RESOURCE MOBILIZATION BY LOCAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS: AGENCY, STRATEGY, AND ORGANIZATION IN THE MOVEMENT AGAINST DRINKING AND DRIVING

John D. McCarthy
The Catholic University of America

Mark Wolfson
University of Minnesota

Mobilization of resources is a central concern among analysts of social movements. However, little research has focused on factors that influence the types and amounts of resources collective actors are able to mobilize. In this study, data from local social movement organizations opposing drinking and driving are used to assess the roles of agency (i.e., amount of effort), strategy, organizational structure, and nature of national affiliation in the mobilization of resources. Measures of agency consistently predict mobilization of volunteer labor, revenue, and membership. Strategy seems less important: An emphasis on victim services was positively related only to mobilization of members. Organizational structure, particularly the number of task committees, was consistently related to mobilization of volunteer labor, revenue, and membership. Affiliation with a highly visible and highly legitimated national organization, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), appears to have an energizing effect on local leaders while it dampens the effects of agency, strategy, and organizational structure. These results are interpreted within the distinctive political and cultural context of the movement against drinking and driving.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) is now firmly embedded in the conscious map of our day-to-day political and social worlds. The efforts of activists in this movement organization have captured the imagination of the print and electronic media. As a result, the personal tragedies of many of these activists are widely known. Because their mediated messages have commanded our attention, many of us now worry more about who will drive home after an evening of imbibing. And few parents of adolescents are likely to avoid occasional discussions with them about how they will get home from the “party.”

This major shift in public consciousness was accomplished in part by the efforts of local activists who, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, created more than 400 groups dedicated to the eradication of drunken driving in communities across the nation. At the time, these groups were almost exclusively small, volunteer projects. The majority of the founders of local groups linked their efforts to the national structure of MADD by being members of the organization. As a result, they were able to draw upon the resources of the national organization, which provided valuable feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript: David Baker, Ami Chaxton, Bob Edwards, Che-Fu Lee, John Lotland, Doug McAdam, Clark McPhail, Pamela Oliver, David Murray, Brian Powers, Bita Short, Jackie Smith, Suzanne Stangenberg, Debra Swanson, and Frank Weed. The comments of the ASR Editor, Deputy Editor, and anonymous reviewers were also extremely helpful.

1 By the early 1990s, as the movement matured, more than 25 percent of the local groups had hired full- or part-time staff to carry out many of the tasks previously handled by volunteers. This transition was possible because of the increased revenues gained from the widespread adoption of telemarketing (Swanson 1995).

2 Most resource mobilization accounts include money, labor, and legitimacy as key resources (Jenkins 1983). Critics have suggested that the resource mobilization framework overemphasizes the importance of volunteer labor as a resource for collective action (Oliver and Marswll 1992). While it is widely believed that social movements depend on the efforts of adherents and leaders (Oliver 1983; Oliver and Marswll 1992), little effort has been made to assess the extent and variation of the labor contributions of leaders and followers.

becoming local chapters. However, a significant minority of group founders affiliated instead with Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), another federation of local groups. Local activists, whether they became a part of RID or MADD, pursued remarkably similar goals in parallel ways. Most activists were relatively inexperienced, but they came to espouse the potential for individual action that is embodied in the slogan many of them adopted: “You can make a difference.” We explore a key question that has been neglected in analyses of social movements: What are the connections between activists’ levels of effort, choices of strategies, and ways of organizing and their groups’ success in mobilizing resources? We address this question empirically by exploring resource mobilization among local groups against drunken driving in 1985.

AGENCY, STRATEGY, ORGANIZATION, AND LOCAL RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

How resources are mobilized—people, money, and legitimacy—is now a central concern of students of social movements. While analysts differ in their specification of essential resources, it is widely recognized that the types and levels of resources available to and exploited by movements are important influences on movement emergence, growth, form, and impact (Jenkins 1983; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988). But what do we know of the ongoing process of resource mobilization at the local level? What factors influence the types and amounts of resources collective actors are able to mobilize?

