Rosaldo and others have noted an emerging cultural citizenship among previously marginalized groups who express their agency, and their alternative sense of belonging, by demanding rights to their own social space from the larger society (1997). Citizenship, from this vantage, is about who “needs to be visible, to be heard, and to belong” (Rosaldo 1997, 37).

Kymlicka suggested that shared identity must be formed in the post–nation-state period through accommodation of diverse national identities rather than suppression of them (1995). Calling on Charles Taylor’s notion of “deep diversity” (1991), Kymlicka argued that societies must accept that citizens of different ethnoracial, religious, and national backgrounds will not always understand their membership in the larger polity in the same way. The result is a national identity that, though overarching, cannot be portrayed as uniform, a predicament that explains the appeal and political necessity of multiculturalism in the United States and other countries where diversity is favored in public discourse and social policy (Baumann 1999; Maddox 2004).

Soysal, in her research on Islam in Europe, suggested that “the universal right to ‘one’s own culture’ has gained political legitimacy, and collective identity has been redefined as a category of human rights” (1997, 513). However, as Joseph Carens noted, these cultural rights are often harshly questioned when they are asserted by less powerful and stigmatized cultural groups, such as Muslims in France during repeated debates over the foulard, the Muslim headscarf (2000). The extent to which members of minority populations can, in fact, maintain their own culture apart from that of the larger society is limited, and the value of cultural distinctiveness—of wearing a headscarf in
France or speaking Spanish in the United States—is determined in contrast to dominant cultural patterns that cannot be ignored and are not uniformly rejected by members of minority communities.

Debates about multiculturalism reflect the changing social landscape, conflicting political agendas and ideologies, and international political events. It is apparent, however, that these debates center on a basic contrast between citizenship understood as a legal status, a bundle of rights, and as a sense of belonging that is felt, or should be felt, in relation to a larger national community marked by sociocultural diversity. It is also clear that both understandings are fundamentally concerned with the problem of membership, with the placing and crossing of group boundaries. For this reason, citizenship is a concept indispensable to national security. It is extremely sensitive to crisis situations in which the moral and political boundaries of the national community are perceived to be threatened.

**CRISIS**

The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were traumatic for all Americans, but those of Middle Eastern descent suffered the “tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion” (Goffman 1963, 3). The subsequent war on terror has raised questions about the values, sympathies, and loyalties of Arab and Muslim Americans, subjecting them to intense public scrutiny, backlash, and government surveillance. After 9/11, fewer than half of all Americans (46 percent) evaluated Arab Americans positively, versus 70 percent giving positive evaluations of African Americans and 79 percent of white Americans (Traugott, Groves, and Kennedy 2002). Whites and blacks alike in the Detroit region prefer more social distance from Arab Americans than from any other group (Farley, Krysan, and Couper 2006).

September 11 was not the first event to focus attention on Arab and Muslim Americans. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1973 oil embargo, the Iranian hostage crisis (1979 through 1981), U.S. intervention in Lebanon (1982 through 1984), and the 1991 Gulf War also subjected members of these groups to scrutiny and backlash. But September 11 and the so-named war on terrorism elevated to a peak hate crimes, discriminatory immigration policies, racial profiling, domestic spying, defamation by public figures and the media, and other acts of discrimination and harassment (Cainkar 2002; Ibish and Stewart 2003; Cesari 2004; Naber 2006). September 11 and its aftermath also prompted the U.S. military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and gave
rise to the USA PATRIOT Act, which greatly expanded the government’s authority to spy on U.S. citizens as it reduced checks and balances on these powers (Cole 2003; Hagopian 2004).

