Franchising Social Change: 
Logics of Expansion Among National Social Movement Organizations with 
Local Chapters

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National social movement organizations with widely dispersed local affiliates have been common since the turn of the 20th Century. And, they have continued to proliferate in recent years. At the turn of the 21st Century approximately one quarter of local U.S. SMOs were affiliates of national ones. Yet little scholarly attention has been directed at describing their common structural forms, the demography of those forms, or the contrasting organizational logics that lead their founders and leaders to prefer one structural template over another.

The recent emphasis upon professionalized national SMOs has diverted attention from an exploration of the role that local affiliates of national franchise SMOs play in facilitating individual activism. This paper makes national SMO franchises and their affiliates the substantive focus and is motivated by an attempt to describe and explain the evolution of the population of national SMO franchises. After putting national franchises into context of the potential variety of SMO forms, I proceed to establish their prevalence of local affiliates among local SMOs with members. Then a number of key dimensions of SMO franchise structure are explored (a commonly recognized name and symbol, articulation between organizational levels, locus of member loyalty, territorial hegemony, locus and scope of control over financial affairs, the selection of goals, tactics and operating procedures and core technologies) with the aim of developing some hypotheses about how national groups decide on the optimum number of local affiliates.

A series of hypotheses are generated based upon the changing meaning of membership, the changing vulnerability of national offices to liability for the actions of local affiliates, and the shifting nature of the primary task specializations of national franchise SMOs. Together, these several hypotheses offer a multifaceted explanation of the fact that the average number of local affiliates of national SMO franchises appears to be declining in recent years.

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While the implications of mass production and large scale administration fill the literature on organizations, the mass production of organizations itself—the cloning of a common set of practices in geographically dispersed units, which is what a chain does—has gone largely unnoticed. (Bradach, 1998)

Introduction

National social movement organizations with widely dispersed local affiliates have been common since the turn of the 20th Century. And, they have continued to proliferate in recent years. At the turn of the 21st Century approximately one quarter of local U.S. SMOs were affiliates of national ones. Yet little scholarly attention has been directed at describing their common structural forms, the demography of those forms, or the contrasting organizational logics that lead their founders and leaders to prefer one structural template over another.

In what follows first I develop taxonomy of SMO forms in an effort to contrast franchised ones with the full range of possible SMO forms. I then offer some empirical support for my claims about the high density of local franchise affiliates in the U.S. Next I describe some key dimensions along which franchise forms may vary from one to another. I do this in order to develop a set of hypotheses about the logics that guide the founders and leaders of national SMO franchises as they make decisions that affect the rate of proliferation of their local affiliates. These decisions and associated ones about local chapter task structures affect the number of SMO members involved as activists at the local level.

My focus in this paper extends the project Mayer Zald and I began several decades ago (see McCarthy and Zald, 2001). We began with the following puzzle: How can we account for the fact that the number of organizations working for social change has been expanding very rapidly while the rate of social activist participation among citizens has not been expanding? Our original solution to that problem highlighted the proliferation of professional SMOs (McCarthy and Zald, 1973), organizations that have more recently been characterized as “advocates without members.” (Skocpol, 1999). The recent quickening of the “decline of civic engagement” debate has drawn increased attention to the explosion of SMOs of this kind as the solution to the puzzle that

1 I thank Jackie Smith and Mark Wolfson for comments on a very early version of the ideas presented here.
motivated us, and that explosion has been documented by careful research (Minkoff, 1995).

I now believe that our original solution to the problem was only part of the answer, and that an exploration of the changing logics of social change franchising can offer an important supplement to it. There now exist important constraints upon national franchises, I will argue, that diminish their enthusiasm for expanding the number of local affiliates. As a result, we find very few modern social movement franchises to have more than 3-400 local chapters. At the same time, the changing rationales for having local members have also dampened efforts to expand their numbers. An important motivation for exploring the shifting logic of social change franchising is the important consequences the number and task structures of its local affiliates have for levels of citizen activism.

A Supply Side Approach to Social Change Activism

When we speak of social change activism we mean acts like signing a petition, attending a peaceful demonstration, joining an SMO, taking part in a boycott, marching in a candlelight vigil, volunteering time to help in carrying out the tasks of a social change organization, giving money, attending meetings, and maybe even taking part in civil disobedience. Relatively few citizens take part in activities like these very often, but when they do, past research suggests that the most important predictor of doing so is whether one is asked to participate in such activities.. (Snow, et al., 1980; Klandermans, 1997; Oliver and Marwell, 1992; Verba, et al., 1995) Of course, there are other relevant factors in accounting for levels of social change activism. Pro-choice advocates do not “March for Life,” even if they are asked. Nor do the poor give much money when solicited no matter their commitment to the cause. And the breadwinner who is committed to the cause but who also has two jobs and several young children is less likely to be able to make it to the SMO meeting.

The importance of being asked to participate draws attention to who does the asking, and for social change activism, it is mostly those who are already involved in the SMOs that create the opportunities for participation. SMOs, among other activities, create volunteer opportunities, stage demonstrations and ask for money. Or they do not. When opportunities are available, people can be asked to take part. As a consequence, we cannot understand changing levels of social change activism without linking them to changes in the population of organizational vehicles that create the opportunities for participation. It is, therefore, the evolution of the SMOs that create activist participation opportunities that is the key to understanding shifting levels of activist participation.

The foregoing account of social change activism corresponds very closely to what revisionist sociologists of religion term supply side ones. (e.g. Finke and Stark, 1992) They argue that religious vitality (by which they mostly mean religious participation) is a function of the supply of opportunities to participate in religious groups rather than the (motivational) demand of potential participants for the availability of such opportunities.
Their research suggests that the extent and variety of opportunities to participate religiously spurs rates of participation. Translated into social change activism, we would expect that the more extensive and the more varied the opportunities to participate in social change activities that are offered to citizens, the higher the levels of participation. This reasoning provides a strong motivation to examine the evolution of the population of social movement organizations during the last several decades, beyond an intrinsic interest in organizational forms and the dynamics of organizational populations..

**Images of Post-WWII Evolution of Activism and SMO Form**

Impressions about the evolution of the population of SMOs over recent decades have been shaped by the great attention that has been paid to examples of the highly professionalized forms. Mayer Zald and I (1973) had Ralph Nader’s Center for Auto Safety in mind as we sketched the parameters of the professional social movement organizational form. It had no members, depended upon grants for financial support and was run by experts who advocated the interests of a class of consumers, in that case, automobile owners.\(^2\) And Theda Skocpol (1999) makes the Children’s Defense Fund (CDF) the poster-child of the professional SMO form. Headed by Marian Wright Edelman, CDF depends upon grants to fund its extensive advocacy on behalf of poor children, and has no members, either individual or organizational.

Many other prominent SMOs of the recent period do have members, but, as many have argued, membership consists mainly of financial support from afar. Public Citizen, Inc., a key SMO of Ralph Nader’s network of organizations is a classic example of the form. It raises most of its resources through direct mail solicitations, and those who donate to the group become members as a result. And other SMOs have both these “checkbook” members as well as more traditional members. So, while Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) claims 3,200,000 members in 2002, the vast majority of them are individuals who have responded to telemarketing appeals to support the organization and have been counted as members because they donates money to MADD.

Such forms of membership are not without meaning for many members (see Minkoff, 1997 and Smith, 1998), and, as I have argued earlier (McCarthy, 1987), the weak social ties that are established by such connection are regularly utilized to mobilize “grassroots lobbying campaigns.”\(^3\) Nevertheless, such membership rarely provides the opportunity for widespread activist involvement for members, and rarely provides any face-to-face contact among “checkbook” members with one another or between them and SMO cadre.