Surprisingly, we do not yet have clear answers to these questions. Most often, research mobilization has been examined at a macro level—the level of the social movement and its social, political, and economic environments. Moreover, the emphasis has been on the emergence of a movement (McAdam et al. 1988). In this mode of analysis, various aggrieved populations are shown to have differential access to resources. For example, the student movement of the 1960s had access to a vast pool of volunteers with discretionary time (McCarty and Zald 1977). The southern civil rights movement flourished in part because of its access to a dense infrastructure of solidarity associations, such as black churches, colleges, and chapters of the NAACP (McAdam 1982; Moris 1984). And the character of the environmental and peace movements has been influenced by patterns of access to middle-class professionals (McCre and Markle 1989). Analyses of the extent of mobilization for entire movements during their early stages are useful. However, such analyses largely ignore different patterns of mobilization within a movement. And they do not tell us much about the ongoing process of accomplishing mobilization once a movement has emerged.

Agency, Strategy, and Organization

Three distinct features of mobilization efforts help account for different levels of local mobilization. The first is agency. What difference does individual enterprise make? Common perceptions of movements suggest that agency is the key factor in the development and proliferation of collective action. On the other hand, sociologists typically stress structural factors such as resource pools, grievance pools, and political opportunity structures (McAdam et al. 1988).

Here we use the term agency narrowly to denote the sheer amount of effort activists invest in collective action rather than its caliber. Empirical assessments have aimed to account for the existence, rather than the amount, of activism (e.g., McAdam 1986; Snow, Zurcher, and Ebland-Olson 1980; an exception is Willings and McAdam 1991). As a result, relatively little is known about how variation in levels of activists’ efforts translates into variation in the amounts and types of resources mobilized. We expect that...
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION BY LOCAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

The emergence of local groups againstdrunken driving

The ability of local organizations to mobilize resources depends on their ability to form the cooperation among actors. They may achieve this through various mechanisms, including the creation of a common purpose, the creation of a shared identity, or the establishment of a common strategy. These mechanisms can be used to build a network of actors, which are then able to work together to achieve a common goal.

A common approach to mobilizing community support is to form a network of local groups. These groups can be formed around a common issue, such as drunken driving, and can work together to mobilize resources and support for the movement. The network can be built by organizing meetings, providing information, and developing a shared strategy. The network can also be strengthened by providing technical assistance and support to the local groups.

In the case of the alcohol/drug awareness program, the network was formed by the Alcohol Task Force. The network was composed of local groups, such as schools, churches, and community organizations. The network was able to mobilize resources and support by organizing meetings, providing information, and developing a shared strategy. The network was also able to provide technical assistance and support to the local groups.

In conclusion, the success of a local social movement organization depends on its ability to mobilize resources. This can be achieved through the formation of a network of local groups, which are then able to work together to achieve a common goal. The network can be built by organizing meetings, providing information, and developing a shared strategy. The network can also be strengthened by providing technical assistance and support to the local groups.
community in the United States. The earliest groups became part of RID, but once Madd emerged, the rate of growth of Madd groups far outstripped that of RID groups, especially from 1981 to 1982, the year Madd grew. The growth rate across the local Madd and RID groups was roughly the same, where there were more than 2,000 formal leaders and close to 4,000 volunteers who assisted in 1985. The local groups reported more than 15,000 active local members and over 40,000 supporters who could be contacted through locally developed mailing lists. Despite the differences between the national structures of Madd and RID, the structure of this study local groups were strikingly similar to one another in structure, goals, and activities. Most resembled what Lofland (1993) calls "Mom and Pop Shops" because they depended on the efforts of only a few leaders, often wife and husband teams. One local Madd group charged by Marshall and Allen (1989) could be confused with a Rid group; it even adopted a signature Rid tactic of releasing balloons to honor victims on Mother's Day. Groups crafted similar programs such as designated drivers, school poster and essay contests, alcohol-free proms, and court-monitoring. These program similarities resulted in part from the influence of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which made program literature freely available to the groups and also co-sponsored national conventions (subsidizing local leaders' attendance) where program ideas were disseminated (McCarthy 1994).

THE NATIONAL STRUCTURES OF RID AND MADD

The two national umbrella organizations that knit local groups together, Rid-USA and Madd, developed differently and with respect to each other. Madd has been more successful than Rid in its efforts to establish national structures and to influence local leaders. Madd has succeeded in creating national structures and to influence local leaders. Madd has succeeded in creating national structures that are more successful in raising money for its central operations. By 1984, its national office operating budget was approximately $1.5 million, the bulk of which was raised by direct mail solicitation. In contrast, Rid-USA reported a total budget of only $2.624 for 1984.