A study of Arab Detroit conducted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks will strike most readers as the perfect setting in which to explore how the interaction of citizenship and crisis is unfolding at ground level. Justifying a study of this kind is not difficult, largely because the link between Arab Detroit, as a place, and the 9/11 attacks, as historical events, seems so consequential, so unavoidable. Yet this impression is itself symptomatic of deeply entrenched ways of thinking about Arabs and Muslims in America. The links between Arab Detroit and the 9/11 attacks are many, but seldom those that flourish in the popular imagination. The 9/11 attackers were not from Arab Detroit and none had personal ties to Detroit—indeed, most were Saudi nationals, and very few Saudis live in greater Detroit. The 9/11 attackers were not U.S. citizens and most Arabs who live in greater Detroit are. Finally, the 9/11 attackers were Sunni Muslims and most Arab Muslims in Detroit are Shi’a. Despite these and many other distinguishing factors, the post-9/11 backlash was immediately and dramatically felt in Detroit. Some of the first arrests were made there, and men accused of belonging to an al-Qaida operational combat sleeper cell were tried and convicted in Detroit (though their convictions were soon overturned). Detroit was drawn into the war on terror almost by political reflex, and this outcome seemed as inevitable to Arab Americans as it did to most other Americans.

As we show throughout this book, the links taken for granted between Arab Detroit and crisis events in the Middle East—as well as crisis events inside the United States that involve Arabs or Muslims—are part of geopolitical and historical patterns that have shaped, and continue to shape, popular notions of citizenship and belonging in the United States. This larger context is the setting in which, to paraphrase Aihwa Ong, Arabs are made, and make themselves, American (2003). It is a social space shared by many American immigrant and ethnic groups, but it also has highly distinctive features. Arabs are set apart from other hyphenated American populations by aspects of U.S. foreign policy that drive a sharp ideological wedge between Arab and American identities. Specifically, Arabs and Muslims living in the United States repeatedly face situations in which their countries of origin, or Arabs and Muslims generally, are cast as enemies of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. As a result, Arab American identity is seen, by Arabs and non-Arabs alike, as an
identity in question, as an identity that must continually prove itself. As a practical condition of citizenship, Arab Americans are expected to assure their fellow nationals that they belong, that they are loyal, that they are not a threat to national security, and so on.

Public demand for these proofs of citizenship has intensified greatly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Once again, Arabs and Muslims are associated with danger, and their hold on U.S. citizenship and its legal protections is jeopardized. Likewise, their normative status as Americans is vulnerable to critique. It is no coincidence, given current trends in the theory and practice of citizenship, that Arab American identity formation has produced a “structure of feeling” in which the rewards of legal citizenship, economic success, and other forms of integration cannot overcome—but can in fact accentuate—a lingering, politicized estrangement from the cultural mainstream. In a real sense, Arab Americans are experiencing a concentrated version of the anxieties about identity and boundary maintenance that are now endemic to the contemporary nation-state. Their community, like the larger American society, is increasingly vulnerable to global political and economic forces beyond its control. For this reason, a careful analysis of Arab Detroit can provide important insights about national belonging and the crisis moments in which it is tested and transformed.

In the chapters to follow, we argue that Arab and Muslim Americans live in a contested zone of overlap between forms of otherness that, for much of American history, have been considered especially problematic and, at times, threatening. These markers are variable, and they intersect in complicated ways, but the most important ones, for our study, can be sorted into three categories: ethnic and racial differences, religious and value differences, and differences in basic political ideology. Attempts to include and exclude Arab Americans along these familiar dimensions produce odd outcomes, and these peculiarities reflect the marginal location Arabs now occupy in the politics of American citizenship. As a result, comparing Arab and Muslim Americans to other minority communities in the United States is both difficult and necessary.

In matters racial and ethnic, for instance, Arabs in Detroit do not identify consistently as white or nonwhite, nor do all Arabic-speakers and their descendants call themselves Arab American. Advances made in the study of Asian and Latino panethnicities (Espiritu 1992; Takaki 1989; Garcia 2000; Davila 2001; Suarez-Orozco and Paez 2002), advances in our understanding of how groups are racialized in the United States (Omi and Winant 1994; Lowe 1995; Waters
1999; Wu 2003; Rodriguez 2003), and the political gains that have accompanied these new understandings cannot be carried neatly into the study of Arab and Muslim Americans (see Jamal and Naber 2008). Likewise, although Arab Americans are commonly thought to be Muslims, most are Christian, a fact that complicates attempts to root Arab cultural difference in Islam, even as it makes Arab Muslim identity highly sensitive for people who are Muslim but not Arab, Arab but not Muslim, or simply Muslim first (Naber 2005; Modood 2005; Read 2007; Jackson 2005). On the political front, Arabs are often associated with radical, anti-American politics, yet most Arab Americans are socially conservative, have highly positive views of American society, and are eager to enter the political mainstream. Analysts and commentators of diverse sorts have noted that Arab Americans are linked to a generic cultural enemy defined as Muslim, racially non-European, and averse to democracy and human rights (Joseph 1999; McAlister 2001; Salaita 2006). In greater Detroit, however, this linkage consistently breaks down at the empirical level. We consider how Arab and Muslim Americans deal with this misfit, how it is used to create an alternative local politics, how it affects the experience of citizenship, and how the political crises that drive these processes have actually been built into Arab and Muslim identities in assertive, defensive, and highly adaptive ways.