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\(^2\) Nader has during the last three decades spawned a wide variety of advocacy organizations of similar form. (See Power, 1988)

\(^3\) Grassroots lobbying campaigns have become common in the U.S. Business groups and interests groups of many varieties use similar techniques for mobilizing wide, if fleeting, activism on issues. Inept campaigns are known among professional grassroots lobbyists as “astroturf.”
Images of SMOs without members and with “checkbook” members have drawn attention away from a focus on other SMO forms, and, I think, provided a distorted picture of the recent evolution of the population of national SMOs. SMO entrepreneurs have continued to create SMOs that do have members of the more traditional type, and which work to engage citizens into activist involvement in their local communities. It is national SMOs with local chapters that I will emphasize. However, first, let me try to place those SMOs within the range of SMO possibilities before I try to establish their prevalence.

**Toward a Taxonomy of Forms**

I will return to other common dimensions of SMO structure below, but in enumerating the range of SMO varieties I want to focus here upon those of geographical scope and membership. Figures 1A and 1B picture the full range of those possibilities. For the moment let us ignore how units across geographical levels are tied to one another, and the criteria of individual membership. Organizational units within and across any geographical level would be included, as would SMOs with individual members of any kind. Within each type the presence of an X indicates at least one organizational unit at that level. Figure 1A includes all of those forms with some provision for individual membership and Figure 1B includes SMOs composed of single units, at one level or another, as well as organizations of organizations.

**Figure 1A about here**

Type I is the proto-type of the SMO franchise structure. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) are examples of the form. Each has a national headquarters, many state level sub-units and a great many local chapters. Each group enrolls individual members. The Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and the Pacific Institute for Organizer Training (PICO), two congregational based community organizing networks are other examples of a somewhat different variety. Each has a national headquarters, many local groups, and a few state-level structures (one in Texas for IAF and one in California for PICO, for instance) that serve to coordinate their local groups within a state. In each case local groups enroll congregations and parishes as members and members of those units are deemed members. SMOs of this type are quite common.

Types II and VII are variations on I in that they each include local chapters that are connected to either a regional or a national unit. I suspect that Type VII is rare in the U.S. because of the great decentralization of many political and social functions. I expect that most Type I groups were Type IIs before they achieved national scope in chapter representation. I know, for instance, that MADD and ACES began by proliferating

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4 SMOs referred to in this and succeeding discussions are included in Table 1 with information on founding date, sub-units and membership, if any.
chapters in the state in which they were founded, and only thereafter began to recognize chapters in other states.

Type V is one of those forms that have received so much attention lately that I have already mentioned. Public Citizen in a good example of the type. In 2002 the group did not list a membership figure in its Associations Unlimited Profile, but indicated that membership dues were $20, and that a subscription to Public Citizen News was included in membership, listing a circulation of 150,000. I suspect that pure examples of this type are relatively rare, since many groups of this form tend to subsequently form state and/or local affiliates. A good example of this is the National Abortion and Reproductive Action League (NARAL). Originally the group resembled Public Citizen with a membership mobilized by direct mail solicitation and a Washington, D. C. headquarters staffed by paid employees. As the abortion conflict shifted to the state level, NARAL proliferated state level units, and in 2002 lists 29 state groups.

Type III includes what I call free-standing locals, those locally based SMOs without affiliation to other organizations. It also includes (signified by the double XX) local SMOs that are affiliated, in coalitional relations with other local SMOs. At the local level these are probably the most numerous SMO form.

There are many variations of form for the groups that are advocates without members. Type XII depicts the form of CDF, mentioned already. Lacking systematic evidence, it is unclear whether Type XIII is a common one, but a recently formed California group, Children Now, appears to be a state level clone of CDF, lobbying on children’s issues at the state level with a professional staff. Children Now has no individual members. And Partnership for a Drug Free America now displays a Type VIII form with a national headquarters, state-level groups in most every state, and many local groups that are affiliates. The Partnership does not have individual members, however.

It would be grand if we had systematic enumerations of the Social Movement Sector (SMS), all of the SMOs in the U.S. in a time-series covering the last three or four decades, but nothing approaching such a data set now exists. That is why we struggle to get a picture of the recent evolution of the SMS. I now narrow my focus to Types I and VII since I am convinced that it will provide another important piece of answer to Mayer’s and my initial puzzle, but also because these forms compose a quite large part of the SMS.

Glimpses of the Dark Matter

The difficulties in gaining empirical purchase on the SMOs that make up the SMS are well known to scholars of social movement organizations. In contrast to profit-making organizations, there is no comprehensive registration requirement for not-for-profit organizations, an important subset of which are SMOs. Formal Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) charitable status (mostly 501©3 and 501©4 for SMOs) creates a class of registrants for which some organizational information is gathered and disseminated. But the filing of this information by registrants is notoriously incomplete, especially among smaller groups. And, large numbers of small, especially local, organizations do not register. As a consequence, it is very difficult to develop estimates of the extent and form of local SMOs in the U.S. It was the frustration at how this state of affairs has shaped the discourse about nonprofit organizations toward the large national ones for which information is available that led David Horton Smith (1997) to speak of the “Dark Matter” of the nonprofit world—that probably very large part of the sector (in numbers of organizations, if not total revenues) that is hidden from view by a distorted map of it.

Given these well-known difficulties, how might we develop an estimate of the prevalence of franchise chapters at the local level in the U.S.? I have sought evidence developed through a number of different strategies in order to begin to get a glimpse of the prevalence of franchise outlets. Each of these strategies produce estimates indicating a very strong presence of franchise locals.

**Enumerating geographical areas.** Kempton and his colleagues (Kempton, et al., 2001) carried out a broad attempt to locate all of the local environmental groups in two areas. These were the Delmarva Peninsula and the state of North Carolina. They followed up their census by contacting a sample of groups from each area. Twenty-four percent (24%) of the respondent groups on the Delmarva Peninsula were chapters of national groups and 14% of those in North Carolina were chapters of national level groups. The researchers were much more confident of the exhaustiveness of their Delmarva estimate, suggesting that their figure of about a quarter of local SMOs may be affiliates of national ones.

Another 16% of the Delmarva groups and 8% of the North Carolina groups they surveyed were affiliated with a regional alliance. These are Type II groups that are not a focus here. Nevertheless, this suggests that 40% of the Delmarva groups and 22% of the North Carolina groups were affiliated with supra-organizational units, and about 60% of the local groups they surveyed that reported any non-local affiliation were chapters of national organizations.

Bob Edwards and Kenneth Andrews are carrying out a similar enumeration of environmental groups in the State of North Carolina, and their preliminary estimates suggest that the estimate by Kempton and his colleagues of 16% of the local groups being chapters of national organizations is probably an underestimate. (Edwards and Andrews, 2002) Their preliminary estimate, based upon a much more thorough enumeration of local North Carolina groups yields an estimate much closer to the one developed by Kempton and his colleagues for the Delmarva area—about 27% of the local environmental groups.

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5 We would expect the size of SMOs to be inversely proportional to their numbers, as we find with other populations of organizations. Evidence from a variety of sources suggests this to be the case.

6 Kirsten Gronbjerg (1992) completed an exhaustive version of this approach by attempting to enumerate the local population of non-profit social service organizations in Chicago.
Enumerating the SMOs of a movement. MaryAnna Colwell and a number of colleagues surveyed a sample of peace movement organizations (PMOs) that were listed in a directory that had been compiled by a foundation in an attempt to enumerate all such organizations in the U.S. in the mid-1980s. (See Colwell, 19xx) Edwards and Foley found in a recent analysis of the data (2002), based upon the sample survey, that of the small budget, non-national groups (most of which were local), 41% of the population of over 3,700 groups were affiliated with another organization. If similar proportions of local PMOs that are affiliated in any way is of the same proportion as for that we saw for the environmental locals enumerated by Kempton and his colleagues, then we arrive at a similar estimate of about 24% of the local PMOs being affiliated with national movement organizations.

Information on Nationals with Local Outlets based on IRS filings. A number of researchers have used IRS non-profit filing records in an effort to describe populations of SMOs (See Brulle, 2000). The use of these records present many difficulties, some of which I have already described. First, a large proportion of groups have simply not applied for and received non-profit tax status, so they are not included in such records. Edwards and Foley (2002) estimate that more than 40% of the population of PMOs do not have formal non-profit tax status.

