Voting Your Values and Moral Visions

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Wayne E. Baker
Professor of Sociology
Professor of Management & Organizations
Faculty Associate, Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 USA
(734) 764-2306
wayneb@umich.edu

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Abstract

Controversial exit polls from the 2004 elections reported that “values voters” swung the election in favor of George W. Bush. The controversy about “values voters” is an indication of questions about the changing social bases of political behavior. American politics appears to be becoming less social structural (membership in groups based on class, religion, gender, race, etc.) and more cultural (shared values that cut across groups). This study contributes to research on the cultural or “values” approach. Using data from the 2003 Detroit Area Study, I find that two values scales (traditional/secular-rational values and survival/self-expression values), as well as “moral visions” (absolutism/relativism), are significantly related to voting, party identification, and political ideology, controlling for the social structural bases. For example, voters with traditional values and absolutist moral visions are more likely to vote for Bush and to identify as very or moderately conservative, compared to those with secular-rational values and relativist moral visions. This study suggests that (1) better measures of values may help to understand the role of “moral values” in politics, and (2) “shared values” are a source of social capital—resources that may be mobilized for social action.
Voting Your Values and Moral Visions

The 2004 elections raised anew questions about values and the vote. The National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, conducted for a consortium of media organizations, reported that “moral values” was the top issue for voters, with 22 percent picking it as “the one issue that mattered most in deciding how you voted for president” (Moore 2004). Eighty percent of those who chose moral values said they voted for Bush, only 18 percent for Kerry. Some commentators seized this finding to claim that “values voters” decided the election in favor of Bush, but some polling experts questioned this interpretation. For example, ABC’s Director of Polling Gary Langer argued that the NEP item was a “poorly devised exit poll question” and it produced a misleading result (Moore 2004). Christopher Muste, senior polling analyst at the Washington Post, offers another criticism, based on the national exit polls conducted by the Los Angeles Times since 1992 (Muste 2004). In the 2004 exit poll, 40 percent selected “moral/ethical values” as one of their two most important issues, but this figure is about the same as in the previous two presidential elections: 35 percent in 2000, and 40 percent in 1996. Moreover, fewer “moral values voters” cast their vote for Bush in 2004 than they did in 2000. And, Bob Dole actually got more of the “values voters” in 1996 than Bush did in either 2000 or 2004. Based on these and other results, Muste (2004) concludes that “values voters” are nothing more than a “myth.”

The controversy about the role of “values voters” is an indication of fundamental questions about the changing social bases of political behavior. As elaborated below, scholars distinguish between social structural bases (membership in groups based on class, religion, gender, or race) and cultural bases (shared values that cut across groups). Both matter, but American politics appears to be becoming more cultural and less social structural (e.g., Layman and Carmines 1997). This study contributes to research on the cultural or “values” bases of political behavior by responding to the call for “better measures” of values (Layman 1997:307). First, I employ two scales that measure values in a deeper way than has been done in previous studies. These scales are well-tested in research on values in America (Baker 2005) and in cross-cultural research (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004). I show how positions on these scales—traditional/secular rational values and survival/self-expression values—are related to voting.

2 The other issues included economy/jobs (20 percent), terrorism (19 percent), Iraq (15 percent), healthcare (8 percent), taxes (5 percent), and education (4 percent).
party identification, and political ideology, controlling for a host of social structural variables. (See Data and Measures for details on these scales and other measures.) Second, I introduce a new measure, “moral visions.” Moral visions are worldviews about the location of moral authority: in the “mundane sphere” (the self) or in the “transcendental sphere” (God and/or religion) (e.g., Jaspers 1953; Orrù 1987; Eisenstadt 1982). Moral visions are the presumed basis of the “culture war” (e.g., Hunter 1991). Moral visions are significantly related to social attitudes, religious beliefs, confidence in institutions, political activism, and frequency of attendance at religious services (Baker 2005:85-103). Here, I consider the extent to which moral visions are related to voting, party identification, and political ideology, controlling for the two values scales and social structural variables. Overall, I find that these values scales and moral visions are significantly related to political behavior and beliefs. These findings suggest that a deeper assessment of values may help to understand the role of “moral values” in American politics.