It is important to better understand these processes, not only because they affect a vulnerable American population, but also because they highlight contradictions in the multicultural ethos that currently dominates the theory and practice of U.S. citizenship. Arab and Muslim Americans are widely associated with enemies in a society that loudly proclaims its belief in pluralism, diversity, and tolerance. In earlier periods of U.S. history, links to enemies were handled in ways that, by today’s standards, would seem extreme. During World War I, laws were passed in the United States making it illegal to speak German in public, or to teach it in schools, or even to use it in church services (Higham 2002; Reimers 1998). During World War II, 110,000 Japanese living in the United States, 70,000 of whom were U.S. citizens, were imprisoned in concentration camps run by the U.S. military (Weglyn 1976; Irons 1983; Saito 2001). In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, no laws have been passed against speaking Arabic in public, or teaching it in schools, or using it in mosques. Similarly, internment camps built specifically for the detention of Arab and Muslim U.S. citizens have not materialized, although they loom as a threat, despite the logistical difficulties entailed in incarcerating even a small percentage of the roughly 6 million Arabs and Muslims now living in the United States.
It is obvious, nonetheless, that Arab and Muslim Americans have been singled out for intense discipline and scrutiny. In Detroit, this treatment includes selective programs of surveillance, deportation, and detention without due process, presumptive freezing of financial assets, vandalism, and personal insult. We catalog these practices, building on the growing number of studies that have chronicled the post-9/11 backlash in the United States (Cole 2003; Dudziak 2003; Ewing 2008). At the same time, however, and in direct response to the post-9/11 crackdown, great efforts have been made in Detroit to include, protect, and accept Arabs and Muslims as full members of American society, and much of this activity has proceeded along lines laid down for recognizing and incorporating other minority communities in the United States (Howell and Shryock 2003; Shryock 2004). This politics of inclusion receives little attention from scholars, but is a powerful force with profound effects on the development of Arab American identities. Since the 9/11 attacks, Detroit has seen the establishment of the Arab American National Museum; the expansion of Arab American community organizations; the election and appointment of Arab and Muslim citizens to political office; new partnerships between Arab American civil rights organizations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; the creation of Arab American and Islamic studies programs in area universities; and the founding and expansion of at least a dozen new mosques.

This blend of pervasive stigma and urgent attempts at social integration produces a distinctive process of citizenship and identity formation we call disciplinary inclusion. Ideally suited to multicultural politics, this mode of citizenship is not new to Arab Detroit, nor are Arabs and Muslims uniquely subject to it. Instead, it is a highly generalized process, experienced differently by different groups and persons in American society, but with effects that inevitably bring Arabs and Muslims into larger, public discourses about American identity. By exploring how disciplinary inclusion works in Detroit, our goal is to enhance the critical potential of a literature on citizenship that has proved indispensable to understanding how power and identity interact in contemporary political systems.

THE DETROIT ARAB AMERICAN STUDY AND DETROIT AREA STUDY

Our analyses are based on a unique combination of data: the Detroit Arab American Study, an intensive survey of the Arab communities in the Michigan
counties of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb, and the Detroit Area Study, a survey of the general population living in the same counties during the same period. Figure 1.1 presents the geographic coverage of these surveys by county and local area, and the location of the three counties in the state of Michigan. Both the DAAS and DAS were designed and conducted using scientific survey methods and procedures. An overview of our samples and research methodology follows (for a more detailed technical account, see www.detroitarabamericanstudy.org).