But there is another problem inherent in these traces for one interested in estimating the extent of franchise chapter penetration in local communities. It is that many national groups with local chapters apply for “Group Exemptions” and file group returns. The IRS labels the chapters of groups that so file “subordinate organizations.” MADD, for instance files a group exemption, as do many other franchise SMOs.

An analysis was carried out by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (1997) of the 1996 IRS Business Master File in order to estimate the extent of affiliate organizations. They concluded:

“Although the number of parent organizations is small (1,772 in 1996), the number of affiliates is quite large. There were 126,864 affiliates on file with the IRS in 1996, up from 89,584 organizations listed in 1991—a 42% increase. Nearly one in five charitable 501©3 organizations in 1996 was an affiliate.” (Italics added)

“Most affiliates do not file 990 returns, those that are filed annually describing a group’s revenues, expenditures and personnel. According to the IRS Business Master File, 21,169 organizations (17 percent of all affiliates) filed an IRS return within the preceding three years. Of the 105,695 organizations without returns, nearly 73,000 had completed the IRS biannual survey and indicated that their gross receipts were below the filing threshold of $25,000. Another 19,800 did not file because they held religious affiliations. About 13,100 organizations could not be positively tracked. Most likely, these organizations either have ceased to be active or are included on their parent organizations’ group returns.” (NCCS, 1997: 406)
This evidence buttresses that of areal and movement enumerations suggesting that a sizeable proportion of local SMOs, maybe approaching one quarter of them, are sub-units of national, or at least, multi-state, super-ordinate SMOs.

Estimating the Prevalence of National SMOs with local Chapters from the Encyclopedia of Associations. The Encyclopedia of Associations began publishing in 1958 and has been published annually since 19xx. It continues to be published annually in hardcopy editions and is also available on the web as the Associations Unlimited database (http://www.galenet.com/servlet/AU). It has been widely used by scholars.

In Table 1 I have assembled, from this and other sources, a haphazard list of groups working for social change many of which have local chapters and local members. A quick glance shows that many such groups list memberships that are probably mostly local ones. For instance, 9-5, which organizes female clerical workers, and ACES, which organizes women who have difficulties collecting child support from ex-spouses, each show a plausible number of local members. (Approximately 500 members per local chapter for 9 to 5 and about 100 per chapter for ACES) On the other hand a group like MADD lists more than 3 million members while my estimates made in the mid-1980s based upon surveys of chapters yielded an estimate of between 25,000 and 40,000 somewhat active local members and volunteers. (McCarthy, Wolfson and Harvey, 1987) The SMOs listed here give some idea of the range of franchise groups. It shows extraordinary variability of the number of local chapters.

Table 1 about here

Tables 2 and 3 display analyses of groups listed in the 1995 Encyclopedia of Associations for organizations included in the “Public Affairs” category. Not all groups that we might categorize as SMOs are included in Public Affairs category, and many groups are included that we might not conclude are SMOs. Nevertheless, examining this category of national groups provides a glimpse of the extent of franchise structures. Public Affairs groups make up a little over 9% of all groups listed in the 1995 Encyclopedia. In all, eighteen categories of groups are listed. Public Affairs shows the highest rate of growth in numbers from 1959 to 1995 of all categories – there are more than 18 times as many groups listed in 1995 than there were in 1959. (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998:103)

I have divided the total population of Public Affairs groups into three arbitrary founding periods. For each organization listed, the number of regional, state or local groups is listed. With all standard bows to the difficulties with problems of left censoring, we see a pattern that matches our image of trends discussed above—in the latest period,

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7 Pam Oliver (Oliver and Furman, 1989) suggests that local activist groups probably rarely engage even 100 local members in any but the most superficial ways. I will come back to this issue. If a goal is engaging as many people locally in activism as possible, the issue of potential upper limits on group size becomes a relevant factor. The options for doing so are proliferating the number of groups or increasing the size of groups.
as seen in Table 2, there were fewer new organizations founded with any kind of membership. Nevertheless, it is notable that groups with the provision for individual membership of some form remain the most common kind of group.

Table 2 about here

Yet, as seen in Table 3, for those groups founded with any kind of membership, there does not appear to be a decline in the proportion of groups founded that include affiliates at any level over the three time periods. The proportion of groups founded during the three periods that have any regional, state or local groups appears to remain remarkably stable. Most notable is the decline in the mean and median number of local chapters for groups founded after 1969. The median number of local chapters falls by more than half between the first and second periods, and falls a bit more in the most recent period. The pattern for last period that shows a decline may indicate the length of time it takes national franchising groups to establish their desired upper limit of numbers of local chapters has not been achieved by many of the newly formed groups. Or it could indicate the increasing prevalence of different logics of chapter expansion by newly formed national franchising SMOs.

Table 3 about here

In this section I have been able to make a circumstantial case that a significant proportion of local SMOs are actually affiliates of national ones. And, I have also provided some evidence that, while national SMO franchises continue to be founded, the ones founded during more recent years on average create fewer local units. Examples of Nationals founded during each period are included in Table 1. The NAACP and the John Birch Society founded in the first, the National Right to Life Committee and Habitat for Humanity founded in the second period, each display substantial numbers of chapters (1802, 4000, 3000, and 1470, respectively). I have not been able to locate a franchise SMO founded during the last two decades with chapter affiliate numbers of this magnitude. This pattern suggests the emergence of new logics of expansion at work in the more recent period. Describing and developing hypotheses accounting for the evolution of the predominant logics governing chapter expansion in recent periods is the goal of the most of what follows. In the last section I will briefly discuss several research strategies for testing these hypotheses.

Franchise Structures: National SMOs with Local Units and Local Members

The basic characteristics of franchise SMOs, consistent with analyses of for profit chains, include 1) a shared identity, 2) the local production of a social change product, and 3) small geographically dispersed units. (Bradach, 1998) “The unique characteristics of chains leads to four challenges: adding units, uniformity, local responsiveness and system-wide adaptability.” (Bradach, 1998:15) The wide geographical distribution of local affiliates coupled with these central challenges raise many issues of coordination
and control for leaders who design and manage them. These foci of the analysis of franchise structures, drawn from studies of for-profit franchising, provide a useful framework for beginning to think about franchising social change.

Because franchise SMOs are nonprofits, however, some of the issues of central concern to those who study for profit franchising are not so central here. For instance, the literature on for-profit franchising has been dominated by exploration of the logics that govern decisions by national franchisers to expand either by contracting with independently owned local franchisers or by creating wholly owned outlets (or some combination of the two forms). (e.g. Kaufmann, et al., 2000; Williams, 1999; Brown, 1998, Oster, 1996’ Baucus and Baucus, 1996) Such a question seems far less relevant in exploring how SMO franchisers make decisions about how to add units, the question that animates my focus on variability among franchise forms. Nevertheless, I will draw at a number of points on research an thinking about for-profit franchising as I proceed.

As well, the variability among religious denominational structures provide us with guides for thinking about the variability among franchise forms. Sociologists of religion have moved beyond simple distinctions between Episcopal and congregation forms, but the rich variation and evolution of religious denominational form, as will be seen, illustrate some of the dilemmas of choice along certain important dimensions of franchising. In the next section I explore a number of key dimensions along which SMO franchises may be arrayed.