VALUES AND MORAL VISIONS—CULTURAL BASES OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Scholars distinguish between social structural and cultural bases of political behavior. The social structural approach argues that members of the same social group—based on class, race, religion, or gender—tend to have similar political beliefs and to vote the same way. Traditionally, for example, Catholics and Jews have supported Democrats, while mainline Protestants have supported Republicans (Manza and Brooks 1997:39). The cultural approach argues that people who have the same values tend to have similar political beliefs and to vote the same way, even when they are members of different social groups. For example, religious orthodoxy cuts across the traditional divisions of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, with “doctrinal conservatives” from all these religious groups tending to support Republicans and “doctrinal liberals” from all these groups tending to support Democrats (Layman 1997). Current debates revolve around the extent to which cultural bases of political behavior are growing in importance, relative to social structural bases such as class or race (e.g., Manza and Brooks 1997; Layman 2001; Fiorina 2005:70-72).

Instead of evaluating trends, I take a different angle and explore the extent to which better cultural measures account for political behavior, holding constant the usual social structural factors. I use a framework for analyzing values that has been tested and validated in prior research on values in American culture (Baker 2005) and across cultures (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Two
fundamental dimensions emerge from this line of research: a continuum of “traditional versus secular-rational values” and a continuum of “survival versus self-expression values.” These dimensions are based on factor analysis of the ten items in Table 1. (Note that some of these ten items are scales themselves, so the number of individual survey items is greater than ten.) Religion, conservative “family values,” and patriotism are major features of the traditional/secular-rational values dimension, such as beliefs in the importance of religion and the importance of God in one’s life, high levels of national pride, pro-life values (against abortion), and beliefs that children should learn obedience and respect. This scale is correlated with dozens of additional items (Baker 2005). For example, traditional values are correlated with beliefs in heaven, hell, life after death, frequent attendance at religious services, confidence in the nation’s churches, and finding comfort and strength from religion. Secular-rational values emphasize the opposite positions on all these topics.

The locations of nations on the traditional/secular-rational values scale is a function of economic development and religious-cultural heritage (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000). Generally, societies with advanced economies tend to have secular-rational values, while those that are un- or underdeveloped tend to have traditional values. Religious-cultural heritage exerts an independent effect. For example, historically Protestant nations are more secular-rational than historically Catholic nations, even after controlling for the level of economic development (GDP per capita) and other factors. The United States is a major exception to the general pattern: Americans have unusually traditional values, and these traditional values have remained stable over the last two decades even as other advanced democracies were shedding their traditional values (Baker 2005, chapter 2).

America as a whole has stable traditional values, but there is variation internally (Baker 2005, chapter 3). The values of individual Americans range along the traditional/secular-rational values scale, while clustering toward the traditional pole. The same is true for respondents to the 2003 Detroit Area Study. The average score on this scale for a national sample of Americans (from the World Values Surveys) and the Detroit Area Study sample are not significantly different. Using World Values Surveys data on the United States for 1981, 1990, 1995, and 2000, I found that traditional values were significantly related to a “family/life values” attitudinal scale, controlling for moral visions and various sociodemographics (Baker 2005, Tables 3.5 and 3.6). This attitudinal scale is based on four items about
the extent to which prostitution, divorce, euthanasia, and suicide can be justified. Those with traditional values are less likely to see these acts as justifiable, compared to those with secular-rational values. Similarly, traditional values are significantly related to attitudes about the separation of church and state: Americans with traditional values tend to favor closer ties between church and state, such as more influence of religion and religious leaders on government and on how people vote (Baker 2005, Table 3.7).

Given the content of the traditional/secular-rational values scale, and its association with conservative social attitudes, I propose the following hypothesis:

**H1.** The more traditional a person’s values are, the more likely the person voted for Bush, identifies as Republican, and identifies as very or moderately conservative, controlling for moral visions and sociodemographics.