Today, Michigan has the highest concentration of Arabs of any state in the union (1.2 percent of the total state population), growing by 51 percent in the 1990s (de la Cruz and Brittingham 2003).\(^3\) About 2.7 percent of the population in Wayne County reports Arab ancestry, with 1.2 percent in Macomb County and Oakland County (de la Cruz and Brittingham 2003).\(^4\) The cities of Dearborn and Dearborn Heights, which border Detroit to the southwest, are a well-known area of Arab concentration (this area is labeled Near SW Detroit in figure 1.1). For example, about 35 percent of Dearborn’s residents are of Arab origin, and more than 60 percent of students in Dearborn’s public schools are Arab American. Although no other enclave rivals Dearborn in size or political prominence, the majority of greater Detroit’s Arab and Arabic-speaking populations live elsewhere, and most live in neighborhoods that cannot be characterized as enclaves.

The DAAS was designed to be a representative survey of all adults of Arab or Chaldean descent living in the three-county region, meaning that we can generalize from our sample to the Arab American population at large in the Detroit region (for technical details on sampling methods, see www.detroitarabamericanstudy.org). We worked closely with representatives of local Arab American communities. Our DAAS Advisory Panel included individuals from more than twenty of Arab Detroit’s secular, religious, civil rights, and social service organizations. During several long planning sessions, our advisors suggested themes to pursue and warned of pitfalls to avoid. They gave input on the questionnaire, provided feedback on its translation into Arabic, publicized the project in their communities, and offered interpretations of our preliminary findings. Given the intense scrutiny Detroit’s Arab communities were already experiencing—in the media and under the close watch of several U.S. government agencies—our sustained collaboration with community leaders and key organizations built trust and enabled us to create a survey instrument that addressed not only
Figure 1.1 Geographic Coverage of the Detroit Arab American Study and Detroit Area Study

Source: Authors’ compilation.
important scholarly issues but also matters of direct concern to people we interviewed.

To be eligible for our survey, respondents had to be at least eighteen years old, live in households in the three-county Detroit region during the survey period, July to December 2003, and self-identify as Arab or Chaldean (Chaldeans are mostly Iraqi Catholics). Arriving at these criteria for inclusion was not simple. Ideas about who is Arab and how that identity should be defined are highly variable, even controversial. Language is frequently mentioned, yet many Arab Americans do not speak Arabic well, or at all, and some people who reject Arab identity speak only Arabic. Generally, descent from parents who consider themselves Arab is important, as is coming from, or having an ancestor who came from, an Arab-majority country. Still, a person might not identify as Arab because she would rather be called American; this same person might watch Arabic satellite television and attend a church where most people speak Arabic. Some people prefer a more precise national label, such as Lebanese, Palestinian, or Iraqi. Others know they have a parent or grandparent of, say, Syrian descent, and are proud of this heritage, but seldom identify as Arab in their everyday lives. Finally, in greater Detroit, there are many people (notably Iraqi Chaldeans) who come from Arab countries, speak Arabic, and share many cultural traits with Arabs, but who do not identify consistently as Arab.

Instead of trying to streamline these alternative forms of identification, all of which are common in greater Detroit, we opted for a flexible, inclusive approach. Our interviewers asked people if there were anyone in their household of Arab or Chaldean descent; in other words, was there anyone in the household who had “parents, grandparents, or ancestors” who were Arab or Chaldean. If people were not sure, they were shown a list of Arab-majority countries and, if further clarification were needed, a map of the Arab world. Using this approach to eligibility, our goal was to conduct 1,000 face-to-face interviews. We obtained 1,016. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) response rate was 73.7 percent, meaning that about three of four people asked to participate in the survey agreed to do so. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the language of the respondent’s choice, English or Arabic. Of the fifty-two interviewers who administered the survey, forty-seven were of Arab or Chaldean ancestry, and thirty-four were bilingual in Arabic and English. The English-language version of the questionnaire is provided on the DAAS website.