**Dimensions of SMO Franchise Forms**

I now specify what I take to be the key dimensions of the franchise form in the social change arena. For the same reasons it is difficult to establish how prevalent franchise forms may be—lack of systematic evidence—we must depend upon illustrations in order to attempt to map the range of variation along these several dimensions. In addition, as Gaffney notes in his 1980 discussion of the formality of affiliation among affiliates and national nonprofits, “Nonprofit organizations, being considerably less concerned with regulations and taxes, and not at all concerned with profit distributions, and being tied together through beliefs and social objectives, are likely to create informal, indistinct, and uncertain forms and systems of organization.” (1980:26) My surmise is that nonprofit organizations in general and SMOs in particular have are increasingly more likely since Gaffney made this observation to display a concern with regulation and ever more well elaborated and documented organizational forms.
A Commonly Recognized Group Name (Logo and Acronym)

What's in a name? When collective actors choose a name for their formally organized efforts they create an image about the purposes their group embodies and some indication about who they are. Group names typically include “citizen” and commonly convey group-ness with terms such as league, committee, and federation. Many such names become household words when the yield pronounceable acronyms, such as ACLU, SDS, PFLAG, NOW, PETA, MADD, SANE, or commonly understood nicknames, such as Amnesty and Habitat. Many times names are chosen in the early stages of organizational building, and then change as the purposes of the SMOs evolve. So for instance, MADD initially stood for Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, and was subsequently changed to denote Mothers Against Drunk Driving. NARAL initially stood for National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws, and was later changed to denote National Abortion Rights Action League, and subsequently the National Abortion and Reproductive Action League, all the while maintaining fidelity to its original acronym. In the short but organizationally eventful period of seven years the emergent National Emergency Committee of Clergy Concerned About Vietnam, begun early in 1966, became Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV) later that year, Clergy and Laymen Concerned (CALC) in 1970, and, ultimately, Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC) in 1972. (Hall, 1990)

When an SMO develops dispersed units, commonly recognized names can be very useful for a variety of reasons. The name serves, of course, as a sense of common identity among activists beyond symbolizing who the activists are. (Clemens, 1993) A group of citizens in a small community speaking in the name of a well known, widely dispersed national SMO can gain immediate credibility. Its presence in a local community can also signal, yet again, the deep local support that the national conglomerate commands. Widely dispersed groups using the same name have, as a consequence, interdependence with other units in other locations. Because using the same names implies that groups are speaking with a single voice, inevitably disputes arise as to the conditions for the use of SMO name. As well, new groups that form under the name of a nationally know group have distinct advantages. (McCarthy and Wolfson, 1996)

A brief comparison between MADD and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) is instructive here. MADD very strictly regulates the use of its name by local groups. Unless a group complies with a very elaborate set of guidelines of operation, its right to be a chapter of MADD can be withdrawn. A number of local groups have had their charters withdrawn. Others have voluntarily chosen to give up the use of the name, and the associated rights reminiscent of the dispute between national SANE and several of its early chapters that choose to disaffiliate. For the local MADD groups, the name is always seen as an incredible asset, and the right to use it in pursuing collective action is typically only given up reluctantly. On the other hand, some local RID groups that have voluntarily affiliated with the national organization are rather casual in their use of the national name and associated logo. Several of these groups established strong local reputations in the fight against drunken driving before they affiliated with national RID.
In these cases the national leaders are the ones encouraging local groups to as they phrase it "Fly the RID Flag." Their inability to enforce the use reflects the nature of central RID’s relationship with its affiliates that will be discussed below.

The symbolic importance of group name and the advantages that accrue to those who can use it are seen also in the series of struggles around control of CORE in recent years. The Congress of Racial Equality became a widely respected SMO during the salad days of the civil rights movement. When control of the SMO fell into the hands of a leader who pursued very different purposes all the while using the public legitimacy that attached to the organizational name, several other civil rights leaders tried to wrest control of the organization from Ron Innis. Had he pursued these purposes with a different organizational name, I do not believe that the, ultimately unsuccessful, effort to oust him would have been made.

The great advantages of nationally known social change name brands, however, does not mean that all franchise like SMOs make it a requirement of affiliation, or even necessarily promote it. A good example is the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) groups. (Warren and Wood, 2001; Warren, 2001; Rogers, 1990; Rooney, 1995) These are the widely admired local congeration based community organizations that seek to organize and empower poor communities by knitting together local congregations and parishes, the most well-known of which are COPS in San Antonio, Texas and BUILD in Baltimore, Maryland. Although relatively tightly coupled to the national IAF organization through both its control of the appointment of lead organizers of the local groups and ongoing indoctrination of leaders in the tactics of community organizing, each local group has its own name and only rarely prominently displays its status as an affiliate of IAF. As a consequence, despite the presence of IAF groups in many communities across the U.S., the IAF does not have very wide national name recognition. Newly formed groups, therefore, must establish themselves one by one at the local level without the benefit of pre-existing local knowledge of the IAF approach. On the other hand, those same newly forming groups do not carry the potential baggage of their successful co-affiliates in other communities, which, in some cases, has been quite controversial.

It is not obvious how common the IAF practice is among SMO franchises since we do not commonly recognize the local affiliates of groups that do not operate under a clearly projected names and symbolic images. It is worth noting, however, that an early study of for profit franchise contracts found that only a bit more than half of them included any restriction on the use of franchisor trade names. (Udell, 1972)

**Articulation Between Structural Levels**

Analysts of SMOs have often discussed the distinct levels of organizational structures that many of them display. (Lofland and Jamison, 1985; Young, 1989, Zald, 1970; Oliver and Furman, 1988) I have chosen to focus only on those that have at least
two levels and one being national and the other being local. The local groups are usually referred to as chapters or locals. And, national offices are sometimes called headquarters.

As SMO structures are established and evolve, there are commonly recurring debates about if and how to best structure geographically dispersed groups into smaller regional, state or county combinations and which intermediate levels of structure, if any, that will be most useful to pursuing group goals. A variety of factors shape this ongoing decision-making. These include the correspondence between an SMO’s strategy and purposes and the appropriate political unit or units of focus. Many groups combine their local units by congressional district because they invest great energy in attempting to influence the national legislative process. The National SANE/Freeze clustering was organized in this fashion. The Southern Farmer’s Alliance, an earlier SMO displaying franchise-like features organized by county because it was seen as the most appropriate political unit for clustering local groups. (Schwartz, 1976) Regional clustering that cross state boundaries are also common, as for many of the groups enumerated by Kempton and his colleagues (2002) that operate on the Delmarva Peninsula that encompasses parts of Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. For many groups, however, state seems to be the most appropriate choice, especially because of the great decentralization of law-making in the United States.

Another contingency in the choice of sub-national combination strategies is the historical evolution of geographical concentration. So SANE, for instance, developed state units where its chapters were most highly concentrated, New York and California. And, MADD developed state level structures as the concentration of local groups progressed. ACES developed regional clusters based upon their naturally occurring concentration in order that coordinators could most efficiently travel between local chapter locations.

It is my observation that very few, if any, SMOs develop more than three levels of structure, but it is quite common to develop at least one level of intermediate structure between nationals and locals. A primary issue once such an intermediate level is created is how it fits into the authority structure of the SMO. By the late 1980s MADD, for instance, developed quite a few state units—they list 37 such units presently. But during that time, these units, while staffed by state activists, reported directly to the national office, as did the local chapters. So the state units did not serve as an intermediary level of authority in the relations between the national organization and the local chapters. In the case of ACES, mentioned above, regional coordinators were appointed by the central office and did serve as intermediate levels of authority and decision-making. Authority relations between levels of SMO structure are not typically transparent, so I have little evidence upon which to estimate the range of possibilities along this dimension of SMO franchise structure.
Locus of Local Member Loyalty

Franchise SMOs show a variety of patterns of individual membership. These include most prominently 1) membership in a local automatically means that one is also a member of the larger entity; 2) membership in the local is one form of attachment to the national, but the same individual, at the same time, may be directly, without intermediation, a member of the national; 3) a resident of the catchment area of a local chapter may be a member of the national SMO without any connection to the local group; and 4) one becomes a member of the SMO by virtue of attachment to a local, but cannot be directly a member of the national, which is constituted only of organizational members. My synthetic analytic approach to membership criteria, however, may suggest more order to such designations than actually exists. Gaffney (1980:24), in his review of issues of legal liability among non-profit entities, notes “Procedures for becoming a member are often left unclear, as are procedures for terminating their status. Many persons become unwitting members of a nonprofit organization, under that organizations bylaws, by subscribing to a magazine or making a donation.”