The effect of traditional/secular-rational values on the likelihood of voting in the election is ambiguous. Those with traditional values could be more likely to vote if their values motivate them to do, but the same may be said for those with secular-rational values. Thus, I expect that this values dimension will not be statistically related to the likelihood of voting.

The second dimension—survival/self-expression values—taps a fundamentally different value orientation. This dimension is the second factor from a factor analysis of the ten items in Table 1. Self-expression values include interpersonal trust, tolerance of others, subjective well-being, and political activism. Inglehart’s (1997) materialism/post-materialism scale is one component of this dimension. Materialist values emphasize economic stability and domestic order; post-materialist values emphasize political activism and freedom of expression. Using the National Election Studies, which include the materialism/post-materialism scale (but not the larger survival/self-expression values scale), Layman and Carmines (1997) find that materialist/post-materialist values matter somewhat, but that religious traditionalism is more important. In the two-dimensional framework I use, religious traditionalism is captured by the traditional/secular-rational values scale.

Analysis of data from the World Values Surveys suggests that self-expression values emerge in post-industrial societies with high levels of existential safety and security, and the satisfaction of material needs (Inglehart and Baker 2000; see, also, Fogel’s 2000 concept of “spiritual” or “immaterial” needs). In contrast, survival values are held by those who live under conditions of uncertainty, insecurity, and
economic or political turmoil. Survival values emphasize economic and physical security above all else, and include distrust of others, fear of foreigners, intolerance of outgroups, and resistance to cultural change (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Dozens of other items are correlated with this scale.

America has retained traditional values, but has moved continuously along the survival/self-expression dimension to be one of the most self-expression oriented societies in the world (Baker 2005). As a result, America occupies a unique position on a global “cultural map” that arrays nations along the two scales. As shown in Figure 1, no other nation has stronger traditional values and a greater self-expression orientation. In other words, the space to the right and below the United States on the map is empty. This unique location is another indication of “American exceptionalism” (e.g., Kingdon 1996; Lipset 1996).

The locations of individual Americans on the survival/self-expression dimension vary, as do their locations on the other values dimension. Those with self-expression values are more likely to see the acts represented by the “family/life values” scale described above as justifiable, compared to those with survival values (Baker 2005, Tables 3.5 and 3.6). Those with self-expression values are involved in more voluntary organizations, and have taken or might take more political actions, compared to those with survival values. These political actions include signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. (The World Values Surveys do not include questions about voting or political party preference.)

The relationship between survival/self-expression values and voting in the elections is clear: Because political activism is a component of self-expression values, people with these values should be more likely to vote in general. Hence,

\[ \text{H2. The more self-expression oriented a person’s values are, the more likely the person voted in the 2000 elections, controlling for moral visions and sociodemographics.} \]

Survival/self-expression values should influence choice of candidate if there are significant differences in the policies of the candidates for office, and voters are willing and able to discern and understand these differences. Voters who are survival-oriented would support a “materialist” candidate who focused on economic and physical security, with programs for creating jobs, fighting inflation, protecting domestic industries, and exploiting natural resources. In contrast, voters with self-expression
values, whose material and existential needs are satisfied, would support a “post-material” candidate who focused on such issues as safeguarding the environment, promoting multiculturalism, and ensuring civil rights for minorities and gay rights.

On some issues, Gore was a post-materialist candidate. For example, protecting the environment was one of his chief concerns. In contrast, Bush supported oil drilling in Alaska and logging and road building in natural forests; he opposed the Kyoto Treaty meant to reduce greenhouse gases (Gore was an author of this treaty). Gore supported affirmative action; Bush opposed it. Gore wanted hate crime laws and labor laws to include sexual orientation, and he supported civil unions for gays. Bush opposed all these positions. On other issues, however, the differences between candidates are less clear; often, they seemed to agree on the goals (e.g., education) but disagree on how to get there. Indeed, polls taken around the 2000 elections indicated that voters failed to see real differences between Gore and Bush. Nonetheless, given that there are at least some clear differences between these candidates that express survival/self-expression values, I propose the following:

H3. The more survival-oriented a person’s values are, the more likely the person voted for Bush in the 2000 elections, identifies as Republican, and identifies as very or moderately conservative, controlling for moral visions and sociodemographics.