The DAS, our companion study, was designed to be a representative sample of the general population living in the counties of Wayne, Oakland, and
Macomb (figure 1.1). The DAS survey population included only eligible adults (age eighteen or older) living in households. Our goal was 500 face-to-face interviews of members of the general population. We obtained 508, bringing the total sample for the combined surveys to 1,524. The AAPOR response rate for the DAS was 56.6 percent, which is about the same as the average response rate for the annual Detroit Area Studies conducted since 1997 (Clemens, Couper, and Powers 2002). The DAS and DAAS were explicitly designed to compare Arab Americans and members of the general population. About 85 percent of the questions were identical in the two questionnaires, permitting comparisons of these two populations over a wide range of topics.

OVERVIEW OF BOOK
The chapters that follow, though varied in analytical focus and perspective, all address the intertwined ideas of citizenship and political crisis in Arab Detroit. Our chapters are in conversation with each other, and central arguments build progressively throughout the book. Still, each chapter can be read as a freestanding analysis, with interpretations and conclusions unique to it. The chapters are organized in three parts. Part I, Community in Crisis, explores the logic and history of Arab American identity formation, laying essential groundwork for our examination of how the 9/11 backlash affected different sectors of greater Detroit’s Arab American community. Part II, Beliefs and Bonds, examines two aspects of community—shared values and social capital. These are essential elements of belonging and inclusion, and each has been questioned in the aftermath of 9/11. Part III, Political Ideology, engages the political and legal dimensions of citizenship, exploring political attitudes among Arab Americans and about them, with special emphasis on civil liberties and U.S. foreign policy, two domains that generate serious contradictions in the way citizenship is extended or denied to Arab Americans. In our conclusion to the book, we build a synthetic model of Arab American citizenship that acknowledges the vital role political crisis has played in shaping Arab American identities over time, giving them distinctive characteristics that are well suited to their location on the margins of multicultural pluralism in the United States today.

Part I. Community in Crisis
In chapter 2, “Arab American Identities in Question,” Andrew Shryock and Ann Chih Lin examine the internal composition of greater Detroit’s Arab
populations—their religious, national, and socioeconomic diversity—to determine how larger, more inclusive Arab American identities are made. Working with data that are both detailed and general, Shryock and Lin show how Arab American identities are shaped by characteristics people bring to the United States from their countries of origin, by the extent to which immigrants and the American-born are incorporated into the larger society, and by the ethnic and racial categories people embrace (and reject) as markers of their personal status and collective identities. Across Arab Detroit, these factors interact to produce a wide range of communities, each with a distinct understanding of what it means to be Arab, American, or Arab American. This process of identity formation is situated within larger political and historical contexts that operate as constraints on the expression and recognition of Arab American citizenship. The authors conclude by discussing the historical emergence of these constraints and how they are visible in the DAAS findings and in the spatial organization of Arab Detroit itself.

In chapter 3, “The Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks,” Sally Howell and Amaney Jamal chronicle the post-9/11 backlash in greater Detroit, focusing on local responses and the role played by the federal government. Because the Arab communities of Detroit are long established and well incorporated, public officials, community activists, and regional media were able to protect local Arab Americans from the more severe forms of public backlash experienced elsewhere in the United States, especially among low-income and recently arrived Arab immigrants. At the same time, however, Detroit’s prominence as a center of Arab immigration and cultural activity attracted the attention of multiple federal agencies interested in locating threats to national security and creating tactical relationships with Arab and Muslim allies in the U.S. war on terror. Howell and Jamal provide a rich portrait of the demographic, social, and historical patterns that make Detroit exceptional, in systematic and telling ways, to Arab Americans in other cities and in the national context. By closely analyzing Detroit’s experience of the backlash, the authors sort out the complex mix of opportunity and insecurity that animates Arab American efforts to engage in public discourse as citizens. They also explore how feelings of coercion and empowerment overlap in attempts to define Arab Detroit as a national resource (a hub of foreign trade and investment, of cultural and linguistic expertise) and a national risk (home to concentrated populations of Arabs and Muslims whose loyalties are endlessly cast in doubt).
Part II. Beliefs and Bonds