The second wave of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) exhibits a classic example of the first form. Local groups enrolled members in the KKK. They became, as a result, members of the national organization. Their connection with the national SMO was mediated through state groups. One could only join through membership in a local group. (Wade, 1998; Chalmers, 1987) This was also the case for the NAACP. (Gaffney, 1980) It appears, also, to be the pattern seen in Habitat for Humanity. (cite) Many modern SMOs, however, exhibit a combination of the second and third patterns, where individuals may join local groups, and, thereby, become members of the national organization or they may join the national organization directly through the mail. This means that in the territory of any local chapter there will exist both SMO members who are connected to it and/or the national organization. This is true for MADD, and also, for ACLU. Let’s call this pattern bifurcated membership.

This is, I believe, the far more common pattern than the first one, among recently formed groups, and it probably is also among groups that were formed earlier but have adapted to the advent of modern technologies. Direct mail and telemarketing technologies have become common among SMO franchises since they can provide relatively stable flows of resources. There are several probable consequences of bifurcated memberships for franchise nationals and their chapters. First, it may put them in competition for members’ resources. For instance, until MADD developed a resource distribution formula acceptable to local chapters it experienced great conflict between locals and the national office over the proceeds of national telemarketing and the rules governing local fundraising. At the same time, conflicts may develop over access to national and local membership lists.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the IAF are examples of the fourth type, multi-tiered structures that are organizations of organizations. For these groups, while there can develop among local members an intense identity with a national movement, there is no conception of membership in a national organization.
Instead, individuals are members of local units that affiliate as corporate members of broader structures.

**Local Territorial Hegemony**

Local SMOs often compete for volunteers, members, financial contributions, gifts in kind, and the attention of mass media, political elites, and the general public (Zald and McCarthy, 1980). Affiliation with a widely recognized national or regional SMO may improve a local SMO's competitive position. This is even more true if the national SMO is favorably viewed among the segment(s) of the local population which the local SMO would like to mobilize. Therefore, it can be to the advantage of a local SMO to obtain a guarantee that other SMOs occupying the same "niche"—that is, groups using the same or highly similar tactical, strategic, and operational formulae, and using the same name—will be excluded from the local area in which the SMO operates. So there may be some incentive on the part of local chapter leaders to oppose the proliferation of additional groups in their communities. Territorial hegemony is widely imagined as one of the key features of for-profit franchise chains, but Udell’s (1972) early survey of franchise contracts suggests that it is not a defining characteristic of them, since he found less than 60% of the contracts to include any reference to “exclusive territory.”

There is great variation, as well, among religious denominations in their policies for granting more or less exclusive territories to local units. At one end of the continuum is the Roman Catholic Church that allocates an exclusive territory to each parish. This policy reduces competition among parishes for the same members. At the other end is the traditional Baptist model where no centralized conception of territorial exclusivity existed, and, in principle, many congregations could compete with one another for members within the same small geographical area. Mainline Protestant groups have tended toward the exclusivity end of the continuum in the U.S., locating churches in a manner that reduces competition among them for residents of the same neighborhood. This process is reinforced by adherence to the policy of comity, a custom that is practiced among some mainline Protestant denominations whereby a church will not be located too closely to where another church already exists. (McCarthy and Hoge, 1978)

From the point of view of the central SMO, it may be desirable to allow only one affiliated SMO to operate in a particular locality. To sanction more than one might create serious difficulties of coordination and control for the central to the extent that several local chapters in the same community may compete with one another for members and resources, as well as notoriety.

In practice SMOs do restrict the number of affiliates in a particular geographic area. MADD, for instance, does not allow more than one chapter in a county, although it has created a new form that it calls "satellites" that allow spin-off groups to pursue specific projects in a county where a chapter already exists. SMOs that use block

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8 Gaffney (1980) distinguishes between congregational and hierarchical, and then specifies a third type, synodal, that he argues blends elements of the other two types.
mobilization through churches and other pre-existing social formations to create local groups may be less likely to depend upon such an exclusive mechanism. Sometimes, it is probably the operation of local norms that limit local expansion of discrete structures such as the pattern seen in the rapid proliferation of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) chapters across college and university campuses during the late 1960’s (Sale, 1973). In the space of a very short time several thousand local chapters of SDS were formed, but there was almost no duplication of chapters on the same campus.

Most SMO leaders probably have a good sense of the scope of their group’s territorial coverage, and can easily provide the geographical boundaries from which it recruits and which it serves, for obvious reasons. As well, funding sources, such as foundations typically ask groups to specify their target areas. The Catholic Campaign for Human Development, for instance, asks applicants who propose to organize the residents of poor communities, to specify the area they intend to serve and from which they intend to recruit members. (McCarthy and Castelli, 1996) When I surveyed MADD chapters in 1986, there was no more than one chapter in any U.S. county. When asked to describe the boundaries of their territory by listing other counties and/or parts of counties within which they recruited members, all respondents were able to do so. Most groups conceived their recruitment catchment area to be broader than their residence county. In 1985 15% of all U.S. counties had a local anti-drunk driving group (either MADD and RID) and those counties included 55% of the U.S. population. Their recruitment counties, on the other hand, included 24 percent of U.S. counties including 67% of the U.S. population. Calculating the geographical coverage of these groups (a total of about 400) by their penetration of media markets showed that their activities would have been covered in markets that included 95% of the U.S. population. (McCarthy, et al., 1987)

Locus and Scope of Financial Control

A key dimension of central-local relations in franchises is the degree and scope of the national headquarters’ control over a local chapter's financial affairs. Theoretically that control may range from very little, with almost no monitoring (as with SDS where the central office had more than enough trouble just keeping an updated list of current affiliates), through simple reporting requirements all the way up to extensive controls that entail spot auditing. In practice, I believe, since most SMO affiliates have relatively little in the way of financial resources central SMO control over the finances of local affiliates tends more toward loose control end of the continuum. There are, however, reasons to suggest that national leaders have a great stake in control of local financial affairs.

When I surveyed local MADD chapters in 1986, I discovered that their median annual revenue was about $1,300 in the previous year. (McCarthy, et al., 1987) And, while some of the local member dues were supposed to be remitted to the national office, in the aggregate that sum was an insignificant part of the total budget of the national office, which at the time was about 8 million dollars. About 15% of the local chapters reported annual revenues of more than $25,000, the trigger to requiring free standing non-profits to file IRS reports. This portrait of local chapter finances mirrors the results
of the analysis of the IRS survey of non-profit affiliates discussed earlier. (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 1997) They found that 17% of the local affiliates has annual budgets under $25,000. None of the local chapters we surveyed owned any property. Some rented space, many used loaned space for an office, and many other groups were located in the home of the President.9

If MADD is at all typical of national SMO franchises, then, whatever tightness of control they might exert over local chapters is probably not motivated by an effort to mobilize greater revenues through local dues pass-through mechanisms. 10 Earlier franchise national offices, such as those of the KKK and the Anti-Saloon League, were motivated by such concerns since they depended to a great extent upon dues pass-through. With the ascendance of other revenue streams for contemporary SMOs, such as direct mail, telemarketing and grants from many institutional sources, dependence upon dues pass through from local chapters appears to have declined in importance.

This does not mean, however, that franchise national’s have no interests in the financial affairs of local affiliates. Since they are both to a varying extent symbolically and legally connected to their local affiliates, national franchise leaders have cause to worry both about the notoriety of scandal as well as potential fiduciary responsibility. First, franchise name brands can be tarnished by financial scandals that involve local affiliates, providing an incentive to avoid them.