Moral visions are fundamental beliefs about the location of moral authority (e.g., Eisenstadt 1982; Orrù 1987). Absolutists locate the source of moral values and moral judgment in the “transcendental sphere”—usually considered to be God but it could be society itself (Durkheim) or even abstract ideas (Plato). Absolutism assumes a universal moral code that is independent and separate from the individuals it governs. This “legalistic” approach (Fletcher 1966) applies the same rules to all people at all times in all situations. In contrast, relativists locate moral authority and moral judgment in the “mundane” sphere, making the individual “the final arbiter of truth” (Shanahan 1992:20; Fletcher 1966). Moral visions are not religious beliefs, though they may be related to them. Rather, moral visions are worldviews that reside over and inform religious beliefs (Baker 2005:67-71; Geertz 1973:126). Religious beliefs, in turn, reside over and inform attitudes about social issues and policies (Davis and Robinson 1996:769).

Moral visions are worldviews—“fundamentally different and opposed ways people conceptualize, reason, and talk about life” (Baker 2005:68). As such, they are “radial categories” (Lakoff 1996). These
“are the most common of human conceptual categories” (Lakoff 1996:7). Radial categories define both central tendencies and their variations. Absolutism and relativism are central tendencies, with many variations. But all the variation revolves around these two worldviews. The dual conceptual system of absolutism and relativism is an example of a universal human phenomenon documented by anthropologists, historians, and sociologists—the organization of social thought and institutions in patterns of opposites (Maybury-Lewis and Almagor 1989). “This [pattern] is reported from so many different parts of the world that it is clearly a kind of system that human beings keep inventing and living by, independently of each other” (Maybury-Lewis 1989:1). As Bell (1978:155) put it, “Only man has created dualities: of spirit and matter, nature and history, the sacred [transcendental sphere] and the profane [mundane sphere].” The “culture war” in America is a contemporary expression of this dual conceptual system (Baker 2005, chapter 3). The ultimate source of this culture war, some say, is the irreconcilable conflict between absolutism and relativism (e.g., Hunter 1991; Himmelfarb 2001).

As radial categories, moral visions are related to a constellation of values (Baker 2005, chapter 3). For example, absolutism is related to religious absolutism, conservative politics, and what Lakoff (1996) calls the “Strict Father” or authoritarian family model. Relativism is related to secular individualism, liberal politics, and to what Lakoff (1996) calls the “Nuturant Parent” family model. Therefore, we should expect moral visions to inform choice of candidate and political identification:

H4. Absolutists are more likely than relativists to have voted for Bush in the 2000 elections, identify as Republican, and identify as very or moderately conservative, controlling for the two values dimensions and sociodemographics.

The relationship between moral visions and having voted in the 2000 elections is ambiguous. There is little reason to believe that absolutists would be more or less likely than relativists to have voted. Therefore, I expect that moral visions are not significantly related to the propensity to vote.

DATA AND MEASURES

This study uses data from the 2003 Detroit Area Study (DAS) on information and values in society. The study population is defined to include all adults who were 18 years and older and resided in households in the Detroit three-county metropolitan area during the survey period, April to August 2003. The geographic area of the survey population includes Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties in
Michigan. The survey population includes only eligible adults living in households. Individuals in institutions, living in group quarters or on military bases are excluded from the survey population. The DAS is an area probability sample based on a conventional three-stage sample design, a primary stage sample of area segment units followed by a second stage sample of housing units within area segments, and a third stage random selection of one eligible adult respondent in households with one or more eligible persons.