A review of press coverage of the two groups in five national newspapers between 1979 and 1985 shows that Madd received far more extensive media coverage than did Rid as a result, Rid did not become known outside of the communities in which it had established strong chapters. The wide and almost universally positive national recognition of Madd has been an important asset for local Madd chapters. Members of Madd have benefited from the advantage of approaching a community already knowledgeable about the group's national activities and predisposed to be supportive. In contrast, Rid activists often began national contacts by first having to explain why they were not associated with Madd.

Rid-USA developed in a bottom-up pattern in which the original members joined, together in a loose confederation. In keeping with this looseness, Rid-USA placed fewer constraints on new groups that chose to join it. Local affiliates in the early 1980s were expected to include the word Rid in their name, adopt bylaws that included the seven substantive goals of Rid, make clear that they were speaking for themselves when taking a stand independent of Rid-USA, provide the Rid-USA with current information on its officers, and pay modest dues of $50 per year (Rid-USA 1982). Each group could decide on its own whether to register as a tax-deductible (501(c)(3)) charitable organization.

Madd, which developed largely from the top down, had an elaborate chartering procedure. 2 The hurdles associated with becoming a Madd chapter in 1984, an application form, resumes of principal organizers, and evidence of understanding of the drinking and driving issue had to be supplied to central Madd. Subsequently, the local group was required to elect officers, adopt Madd's bylaws and policies, submit the names of at least 20 dues-paying members, agree to the "general supervision and control of the national Board of Directors as expressed in the bylaws and such policies as the Board may, from time to time, adopt" (Madd 1984:1), and pay a $200 chartering fee.

10 The differences we find between Rid and Madd umbrella structures are consistent with those shown by Young, Blana, and Bailey (1994) in comparing what they call "federated" structures with corporate nonprofit organizational structures. The Madd-like ("corporate-like") structures are substantially less likely than Rid-like structures ("federated") to require a common logo and common financial and governance procedures of locals.

11 Our assessment is widely shared by observers of this movement. A close observer of the movement and a member of Rid's National Advisory Board states that Rid, "though older seems destiny to play Avis to Madd's Hertz." (Ross 1992:177).

RESOURCES MOBILIZATION BY LOCAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

We now describe the typical array and level of resources mobilized by all the local groups driving issue had to be supplied to central Madd. Subsequently, the local group was required to select officers, adopt Madd's bylaws and policies, submit the names of at least 20 dues-paying members, agree to the "general supervision and control of the national Board of Directors as expressed in the bylaws and such policies as the Board may, from time to time, adopt" (Madd 1984:1), and pay a $200 chartering fee.

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Data Gathering

Data for the following analyses are drawn from a survey of citizens' groups against drunk driving in existence in 1985. First, we conducted a census of these organizations. The census identified a population of 458 local groups operating during 1985. We developed a questionnaire to elicit information on a variety of substantive questions about each organization, its members and leaders, its activities, and the extent and shape of its community involvement. The questionnaire was mailed in 1986 to the president of each local group identified in the census. Respondents provided information about their own background and efforts on behalf of the group, the backgrounds and efforts of the other officers, the composition of the membership, and the activities and structure of the group itself. Follow-ups by telephone and mail were made. Relatively complete responses were received from 370 local groups (a 78 percent response rate).

12 Several complementary strategies were pursued to enumerate the population of local citizens' groups against drunk driving. These included contacting all Governor's Highway Safety Representatives and the two major national umbrella organizations, Rid-USA and Madd, to locate groups meeting our definition. In addition, newspaper and periodical sources were extensively reviewed for mentions of groups that met the criteria for inclusion. Also, as other coalitions of groups were discovered, we solicited information about local groups that were members of the coalition. Finally, as information was gathered from local group leaders, respondents were asked to provide names, addresses, and telephone numbers of any other groups operating in their communities.

13 The decision to rely on a single respondent to provide information for these groups was based on the work of Weed (1989). Weed gathered information from the offices of local Madd chapters and found that each provided substantially the same information about their organization's activities, structure, and processes. The practice of using informants to provide organizational information is common (see Knoke 1990 and Waller 1991).
Measures of Resource Mobilization

We developed measures of membership size, group finances, and labor provided by volunteers. Although not the main focus of our analyses, we also developed measures of media attention and community contacts.