Second, many local chapters enjoy the tax-exempt/tax deductible (501-C-3) status by virtue of their affiliation with the central franchise organization. This provides the Central another incentive for exerting some degree of financial control as a result of its fiduciary responsibility for its component parts. For example, local affiliates of national groups that file group exemptions are subject to limitations on the amount of money that can be spent on lobbying for passage of state legislation. Therefore restrictions are imposed by the central organization, as they are by MADD, to protect the whole organization's 501-C-3 status (as the federal tax code and subsequent rulings impose limits on the expenditures of funds for lobbying by tax-exempt/tax-deductible organizations (see McCarthy et al., 1991). Gaffney (1980) terms this general issue the problem of ascending liability. He reviews the substantial case law and appellate rulings about the conditions under which denominational structures can be held liable for the behavior of their congregational affiliates. I have been unable to find much trace of litigation over ascending liability issues for SMO franchises. This does not guarantee, however, that franchise SMO leaders are not privy to legal advice by lawyers from the "nonprofit bar" couched in terms of financial liability since many national franchise SMOs have very “deep pockets” indeed.

9 Udell’s (1972) review of for profit franchise contracts shows, in contrast, how central financial pass-through arrangements are to those franchisor-franchisee relationship.

10 It is important to note that the central office's financial control over a franchise local is often rather weak compared to that seen in business versions of the franchise form. One reflection of this is the fact that central MADD has at times sponsored contests among its chapters in order to encourage greater adherence to the central office's financial reporting requirements.
Selection of Goals, Tactics and Operating Procedures

In this section I take up how the substance of the templates franchises promulgate that allow them to create somewhat uniform social change products in diverse locations are disseminated, monitored and bounded. Many national groups develop signature tactics along with a menu of interrelated goals that are offered to chapters as suggested lines of action. Since these interior elements of SMO franchise operations are not very transparent, I will depend heavily upon my knowledge of MADD and the IAF for examples.

There are a number of mechanisms employed by national headquarters aimed at creating some uniformity in goals and tactics across local chapters. These include the preparation of written materials describing them and, probably more importantly, face-to-face interaction between national and local leaders. MADD, for instance, holds regular workshops for local leaders where many of them are assembled for several days where sessions on goals, tactics and operating procedures are offered. I have attended many of these sessions and they are typically staffed by some combination of experienced local leaders, outside consultants and national office employees. Many of the sessions are premised upon the explicit premise that local conditions vary tremendously, so that leaders must adapt the general templates that are offered to their own specific local circumstances. A wide range of video, audio and written material is made available at these workshops, much of it produced by the central office or by supporting organizations or agencies (such as insurance companies and the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration).

Standard operating procedures were also specified in a Chapter Handbook that included rules about accounting and record keeping, as well as the recruiting and training of volunteers. During its rapid growth phase, MADD required a program of self-study—a sort of "correspondence course"—for the presidents of chapters in the process of forming or chartering. Prospective chapter leaders were required to go through a number of stages before a chapter could become a fully chartered MADD group. The same is true for ACES that provides a 75 page Chapter Handbook to each chapter leader. (Jensen, 1994) It describes the structure of the organization, responsibilities of officers, dues and fundraising policies and procedures for recruitment of members and volunteers.

In the middle 1980’s the primary contact between MADD’s central office and local leaders was the Chapter Affairs Coordinator. The occupant of that position was in regular telephone contact with leaders all across the country, traveled widely making visits to local groups, and made an effort to monitor the activities of those groups that

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11 I ignore in what follows an important issue of local group structure that has traditionally occupied social movements analysts, that of governance. How is local leadership selected, and what are the rules of succession? Does the national have power of selection over local leaders? How much input is there from local members in leadership selection?
displayed signs of weakness or major deviation from the Central office’s understanding of appropriate behavior by chapters.

As MADD matured into the late 1980’s the group experienced conflict between the central office and chapters over a number of issues including fundraising techniques and appropriate behavior. National leaders were particularly concerned with fundraising behavior since the national group had been heavily criticized for its fundraising practices. As well, the national leaders regularly reminded local leaders about the lobbying and partisan political activity restrictions that inhered in their status as affiliates of MADD through its formal IRS registration. Many local leaders were active in lobbying their state legislatures, and few of them came to the drunk driving issue with any previous political experience. It was this particular combination of vigorous agency and political naiveté that caused the national leaders, and their lawyers, so much concern.

One national leader used the “herding cats” imagery to capture what she saw as the difficulties of keeping chapters in line and effectively working toward what the national office saw as important goals, most importantly community awareness of the drunk driving issue. Ultimately, the national office had the weapon of taking control of a recalcitrant local chapter, and, in several notorious cases, MADD central took possession of the offices, files and finances of chapters, and installing new replacement leaders.

In contrast to MADD, the IAF’s control over goals, tactics and operating procedures is more direct through its choice of a local chapter’s “lead organizer.” Rather than attempting to establish bureaucratic control through extensive written regulations, monitoring and social control, IAF selects and intensively trains “community organizers.” Candidates are screened and then given a probationary period of training. If they are retained they move through a series of apprenticeship positions where they work with more experienced organizers until they are assigned the responsibility as a “lead organizer,” who is the main representative of IAF in the local group. As organizers move through this elaborated system they undergo ongoing training in the principles of IAF, so that local groups tend to employ quite similar technologies of organizing poor communities. These include enrolling congregations and parishes as corporate members of the local group, the use of one-on-ones in order to identify and recruit local leaders, and the holding of annual assemblies that bring together members of the group’s constituent units. A signature IAF tactic is the “accountability session.” In a session public officials, including elected ones, are asked to attend. Local IAF leaders outline issues of importance to the group, and ask the officials to make a public commitment of support of the group’s position on the issue in front of assembled members. The performance of officials is used to communicate to the broader membership which of the officials most merits support, and the actions of those who do receive such support can later be assessed in light of the public commitments. In this way, IAF groups can exert great influence upon the policies of elected officials.

IAF groups take an interest in a wide variety of local issues including education, housing and crime. An ongoing deliberative process that includes a wide representation from constituent groups determines which issue any particular group chooses to pursue.
The process by which issues are chosen and the template for building a local group and involving the group in local politics is highly uniform across the IAF groups, and, as well, appears to also characterize the groups that make up other congregation-based networks of community organizations that have modeled their approach after IAF (Gamaliel, Dart and PICO). For all of these groups the template for franchise operation is embedded in the experience of the “lead organizer.” As a result, the proliferation of local chapters occurs much more slowly for them than in groups like MADD, for instance, where chapter proliferation did occur far more rapidly. Table 1 includes crude estimates of the number of congregation based community organizations for each of the four national networks, and, as can be observed, the total number of local chapters still does not reach the present number of MADD chapters.

Core Technologies

SMO franchises can be usefully characterized by their primary specialization along the lines of Minkoff’s analyses of women’s and racial/ethnic SMOs. (1995) She distinguishes between advocacy, service and protest emphases. Many groups combine one another of these primary approaches to social change, and an exhaustive typology probably would include a number of other primary approaches. Public education or community awareness, for instance, has been a primary concern for MADD, what Klandermans terms “consensus mobilization.” Local MADD chapters display a variety of mixes of these general emphases. So do local IAF groups. Some of them, for instance are much more deeply involved in providing low cost housing than others. Pursuing each emphasis requires different skills and is more or less labor intensive.

And the way in which franchise chapters are organized may have implications for the extent to which they may provide opportunities for members and volunteers to take part in their activities. For instance, MADD utilizes a task force model that allows for the development of temporary structures of issue responsibility depending upon member interests. Such an approach, also typical of local NOW chapters, creates the possibility of wider involvement of individual members in diverse tasks by creating a division of labor around issues. The nature of tasks that are created for members to pursue may be broader or narrower, and be more or less divisible and more or less appropriate for any volunteer. The more labor intensive such tasks, the more able groups will be to engage more members for greater levels of commitment (e.g. court monitoring task forces for drunk driving, whereby volunteers observe judges behavior in adjudicating and sentencing drunk driving offenders).