The sample size for the DAS is 508. The AAPOR response rate is 56.6 percent, which is about the same as the average response rate for the 1997 – 2001 DAS studies (Clemens, Couper, and Powers 2002). Sampling weights were constructed to account for variation in probabilities of selection and non-response rates, and to adjust sample results to match known Census totals for the Detroit three-county area for age, gender, and race. The probabilities of selection varied because a single adult was selected from each household, in effect over-representing in the sample persons who live in households with fewer adults. Non-response rates were higher in some areas than others, and the inverse of the response rates in sample areas was used as an adjustment factor. Post-stratification weights were developed so that the final weighted estimates agreed with Census distributions by age, gender, and race for the metropolitan area. A rescaled final weight, which is the product of all three adjustments, was computed which sums to the unweighted sample size of 508. All analyses employ the final rescaled weight. Missing data were imputed using IVEware, which performs imputations of missing values using the sequential regression imputation method (Raghunathan, Lepkowski, Van Hoewyk, and Solenberger 2001). This program was also used to account for complex design features.

A potential limitation of these data is the passage of time between the 2000 elections and the 2003 survey, and hence the possibility that voters forgot or over-report their vote (Belli, Traugott, Young, and McGonagle 1999). The possibility that values and moral visions changed over this period is minimal. Prior research (e.g., Inglehart 1997) shows that a person’s core values and visions are stable over longer periods than the time between the November 2000 elections and the 2003 Detroit Area Study field period. The geographic focus of the Detroit Area Study is another limitation since it is not possible to generalize to the American electorate from a regional sample. Nonetheless, there is considerable demographic, economic, social, and political variation in the three counties that make up the Detroit area. Thus, it is
possible to examine the extent to which the variation in values and moral visions relates to voting, party identification, and ideological identification.

The dependent variables are four dummy variables: (1) Voted in 2000 elections (1 = yes, 0 = no); (2) voted for Bush (1 = yes, 0 = other), (3) identify as Republican (1 = yes, 0 = other), and, (4) identify as very or moderately conservative (1 = yes, 0 = middle of the road, moderately liberal, very liberal).

The independent variables are the two values dimensions and moral visions. The two values dimensions are the first and second components from a factor analysis of the items in Table 1, over all the nations in the World Values Surveys plus the DAS. Moral visions are measured with an item from the World Values Surveys: “Here are two statements which people sometimes make when discussing good and evil. Which one comes closest to your own point of view? Statement A—There are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. These always apply to everyone, whatever the circumstances. Statement B—There can never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. What is good and evil depends entirely upon the circumstances at the time.” Absolutists selected Statement A; relativists selected Statement B. Because this measure of moral visions is a single dichotomous survey item, it is subject to potential concerns about reliability and validity (see Baker 2005 for how these issues are addressed).

The control variables include these sociodemographics. (1) Age. Youth dummy variable (1 = 18 – 25; 0 = other), middle age dummy variable (1 = 26 – 54; 0 = other); ages 55+ are the missing category. (2) Race dummy variable (1 = Black; 0 = nonblack). (3) Gender dummy variable (1 = female; 0 = male). (4) Marital status dummy variable (1 = married now; 0 = other). (5) Education (five categories from 1 = less than high school to 5 = advanced degree). (6) Household income (four categories from 1 = less than $20K, 2 = 20K – 49,999, 3 = 50K – 99,999, 4K =; 100K+). (7) Employment status dummy variable (1 = working now; 0 = other). (8) Religion dummy variable (1 = Protestant; 0 = other).3 (9) Location of residence dummy variable (1 = suburbs; 0 = Detroit).

“VALUES VOTERS” IN THE DETROIT REGION: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

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3 Following Layman (1997), I created dummy variables for mainline and evangelical Protestants. However, these effects were not significant, so I retained a single dummy variable for all Protestants.
Traditional/secular-rational values are significantly related to the vote and political identification (H1). As shown in Table 2, the more traditional a person’s values are, the more likely the person voted for Bush in the 2000 election, controlling for moral visions and sociodemographics. Those with traditional values are significantly more likely to identify as Republican and to identify as very or moderately conservative, holding constant other factors. This values scale is not significantly related to the likelihood of voting in the 2000 elections, as expected.