Descriptive statistics and comparisons of MADD and RID groups on these variables are presented in Table 1. Two key patterns emerge. First, the groups are modest in size, financial resources, and mobilization of volunteer effort: They are almost exclusively volunteer-based organizations—only two of the MADD groups and none of the RID groups reported employing any full-time paid staff. Second, there are consistent differences between the MADD and RID groups on all of the measures. Advantages seem to accrue to local groups that affiliate with the more visible and resource-rich national umbrella group, MADD, despite the fact that the RID groups tended to be older.

Groups were typically small, with an average membership of 124 and a median membership of 35. Few groups reported memberships of more than 1,000. The median membership of the MADD groups (36) is larger than that of the RID groups (20). Most groups maintained a mailing list, which was typically larger than their membership but was still modest in size. MADD groups had significantly larger mailing lists than did RID groups. A higher percentage of MADD groups published regular newsletters for general distribution than did RID groups.

When the groups held general membership meetings, attendance was low (median attendance was 12), but typically a sizable segment of the membership attended each meeting (the median was 30 percent of the membership). Attendance at MADD membership meetings was usually larger than that at the RID meetings. Beyond the labor of the group's officers, the typical group could count on a median of 32 hours of work a month from its volunteers. Following the pattern of other mobilization outcomes, MADD groups commanded more volunteer labor than did the RID groups.

Measures of Agency, Strategy and Organization

What accounts for this variation? What roles do agency, strategy, and organization play in explaining variable levels of resource mobilization across groups? What role does the age of a group play? Are there advantages related to affiliation with MADD? Are these advantages direct, or do affiliation interact with agency, strategy, and organization variables (i.e., do MADD and RID groups receive different "returns" on their investment of time, choices of strategies, and mechanisms of organizing group activity)?

Before we attempt to answer these questions, we address the measurement of variables representing agency, strategy, and organization. Table 2 displays three measures of level of agency among the leaders of the local groups against drunken driving. First, we examined the number of hours devoted to the organization on a weekly basis by presidents and vice presidents (as reported by presidents). The typical levels of effort expended by these leaders is impressive, with presidents on average devoting 15 hours a week to the group's efforts. MADD presidents contributed significantly more hours than RID presidents (16.3 and 9.3 hours, respectively).

Making public appearances (face-to-face as well as mediated) on behalf of the group is one of the most important tasks of group leaders and occupies much of their time and energy. On average, representatives of these groups made more than 32 public appearances in 1985 (either on radio or television or in front of groups). MADD leaders made an average of 34.6 such appearances, while typical RID group leaders made 16.3.

We developed measures of a group's emphasis on each of the three general strategies in the context of the fight against drunken driving:
Table 2. Agency, Strategy, and Organization Structure Characteristics of Groups against Drunken Driving, by Type of Group, 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
<th>MADD Groups</th>
<th>RID Groups</th>
<th>Significance*</th>
<th>Number of Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean hours per week, President</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean hours per week, Vice President</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of public appearances per year</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative action</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim services</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public awareness</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of task committees</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of officer meetings per year</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of membership meetings per year</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significance level of t-test for difference between RID and MADD groups; n.s. = not significant.

emphasis on victim services, the greater the mobilization of volunteer labor. An emphasis on public awareness should increase a group's exposure to broader audiences, facilitating fundraising and recruitment of members. Similarly, legislative advocacy and victories should result in greater public exposure, resulting in greater success at garnering human and financial resources. On the other hand, strong pursuit of a legislative agenda could create opposition that might reduce access to financial resources. 20

Three measures were developed for a group's internal organization of activities. These are the number of general membership meetings per year (a mean of about 7), the number of task committees (a mean of less than 2), and the number of officer meetings (a mean of about 7). MADD groups tend to have significantly more task committees than do RID groups, there is a negligible difference between them in the number of officer meetings per year, and the MADD groups hold significantly more general membership meetings than do the RID groups. 21

However, these groups, in spite of the differences between them, are typically small, almost entirely volunteer, and modestly funded.