Logics of Franchise Expansion

In this section I briefly spell out the broader processes by which I expect that the population of franchise SMOs evolves over time. Then I propose some organizational level hypotheses that have SMO industry level implications and that are consistent with the foregoing discussion of franchise dimensions.
My conception of the evolution of the SMO franchise population offers nothing special beyond standard treatments (Scott, 1998; Aldrich, 1999). Patterns of national franchise births and deaths along with organizational change on the part of surviving SMOs shape the characteristics of the population through time. There may occasionally be cases of what Rao and his colleagues (Rao and Singh, 1999; Rao, et al, 2000) call weak speciation, by which they mean partial innovation in organizational form. This may occur at founding, and it also may occur as national franchises adapt and adjust their many features over time. My account of franchising, I am aware, privileges agency and organizational rationality. This does not preclude the central importance of institutional processes (Scott, 2001), of course, and, as some examples will make clear, institutional logics shape many decisions by national franchise leaders.

I believe there is good reason to believe that SMO franchise forms are particularly unstable. Such instability stems, importantly, from conflict over authority and control relations between national headquarters and local affiliates, a dimension of franchise structure I have chosen to ignore in the foregoing. As a result of what appears for many franchises to be chronic conflict over such issues, I think many of the franchise dimensions are likely to undergo regular assessment and tinkering.

The reality of creating formally organized structures for doing social change is, instead, typically a series of contested choices about structuring collective effort that result in a process that is best described as "making it up as we go along." Usually, these debates begin with "what do we want to accomplish?" and proceed to "how to get it done?" In the meantime, within franchise conflict creates great instability and may accentuate the impact of institutional processes. Several vignettes provide a glimpse of the process of inventing and tinkering with formal franchise structures. Together, they make clear how haphazard the initial structuring of the inter-relations between franchise levels can be in practice and the extent to which the form of those relations remain open to change.

The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, 1957-8. "An ad hoc venture intended by its founders to serve a temporary educational purpose, SANE was not designed to become permanent membership organization..(Katz, 1986, p. 29)." Originating in the placing of several newspaper advertisements decrying the nuclear threat, "By the summer of 1958 SANE had about 130 chapters representing approximately 25,000 Americans (p. 29)." Willy nilly an organizational structure emerged with a National SANE office, some state groups and many local groups. A red-baiting attack on SANE by Senator Thomas Dodd created an organizational crisis that resulted in the Board of Directors of National SANE establishing "Standards for SANE Leadership" that dictated an anti-communist membership policy to local groups. Many of the local groups "...were not directly chartered by the central office, ..but rather by an intermediate Greater New York Committee (p. 51)." In order to "...have more control over them, [the groups] were now required to take out a charter with the national organization which included..(p. 51)" an anti-communist membership provision. As a result,
"About one half of the chapters in the New York metropolitan area, which comprised one-half of the SANE chapters in the nation, refused to take out new charters and thus were expelled from the organization (p. 52)."

The Anti-Saloon League, 1895-1913. Begun in Ohio by Howard Russell, the Anti-Saloon League was explicitly created along the lines of a "business model." "The role of the local members, therefore, was not to participate in shaping the league's direction but to contribute funds, listen to speakers, volunteer in distributing literature, canvass voters, and serve at the polls on election day (Kerr, 1985, p. 82)." The state executive committee of the League created a systematic plan for helping local Leagues to organize, and increasingly was approached to help organize Leagues in other states. As the League expanded to become national in scope, it "...evolved through experience and expedience (p. 116)." "In devising the constitution of the Anti-Saloon League, the leaders were continually plagued by a major problem (p. 116)." That was balancing the needs and demands of the local groups and members with the aims and interests of the large professional staff employed by the national and state offices. "The reconciliation of these competing needs in the formal, constitutional structure took many years. The league underwent major constitutional changes in 1903 and again in 1913 on the national level and, beginning in 1903 on the state level as well. The result was a complex, evolving mix of authority embodied in the salaried officers, especially the general superintendent, and control of league direction by its constituency (p. 116-70)."

The Southern Farmer's Alliance, 1880-90. A rural populist insurgency, the Alliance became briefly a mass organization speaking for small southern farmers. "[T]he county alliance was...the main organizing vehicle for local economic action...[C]ounty-level leaders were the unsung heroes of the spectacular growth of the Alliance during the 1880's...[T]he locals were essential for recruiting membership...the average county organization contained 700 members...The clubs filtered the membership and developed the understanding necessary for participation in protest activity. The county groups coordinated action and gave the group direction. Between them, they provided the organization with its prime resource--an active, committed, and disciplined membership...State organizations often began as simple coordinators of local action, but their nature soon changed...statewide organization replaced haphazard local expansion with systematic proselytizing across the state. This work was done by full-time state lecturers, individuals usually selected from the ranks of the most successful county organizers. The lecturers invaded new areas, formed new clubs, and inspired local actions. They sold Alliance literature to the new recruits, collected the first round of dues and received commissions as high as $5 for each club organized... Thus, statewide organizing created both a pull and a push toward statewide coordinated activity...The national organization remained weak throughout the history of the Alliance...The locus of Alliance activities flowed from the local to the state but it did not progress further (pp. 105-112, Schwartz, 1976)."
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, 1980-86. MADD began with a single victim of drunk driving creating a local group and, in a few years had more than 300 local groups. Drawing from the report by a management consulting firm hired to evaluate MADD's structure in 1985 and to make suggestions for its future structuring shows the tensions that were created. "To quote a Board Member, describing MADD's development, 'It just happened.'..We believe that MADD could not escape moving from one structure, highly centralized, with very loose coordinative arrangements, to another in which there would be more coordination between chapters and central staff, more connection between chapters, and a clearer allocation of responsibilities and authorities. MADD is now an entirely different organization that it was when it consisted of a few chapters and a charismatic leader. It is bigger, of course. It is also more widely dispersed, with a great diversity of state level organizations. Of particular importance is the absence of any organizational device for monitoring what happens in the chapters. Chapters are chartered by the central office after a searching accreditation process. But once a chapter is chartered the central office has little control over what the chapter does and, often, very little awareness of what it is doing..The State Coordinating Committees[SCCs] do not have any responsibility to report to the central office on any matter. Nor does any SCC have a mandate from MADD to supervise the chapters in its states..No particular method for advancing legislative and law enforcement programs is given the SCC... (Sant'Anna and Weiss, 1966; pp. 8-20)," even though they were very active in legislative activities.

Association for Children for Enforcement of Support. ACES was begun by Geraldine Jensen in Toledo, Ohio in 1984 who was dissatisfied with that state’s child support enforcement mechanism. She reports (Jensen, 1994) that a representative from a local SMO (Advocates for Basic Legal Equality) quickly offered help and “they forced us to sit down and write by-laws and regulations and figure out how we were going to structure ourselves, and how we were going to start chapters. We got stuff from MADD, the Sierra Club and the Boy Scouts. We had a committee and we read through that and we stole a little bit from everybody. We did that during the first four months of the organization. People were coming from all over Ohio and other states—Michigan—so we needed a framework. Mainly we came up with a chapter agreement, which is the document they have to sign that say’s they will follow the regulations. We came up with a structure for a broad that is over the chapters.” The group went on to add paid regional directors to coordinate dense clusters of chapters in California and other areas.

These vignettes provide support for my surmise that franchise SMOs may be subject to especially high rates of organizational change. As a result, one might argue that the franchise sector of the SMI will have been rapidly becoming more homogeneous over recent decades as the entire SMI has been subject to strong environmental forces, especially those relating to the meaning of local membership and ascending liability.
Recall that my analysis has been motivated by a search for the logics upon which leaders rely in choosing desired number of local chapters, as well as the tasks that those chapters create for local members. In for-profit franchises the increased profits derived from adding additional can be expected to lead to expansionary approaches possibly dampened by issues of coordination and control. On the other hand, it appears clear that SMO franchise leaders place governors on expansion. I will specify some families of logics that appear to affect that choice, and then develop some illustrative hypotheses for each family.