Survival/self-expression values are significantly related to the likelihood of having voted in the 2000 elections (H2). As shown in Table 2, the more self-expression oriented a person’s values are, the more likely the person voted in the 2000 elections, controlling for other factors. This finding is consistent with the findings from other studies that people with self-expression values have higher levels of political involvement, compared to those with survival values (Baker 2005; Inglehart and Baker 2000). Contrary to expectations, however, survival/self-expression values are not significantly related to voting for Bush, identifying as Republican, or identifying as very or moderately conservative (H3).

Moral visions are significantly related to having voted in the 2000 elections, holding constant other factors (Table 2). The odds of an absolutist voting in the election are almost double those of a relativist. Moral visions are significantly related to choice of candidate and political ideology, holding constant the two values dimensions and sociodemographics (H4). Absolutists are more likely than relativists to have voted for Bush and to identify as very or moderately conservative, controlling for other factors (Table 2). However, absolutists are not more likely to identify as Republican. Note that the results in Table 2 show only the direct effects of moral visions, but moral visions also have indirect effects via the two values dimensions (Baker 2005:90-91). For example, absolutists tend to have traditional values, and relativists tend to have self-expression values. Therefore, the total effect of moral visions on voting, party identification, and political ideology equals the direct effect shown in Table 2 plus indirect effects via the values dimensions. In other words, the influence of moral visions on values amplifies the effect of moral visions on voting and political identification.

4 The effects of traditional values on voting for Bush remain statistically significant when party identification and political ideology are included as predictors. The effect of moral visions on voting for Bush remains statistically significant when party identification is included as a predictor, but the effect of
I included social structural variables as controls, but a brief consideration of their effects (net of values and visions) lends credibility to the models. For example, age is correlated with the likelihood of having voted in the 2000 elections (Table 2). The young (18 – 25) are the least likely to have voted, compared to older voters. This finding is consistent with the well-documented fact that the young exhibit low voter turnout, and that youth voting has been declining over time (a trend slightly reversed in the 2004 elections). Further, respondents who were 18 – 21 in the 2003 DAS were too young to have voted in the 2000 elections. Education is positively associated with the likelihood of having voted, which is consistent with generally known facts about voting. Similarly, Blacks were considerably less likely to have voted for Bush or to identify as Republican.

Taken together, these findings indicate that “values voters” are real phenomena in the three-county Detroit region. There is a significant tendency for voters with traditional values to vote to Bush, to identify as Republican, and to identify as very or moderately conservative, controlling for the effects of age, race, gender, marital status, education, household income, employment status, religion, and place of residence. In addition, there is a significant tendency for voters with absolutist moral visions to vote to Bush and to identify as very or moderately conservative, controlling for the same social structural bases. However, Bush lost the Detroit region (and Michigan) in 2000, so these “values voters” were not enough to swing the region in his favor. The effect of “values voters” depends on the proportion of the electorate with traditional values and absolutist moral visions, how motivated they are to turnout and vote, and how strongly their values and moral visions influence choice of candidate, compared to other factors. For example, the proportion of Detroit region residents who are absolutist is six percentage points higher than the proportion who are relativists: 51.3 percent versus 45.3 percent are relativists. (About 3.3 percent disagree with both statements about moral authority.5) And, voters with absolutist moral visions were more likely to turnout and vote, compared to relativists. Thus, absolutists had a numerical edge and were motivated to turnout and vote. However, other factors matter and cancel or counterbalance these advantages. For example, race is a much bigger predictor than moral visions: Blacks are much less likely

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5 These figures are similar to the nation in 2000 (World Values Surveys): 49.2 percent absolutists; 46.6 percent relativists; 4.2 percent said that neither statement was true (Baker 2005:79-80).
than nonblacks to vote for Bush (Table 2). Absolutists tend to vote for Bush, but an absolutist who is also Black would be more likely to vote for Gore, controlling for other factors. Finally, voters with absolutist moral visions and traditional values are more likely to vote for Bush, but these are only tendencies—not all of them did vote for Bush. These are some of the reasons why “values voters” did not swing the regional election in favor of Bush.