PREDICTING MOBILIZATION OUTCOMES

Membership size, hours of volunteer labor per month, and amount of revenue per year are the measures of resource mobilization used to explore the empirical connections between mobilization and agency, strategy, and organization. We asked each group to provide an estimate of local membership at the end of 1985 as well as the group's 1985 revenue. We then asked a series of questions about the number of volunteers and how many hours volunteers typically worked during a month. With this information we developed an estimate of volunteer hours per month. The distributions of all three dependent variables are highly skewed, so we used their natural logarithms in the analyses. We began by inspecting the bivariate relationships, which are consistent with our general expectations: With one exception, each of the measures of agency, strategy, and organization is positively related to each of the resource mobilization outcomes (not shown). The exception is the absence of a relationship between the number of membership meetings and membership size. The pattern for MADD affiliation for the most part mirrored the comparisons seen in Table 1—affiliation with MADD is associated with higher levels of membership, volunteer labor, and revenue. Age of the organization is related to membership and revenue—older groups are larger and richer, but do not have more hours of volunteer labor.

We then modeled the joint effects of our measures of agency, strategy, and organization, along with age of group and MADD affiliation, on levels of resource mobilization. We checked all possible interaction effects between MADD affiliation (MADD = 1, RID = 0) and each of the agency, strategy, and organization variables, as well as the organization's age, retaining only significant interaction effects. The results are shown in Table 3.

In the model predicting hours of volunteer labor, the number of public appearances is positively associated with hours of volunteer labor. The other agency variables—president's hours and vice president's hours—are unrelated to hours of volunteer labor. None of the measures of strategic emphasis is related to volunteer labor. This is somewhat surprising given our expectation that offering extensive victim services, which is a labor-intensive enterprise, would require that groups mobilize large pools of volunteer labor. The number of task committees is positively related to the amount of volunteer labor. Lastly, neither an organization's age nor its affiliation with MADD is related to the mobilization of volunteer labor.

Turning now to the revenue model, among our measure of agency, only the number of public appearances is related to revenue level. For strategy and organization, however, three statistically significant interaction effects emerge. The effect of MADD affiliation on revenue appears to be indirect, oper-
Table 3. Unstandardized OLS Coefficients from the Regression of Mobilization Outcomes on Selected Independent Variables: Groups against Drunken Driving, 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Mobilization Outcomes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hours of Volunteer Labor</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Number of Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s hours per week</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.012**</td>
<td>.017**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President’s hours per week</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.020*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of public appearances</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.007***</td>
<td>.056**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Appearances x MADD affiliation)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.052*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative action</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim services</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.1483***</td>
<td>.166*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Victim services x MADD affiliation)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.734***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public awareness</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.262**</td>
<td>.054**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of task committees</td>
<td>.243***</td>
<td>.063***</td>
<td>.900***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Task committees x MADD affiliation)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.448**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of officer meetings</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.218**</td>
<td>.026*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Officer meetings x MADD affiliation)</td>
<td>-.197**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of member meetings</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>-.028**</td>
<td>-.042**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MADD affiliation</strong></td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.389**</td>
<td>.761*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age of group</strong></td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.024**</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>1.513*</td>
<td>3.716***</td>
<td>1.905**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>.364**</td>
<td>.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-statistic</strong></td>
<td>7.921***</td>
<td>11.533***</td>
<td>14.379***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of groups</strong></td>
<td>252</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

Finally, age of an organization is positively associated with group revenue, as expected. The adjusted $R^2$ of .364 suggests that the variables included in this model do a reasonably good job of predicting revenue levels.

In the membership model, there is a clear relationship between agency and membership size. All three measures of agency—president’s hours, vice president’s hours, and number of public appearances—are positively associated with membership. The model also identifies a significant interaction between MADD affiliation and number of public appearances. The effect of number of public appearances for RID (b = .056) is much stronger than the effect for MADD (b = .056 - .052 = .004). This pattern of results means that public appearances are more strongly related to membership levels for RID leaders than they are for MADD leaders. Also, the advantage that accrues to MADD groups for mobilization of membership is greater at low levels of public appearances.