Member Logics

It is clear that the meaning of local individual membership for franchise SMOs has changed during recent decades as has membership in SMOs more generally. This change has strong implications for how franchise leaders think about whether to invest resources in expansion of the number of local affiliates. This insight makes sense of evidence I have collected from local MADD affiliates. In my 1986 survey of them, it became clear that many of the groups invested rather little effort or thought in recruiting local members beyond the 20 they needed to be chartered as a chapter. In my 1990 survey of them I asked the direct question “In the last year did your group make any systematic effort to recruit members?” More than 40% of the groups leaders answered no, and the majority of those that answer yes had not put great effort into doing so.

HO 1: To the extent that a National SMO franchise does not need local members as a source of financial support, it will be less inclined to encourage extensive proliferation of local chapters, and, therefore, decisions on chapter proliferation will be governed by other organizational logics.

HO 2: To the extent that a National SMO franchise does not need local members as a source of financial support, its decisions about whether to encourage extensive recruitment of local members will be governed by other organizational logics.

I have worded these hypotheses to apply to individual franchise organizations. However, to the extent that franchise SMOs in general do not need members for financial support, these processes have SMI level consequences.

Organizational Control Logics

When franchise national offices are tightly coupled with their local affiliates through an IRS “group exemption” or explicit written agreements, those offices become liable for some behavior and activities of their chapters. Those liabilities may be financial, or have financial consequences, or they may be regulative, through the
possibilities of sanctions by IRS. In fact, it is not easy to find many cases where franchise nationals have suffered such consequences because of their potential liability. Nevertheless, many franchise leaders are especially sensitive to such possibilities. Organizational decisions making based upon these contingencies is likely to be especially affected by institutional processes through professional contacts between national leaders, through the provision of technical assistance through movement technical assistance providers and through the solicitation of advice from the “nonprofit bar.”

HO 3: National franchises that are tightly coupled (e.g. those that file “group exemptions” and/or have written agreements that connect them) with their subordinate chapters will tend to limit the number of local chapters they form because chapter proliferation expands their vulnerability to violations of IRS regulations, and, hence, their IRS charitable status.

HO 4: National franchises that are tightly coupled with their subordinate chapters will tend to limit the number of chapters they form because chapter proliferation expands their vulnerability to civil liability claims based upon the behavior of local groups.

Core Technology Logics

The activities that franchise affiliates specialize in have consequences for the task structures they create and, therefore, the extent to which they need local members for something other than their ability to contribute financial resources. Volunteer labor is most useful at the local level, but organizing and maintaining it can be quite demanding (Oliver and Marwell, 1992). To the extent that local groups specialize in media strategies to create public awareness or lobbying rather than approaches that entail offering labor intensive services or mobilizing many citizens for political participation there will not be such a great premium for continuing to expand local chapters or to expand the number of local members in them.

HO 5: National franchises that specialize in providing a labor intensive volunteer based local service will encourage the proliferation of local chapters.

HO 6: National franchises that specialize in mobilizing citizens to participate in elections will encourage either the proliferation of local chapters or the size of their membership.

HO 7: National franchises that specialize in advocating for a social movement constituency will tend to limit the number of local chapters they form.

HO 8: National franchises that specialize in lobbying in national legislative, executive and judicial forums will limit the number of local chapters they form.

HO 9: National franchises that specialize in lobbying in state legislative, executive and judicial forums will proliferate more local chapters.
Other Organizational Logics

The families of logics I have discussed, of course, are not exhaustive. Logics of appropriateness (Clemens, 1997), comity, territorial hegemony, and professionalization are others that might be explored to additional factors in the calculus of coming to a preferred number and location of local affiliates. And, hypotheses similar to those I have put forward could be developed for each of them. I have not mentioned professionalism up to this point, but the increasing professionalization of leadership in SMOs generally (McCarthy and Zald, 1973), and most likely, in local affiliates of national franchises particularly is bound to be an important factor. It remains to be thought through exactly how this trend may affect the preference for a desired number of affiliates and/or their task structures.

Toward a Research Agenda

I conclude with brief discussions of several research strategies that might help move forward the testing of some of the claims I have made above.

Analysis of National SMO Franchise Agreements and By-Laws. These documents should be, for the most part, publicly accessible, and, therefore, easily gathered. An analysis of a sample of them would allow one to map empirically the range of some of the franchise dimensions I have discussed above. The Urban Institute project that is in the process of making annual IRS 990 filings easily accessible may facilitate a better grasp on the extent to which national franchise SMOs use the “group exemption” category.

The Encyclopedia of Associations Project. Frank Baumgartner and I (together with Erik Johnson) are beginning a project that will culminate in a time series coding of all entries in the Encyclopedia of Associations for each year that it has been published. The 1995 data for Public Affairs Associations displayed in Tables 2 and 3 above demonstrate the possibilities that exist for addressing some of my claims when this data set is complete.

State and Local Enumeration Strategies. A number of researchers have deployed a triangulated strategy of enumeration of all organizations of some particular types within a specified geographical area. I alluded to the ongoing work of Bob Edwards and Andy Andrews (2002), and to the published examples of Kempton and his colleagues (2002) and Gronbjerg (1992). Kirsten Gronbjerg is now in the middle of an attempt to enumerate all of the nonprofit organizations in the state of Indiana using a similar methodology.

Hyper-Network Sampling Strategies. Hyper-network sampling identifies organizations through sample surveys that include members of them. Every respondent
who lists a membership is then asked for details of the organization, and a sample of organizations is thereby created. This approach is quite useful for sampling populations of associations which are part of the “dark matter.” It has recently been employed very effectively in a study of national religious congregations carried out by Mark Chavez. His analyses suggest that the strategy is most helpful in identifying the very small congregations. The assessment of an enumeration of SMOs in a geographical area with a hyper-network generated sample of SMOs developed from individual respondents in the same area could provide a rigorous check on the adequacy of such an enumeration.

References


Table 1: Selected Examples of National SMOs With Local Outlets***
(Current estimates unless otherwise specified)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMO Name</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>State/Regional</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MADD</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 to 5</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread for the World</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Cause</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORML</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOW</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pax Christi</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAF</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gray Panthers</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACES</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Birch Society</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLAG</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRLC</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td></td>
<td>75**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICO</td>
<td></td>
<td>14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamaliel</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Million Mom March</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARAL</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>People for the American Way</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Citizen</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat for Humanity</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International, USA</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students for a Sensible Drug Policy</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimate by Oliver and Furman (1989) for 1983-84.
*** All other estimates from Associations Unlimited or Named Organization’s website, March, 2002.
Table 2: Percentage of Public Affairs Groups listed in the 1995 *Encyclopedia of Associations* With Members and Without Members, by Founding Period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founding Period</th>
<th>With Members</th>
<th>Without Members</th>
<th>N*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1969</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1995</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>84%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,083</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The 1995 *Encyclopedia of Associations* lists 2,178 public affairs organizations, but only 2,083 of the entries include founding date of the organization.

3/22/02
Table 3: The Number of Regional, State and Local Units for Public Affairs Groups With Members listed in the 1995 *Encyclopedia of Associations*, by Founding Period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founding Period</th>
<th>Regional Groups</th>
<th>State Groups</th>
<th>Local Chapters</th>
<th>Any Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% With</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>% With</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1969</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1995</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The 1995 *Encyclopedia of Associations* lists 2,178 public affairs organizations, but only 2,083 of the entries include founding date of the organization. Of these 1,741 have members.

3/22/02
### Figure 1A: Logical Possibilities of SMO Organizational Form, by Geographical Scope with Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/Regional</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
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<td>0000</td>
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<td>0000</td>
<td>0000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 1B: Logical Possibilities of SMO Organizational Form, by Geographical Scope without Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>IX</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>XI</th>
<th>XII</th>
<th>XIII</th>
<th>XIV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/Regional</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(XX)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(XX)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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