In chapter 4, “Belief and Belonging,” Sally Howell and Amaney Jamal consider how participation in churches and mosques shapes ethnic and religious identities, political involvement, and perceptions of discrimination or estrangement from the larger society. Historically, Arab houses of worship have played a central role in the incorporation of immigrants as citizens, but in recent decades, as Islam has taken on a more problematic status in American political culture, this process have begun to work differently for Muslim and Christian Arabs. Howell and Jamal find that Christians are well along the path to full American citizenship. For Orthodox Christians and those who are moderately pious, church attendance leads to greater identification with Arab American ethnicity and greater concern about stereotyping and discrimination. Similar effects are not found among Chaldeans, however, or among those strongly committed to Christianity. Among Muslims, those highly committed to the practice of Islam feel a greater sense of discrimination than other Muslims do. Local mosques do not necessarily foster this sense of stigma, but mosque participation does encourage some Muslims to express their dissatisfaction through the political process. Higher incomes, more education, and increased time in America actually contribute to a sense of marginalization among Muslims (and among some Christians as well). Religious piety and attendance at Friday prayers or Sunday services play a less important role. As Arab Muslims become more American culturally, their awareness of not being accepted as Americans by their fellow citizens grows more acute. These findings suggest that the war on terror, by singling out Muslims and Muslim institutions as potential threats to national security, has denied Muslims the same access to the benefits of citizenship as other Americans.

In chapter 5, “Values and Cultural Membership,” Wayne Baker and Amaney Jamal compare the values of Arab Americans in the Detroit region with members of the general population living in the same area, with Americans nationwide, with the peoples of several Arab nations, and with a large number of other societies around the globe. They use two dimensions of values: a continuum of traditional versus secular values and another of survival versus self-expression values. The first taps a constellation of values about God, country, and family; the second focuses on values about security, trust, tolerance, and well-being. The assimilationist view of citizenship assumes that immigrants attain cultural membership by adopting mainstream values. Baker and Jamal
find that, on average, the values of Arab Americans are closer to those of the Arab world—strong traditional values coupled with strong survival values—than they are to the values of the general population in the Detroit area or nationwide. The strong traditional values of Arab Americans do not vary by legal citizenship, place of birth, language, religion, or residence. Education is one of the few factors that secularizes values. More self-expressive Arab Americans are closer to mainstream American society: they tend to be U.S. citizens, be born in the United States, speak English, and be Christian. Arab Americans who had a bad experience after 9/11 are more survival oriented, and those who received expressions of support and solidarity are less so. Baker and Jamal conclude that how one interprets differences in the values of Arab Americans and other Americans depends on one’s theory of citizenship (assimilationist versus cultural) and one’s frame of reference (local, national, or global).

In chapter 6, “Local and Global Social Capital,” Wayne Baker, Amaney Jamal, and Mark Tessler assess the state of local social capital (that bound to the Detroit region) and global social capital for Arab Americans and for the general population. They use the short form of the Social Capital Benchmark Survey that was included in the DAAS and DAS, as well as questions about transnational ties. Social capital and civic engagement are mutually reinforcing, and each fosters a perception of common bonds with fellow citizens. The authors find that, like other largely immigrant groups in America, Arab Americans have less local social capital than the general population. For example, Arab Americans are less trusting, less involved civically, less involved in voluntary organizations, and less likely to socialize with people from other neighborhoods or other races. Arab Americans do have more global social capital than the general population, however. Once the authors control for immigrant status, as well as immigrant markers such as Arabic language use and enclave residence, the differences shrink between the two populations. The factors that elevate local social capital and depress global social capital are those related to assimilation success: higher education and income. Thus, one way to enhance the social capital of local immigrant communities is to ensure that avenues to economic and educational achievement remain open.