Among the measures of strategy, only an emphasis on victim services is positively associated with membership levels. Finally, organizational factors are consistently related to membership levels: The number of task committees and the number of officer meetings are both associated with mobilization of membership. On the other hand, in this multivariate model, the number of member meetings is negatively associated with size of membership. In the multivariate analysis, affiliation with MADD is significantly related to high levels of membership. To our surprise, group age is not related to membership levels.

**Group age**. The causal priority of group age in accounting for mobilization level seems the most easily assumed. However, while the relationship between group's age and the three mobilization outcomes was positive and statistically significant at the bivariate level, only in the case of revenue does the relationship hold in the multivariate models. We are confident in interpreting this effect—the longer a group has existed in a community (up to the point when we gathered data) the greater the annual revenue it was able to generate. But group longevity did not predict membership size or hours of volunteer labor when other group characteristics were taken into account. These patterns imply that the process of mobilization of material resources is in some way distinct from the mobilization of labor and membership.

**Agency: Difficulty in establishing causal priority is most obvious in assessing the relationships between the recent efforts of leaders and mobilization outcomes: Does leader effort generate mobilization outcomes, or does broader movement momentum create community demand that spurs greater leader effort? An outpouring of community support for a local chapter of a widely known and highly legitimate group like a MADD chapter may lead to greater effort on the part of leaders than would be the case in their absence. This could account for the observed differences in level of effort between MADD and RID leaders.**

We developed a few pieces of longitudinal evidence that allow us to assess whether leader’s effort affects mobilization, or vice versa. We assume a constant level of community response to a group between 1985 and 1990. This seems to be a reasonable assumption because the kinds of community characteristics—level of public regardingness, level of charitable activity, and so on—that create such demands should change rather slowly. Earlier analyses (McCarthy et al. 1988), for instance, demonstrate that the socioeconomic level of communities is most important in accounting for foundings of groups against drunken driving in local communities—more affluent communities spawn more foundings. If the socioeconomic level of a community is also a reasonable indicator of community’s past response to a group once it has formed, then our as-

**Interpreting the Results: Problems of Causal Order**

We have framed our hypothetical accounts and structured our analyses assuming that the causal processes of interest involve agency, strategy, and organizational structure, alone or in concert, resulting in variable mobilization outcomes. However, because our evidence is derived from a cross-sectional survey, we are obliged to establish the plausibility of our assumptions about causal direction for many of the relationships we have explored.
Thus, it seems plausible that emphasizing not well-organized and mobilization research and we were unable to capture details of the relationships between groups and individual participation, not well-organized membership relations. Such a situation was prevalent in our finding that members of the local group were affiliated with M and E, but not with the M and E. The many instances of self-help and organizational activities, which is the basic idea of voluntarism, were not discovered.

**Organizational structure.** We found that groups of contacts more involved in local participation were not well-organized and that they had low levels of membership. The main effect of organizational activities was the increased number of task committee members. Facilitating the basic idea of voluntarism, we decided to conduct an analysis of organizational activities involved in the M and E.

**Membership.** With the exception of the number of members in the early stage, leadership of membership meetings related to each other, such as the number of members, participants' involvement, and organizational autonomy increased. In all the analysis, the basic idea of voluntarism did not create more task committees to accomplish organizational goals. But our observation shows that organizational meetings, discussions, and interviews are required to be successful and regulate the number of members recruited. The leadership of the organization and organizational autonomy provided the basic idea of voluntarism.

**Control** The number of task committee members increased, fostering members' consistent control with respect to their expectations. Memberships are likely to follow leadership and reach expectations. Leadership, criteria should be developed for membership. M and E, leadership, criteria should be developed for leadership, criteria should be developed for membership.

**Drawing again the picture of organization in our analyses support the Bivariate correlation coefficient between the two stages for the M and E, but the coefficient for the M and E is less than that for the number of task committee members to be 0.38 (p = .01).

**SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION.**

**What do our results imply about the general role of agency, structure, and organization in the mobilization of financial and human resources?** Leadership of organizational activities, represented by local accountability measures, are strongly linked to volunteering on victim services. Emphasis on victim services is strongly linked to volunteering on victim services.