**CONCLUSION**

The controversy about the role of “values voters” is an indication of fundamental questions about the changing social bases of political behavior. American politics appears to be becoming more cultural and less social structural. This study contributes to research on the cultural or “values” bases of political behavior by employing two values scales and a measure of moral visions that have been well-tested in research on values in America and in other cultures. The findings show that “values voters” are not a myth, though their impact may have been exaggerated. In the three-county Detroit region, there is a significant tendency for those with self-expression values to turnout and vote, compared to those with survival values, controlling for other factors. Voters with traditional values and absolutist moral visions tend to vote for Bush and to identify as very or moderately conservative, controlling for the social structural bases of political behavior (age, race, gender, marital status, education, household income, employment status, religion, and place of residence). However, Bush lost the Detroit region (and Michigan) in 2000. “Values voters” were not enough to swing the region in his favor.

This study shows that “better measures” of values (Layman 1997:307) can improve the understanding of the cultural bases of political behavior in general, and the phenomena of “values voters” in particular. Including an even broader and deeper array of values in future surveys might further illuminate the role “values voters” actually play in American politics. This study also demonstrates that shared values, not just social networks, are a source of social capital—resources that can be mobilized for social action. As Etzioni (2001) argues, community is more than a social network of affect-laden relationships among people, as Putnam (2000) defines it. Community is also a “commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings” (Etzioni 2001:223). Even if the social network is disintegrating (Putnam 2000), shared values can hold the community together (Baker 2005)—and the shared values of voters can impact political behavior.
REFERENCES


### Table 1. The Components of Two Values Scales

#### Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values

TRADITIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:

- God is very important in respondent’s life: .91
- It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination [Autonomy index]: .89
- Abortion is never justifiable: .82
- Respondent has strong sense of national pride: .82
- Respondent favors more respect for authority: .72

(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)

#### Survival vs. Self-Expression Values

SURVIVAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:

- Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life [4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Index]: .86
- Respondent describes self as not very happy: .81
- Homosexuality is never justifiable: .80
- Respondent has not and would not sign a petition: .78
- You have to be very careful about trusting people: .56

(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)

Note: The original polarities vary. The above statements show how each item relates to a given dimension, based on factor analysis with varimax rotation.
Table 2. Binary logit coefficients from regression of voting behavior, party identification, and political ideology on moral visions and values, controlling for social structural bases, 2003 Detroit Area Study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Voted in 2000 election</th>
<th>Voted for Bush in 2000 election</th>
<th>Identify as Republican</th>
<th>Identify as very or moderately conservative</th>
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<td><strong>Moral Visions</strong></td>
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<td>.432*</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>.745***</td>
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<td><strong>Values Dimensions</strong></td>
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<td>-.618***</td>
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<td>.060</td>
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<td>-2.826***</td>
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<td>Married now</td>
<td>.638</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.320</td>
<td>-.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.350**</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>-.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working now</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>-.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.351</td>
<td>.888***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>-.222</td>
<td>-.263</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-.364</td>
<td>-.622</td>
<td>-3.612***</td>
<td>1.391**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 Log-likelihood 482.87 398.56 368.31 560.61
N of observations 508 362 508 508

Notes:
- p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (one-tailed test for moral visions)
- Total sample size for 2003 Detroit Area Study = 508. Respondents who did not vote are excluded from model estimating voted for Bush.
- These results reflect adjustments for complex design features, sampling weights, and imputation of missing data (see Data and Measures for details).
Figure 1. Global Map Based on Traditional/Secular-Rational Values and Survival/Self Expression Values