Part III. Political Ideology
In chapter 7, “Civil Liberties,” Ronald Stockton explores the dilemmas of citizenship created by the attacks of September 11, giving primary attention to the problem of equal protection under the law. Although Arab Americans and
the general public are similar in their distress over the 9/11 attacks and in their willingness to support restrictions on civil liberties, large gaps open up between the two populations when restrictions are targeted at Arab Americans. Most members of the general public are resistant to ethnic or religious targeting, but among Arab Americans resistance soars (especially among those at special risk, such as Muslims and noncitizens). Stockton finds that, consistent with national studies, the willingness to restrict rights increases, among the general population, with fear. For Arab Americans, however, the pattern is reversed: those who are afraid and those who had a bad experience after September 11 are more likely to resist limitations on rights. Arab Americans who perceive the media to be hostile to them are also exceptionally resistant, this being an aspect of fear often overlooked. Identity also plays a role. Those proud of their American identity are more accepting of restrictions, whereas those who identify with the term Arab American are more resistant. Finally, some Arab Americans are afraid that extremists of Middle Eastern origin could compromise their position in the United States, and are therefore willing to support limitations on civil liberties to protect the country against those who would do it harm. Stockton argues that Arab Americans are clearly torn between a desire to protect society from future attacks and a fear that their own communities will be targeted.

In chapter 8, “Foreign Policy,” Stockton examines the foreign policy attitudes of Arab Americans. Like members of the general population, Arab Americans form their political attitudes according to ideological, religious, cultural, and informational patterns. Arab Americans are distinctive, however, because they retain ties of affection and concern for homelands that are (or are perceived to be) in conflict with the United States. Whereas some American ethnic groups with homeland ties—Irish, Jews, Vietnamese, Cubans—are seen as supporting policies consistent with American domestic and foreign interests, Arab Americans are associated with foreign regimes and movements that confront U.S. policy. Arab Americans, Stockton argues, are allowed to function as citizens with the right to petition, protest, and object, but only as long as their behavior is not seen as the expression of a collective Arab or Muslim identity hostile to the United States. Four key patterns emerge from Stockton’s analysis. First, there is a consensus among Arab Americans in favor of a Palestinian state. Second, on U.S. policies in the Middle East, most Arab Americans have doubts, but Iraqis, Christians, Republicans, and those proudest to be American were more supportive. Third, on the causes of the September 11 attacks, Arab Americans agree with the general public that U.S. policies toward the Arab
Gulf states and Israel may have been a factor, but few feel that there is a fundamental clash of civilizations. Finally, Stockton argues that some Arab Americans hold back their opinions on the causes of the September 11 attacks. Those with a heightened sense of insecurity, and those who perceive a hostile media, often declined to answer questions about the attacks. In this regard, concerns about the loss of civil liberties combine with foreign policy attitudes to act as a constraint on freedom of expression among Arab Americans.

**Conclusion**

In chapter 9, “The Limits of Citizenship,” Andrew Shryock and Ann Chih Lin provide an integrative conclusion to the book. Using patterns discussed in previous chapters, the authors reassess key assumptions about national belonging. These assumptions affect the way non-Arabs see Arabs, but also influence the way Arab Americans represent themselves to mainstream society. This reciprocal influence is both a practical constraint on the public acceptance of Arab American citizenship and a powerful motivation (for Arab Americans) to express national belonging in broadly intelligible ways. Focusing on popular notions of otherness, loyalty, and political opposition, Shryock and Lin scrutinize widespread beliefs that Arab Americans are not like most Americans and do not really support the U.S. government or feel solidarity with other American citizens. They show how these beliefs distort a more complex reality, foster misconceptions about the relationship between cultural diversity and citizenship, and lead to faulty conclusions about how, and to what extent, Arab Americans identify as U.S. citizens. The authors argue that rethinking the relationship between citizenship and crisis might enable a better understanding of why Detroit’s Arab and Chaldean communities have adapted to the pressures of the war on terror with a resilience many observers find surprising.

**THE DAAS: AN EXPERIMENT IN CITIZENSHIP**

Unlike Arab populations in many other American cities, Arabs and Muslims are not an oddity in greater Detroit. They are a prominent community, with ample representation in mainstream institutions, an influential place in the local economy, and an impressive array of appointed and elected officials. Yet even in greater Detroit, Arab Americans provoke anxiety and are easy targets of harassment and abuse. The DAAS and DAS were designed to make sense of this unusual combination of acceptance and exclusion, which renders Arab
Detroit exceptional in ways that challenge popular conceptions of what American citizenship can mean.

We argue throughout this book that Arab Americans are caught up in highly ambivalent relationships with their own nation-state. As transnational models of human rights and global citizenship flourish in diverse sectors of American society, Arab Americans must continually struggle to assert credible and secure attachment to domestic models of U.S. citizenship. As more and more Americans assert cultural identities that connect them, legally and emotionally, to nation-states and regional cultures that lie outside the borders of the United States, Arab Americans must prove to a larger American society that their first loyalty is to the United States, and that whatever ties they maintain to Arabs and Muslims abroad are not a threat to Americans at large. Along these and other dimensions, it is clear that Arab Americans do not experience citizenship in ways common among their fellow nationals. Understanding the culture of crisis in which Arab (and non-Arab) Americans now live is key to assessing this misfit and changing it.

We began this introduction by claiming that the Detroit Arab American Study intervenes in a process of normalization that obscures the dangers, opportunities, and sociopolitical transformations now reshaping the post-9/11 world. This intervention operates at the level of theory and analysis, but it also operates at the level of method. Our ability to administer the survey—even as the FBI conducted its own interviews and the U.S. military invaded Iraq—depended on culturally sensitive engagements with Detroit’s Chaldean and Arab populations and effective collaboration with key representatives of their communities. For these reasons, the DAAS itself can be seen as an experiment in citizenship, conducted in a moment of political crisis. Its strengths and weaknesses are very much a product of the special conditions in which the study was conducted. We are confident, however, that the significance of our findings will outlive these conditions. The work of citizenship is unrelenting, and for Arab Americans it is difficult work at best. If the past is a reliable guide, we can assume that Detroit’s Arab and Arabic-speaking communities will face new political crises in the future. The DAAS, as a historical benchmark, will provide information and analytical insights that can help people understand these new conditions, when they come, and respond to them intelligently.
NOTES

1. This section is a digest of earlier research done by members of the DAAS team and by other scholars at work in Arab Detroit. Most numerical claims are based on U.S. Census figures or are derived from Kim Schopmeyer’s demographic profile of Detroit’s Arab population (2000). Our more general depictions of Arab Detroit are based on research presented in the works of Barbara Aswad (1974), Sameer Abraham and Nabeel Abraham (1983), Ernest McCarus (1994), Barbara Aswad and Barbara Bilge (1996), Michael Suleiman (1999), Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock (2000), and Sally Howell and Andrew Shryock (2003).

2. Social distance refers to the degree of acceptance or closeness that members of one group have for another group. The findings about social distance and Arab Americans are based on data from the 2004 Detroit Area Study, a representative survey of the adult (eighteen and older) general population living in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties (Farley, Krysan, and Couper 2006). Social distance may be measured in several ways; here, it is the percentage of respondents who excluded each racial-ethnic group (Arab Americans, whites, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics) as contiguous neighbors in the neighborhood that has their ideal mix.

3. About 1.2 million of the total U.S. population of 281.4 million reported Arab ancestry, according to the 2000 census brief on the Arab population (de la Cruz and Brittingham 2003). This population grew by 41 percent in the 1980s and 38 percent in the 1990s. About half of the Arab population is concentrated in five states: California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York.

4. The 2000 U.S. Census estimated the total number of Arab Americans in the three counties to be about 100,000. However, some researchers and community leaders claim that the U.S. Census substantially undercounts people of Arab descent and that the population could be as large as 300,000 (Schopmeyer 2000; David Shepardson, “Metro Detroit Leaders Claim Numbers Undercounted,” Detroit News, June 4, 2002).

5. Chaldeans are a linguistic, ethnic, and religious group (almost all are Catholic) from the Middle East, mainly Iraq. They are mentioned by name in the eligibility protocol for several reasons. First, Chaldeans share life experiences and cultural traits with Arabs, and most speak Arabic as well as Syriac and English. Second, some Chaldeans identify as Arab American and some do not, the proportions of which we wanted to determine with data. Third, greater Detroit is home to one of the largest expatriate Chaldean populations in the world.
REFERENCES