**Volunteer labor is critical to local social movement efforts. The mobilization of financial and human resources to support local volunteer groups is less likely to be predictable than the mobilization of members' support for volunteering on victim services.**

**Volunteer labor is critical to local social movement efforts. Our results suggest, first, that the organizational activities, represented by local accountability measures, are strongly linked to volunteering on victim services. Emphasis on victim services is strongly linked to volunteering on victim services.**

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more money for all groups. This pattern may be the consequence, in part, of the fact that some RID chapter leaders interpreted victim services to include "court monitoring," which RID-USA strongly encouraged local groups to pursue. This consists of volunteers sitting in court while drunken-driving cases are being handled, monitoring the process, and publicly criticizing judges who have not been harsh enough on violators. Such action can be construed as service to individual victims, but it is more confrontational than most of the direct service efforts of local groups against drunken driving.

Except for the victim services x MADD affilia-
tion interactive effect on revenue, all of the interac-
tion effects suggest that while leaders of MADD groups typically work harder, the relationship between their level of effort and resource mobilization is weaker than that for the RID groups. This pattern resembles patterns noted in neoinstitutional analyses of organizations (Meyer 1970; Powell and Dimaggio 1991): Groups in strong institutional environments prosper as much on the basis of their legitimacy as on achieving their instrumental goals and objectives.

Energizing effects. What explains agency differences between MADD and RID? They could result from several processes, including (1) selection effects resulting from MADD's more stringent criteria for group chartering, (2) wider interest and enthusiasm for MADD groups that result from the wide legitimacy and knowledge of MADD, or (3) direct chartering effects whereby leaders associated with a highly prestigious national organization are energized by that involvement.

Differential selection processes, which may result in more energetic individuals be-
coming MADD leaders, may account for the differences in levels of effort. The elaborate hurdles to becoming a MADD chapter may screen out many potentially "uneenergetic" leaders. On the other hand, RID, as shown by a perusal of its Chapter Directory in 1985, included many individuals and a number of

...23 We used the measure employed by the Independent Sector researchers (Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1988) to measure past volunteer activ-
ism: "Some people are active in community groups (i.e., church, civic, fraternal, political, and social). How active were you in any such groups during the last year?" Response categories were "very active," "somewhat active," "not very active," and "not at all active." We also found that in 1985 the number of local members was significant predictor of the mobilization of both financial and human resources. The number of public appearances made by leaders and the number of task committees fielded by a group was strongly related to the level of legitimacy, and opposition by powerful, moneyed, organized interests (Marwell and Ames 1979; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Olson 1971).

The...24 Our data show that the leadership of local MADD chapters, however, suggests that any such energizing effects are not directly produced by contact with the national or-

these effects (if the net cross-sectional rela-
tionships can be treated as causal) general? We speculate that the impact of a broad task committee structure on resource mobilization should be general across social movement organizations and volunteer citizen groups of all kinds. We see no reason why the advan-
tages of decentralizing group tasks for mobiliz-
ing resources should be greatly affected by variable features of local groups such as the level of local support (widespread versus narrow) or the nature of their tactics (rally versus unruly).

But the consistent positive effect of the number of a leader's public appearances on resource mobilization may be far less gen-
el. Almost all of these leaders, regardless of their national affiliation, found widespread sup-
port in the communities in which they worked for their general goals, as well as for most of their specific policies. This prompt-
ed our analyses as a "consen sus" variable.22 Such widespread support may guarantee that the sheer number of pub-
lic appearances is related to the mobilization of resources regardless of the manner in which they are staged and the social location of their audiences. On the other hand, for con-
flict organizations that encounter local opposition, some public appearances may not promote resource acquisition. If so, then we would expect the effect of the gross num-
ber of public appearances to hold more strongly when the goals of a movement en-
joy widespread community support.

The differential effects of agency on re-
source mobilization for the two coalitions of groups were unexpected and seem paradoxi-
cal. MADD leaders appear to expend more effort than do RID leaders—energized, we think, by their being part of a large, well-known, and highly respected national federation (Stetke 1995). Yet MADD leaders mo-
bilize fewer resources per unit of group ef-
fort than do RID leaders. Thus, MADD chap-
ters to some extent reap the benefits of na-
tional name recognition regardless of lo-
cal performance; RID chapters, on the other hand, enjoy fewer "legitimacy benefits" from na-
tional affiliation, and so mobilization de-

22 See McCarthy and Wolfsong (1992) for an ac-
count of this movement that hinges on its articu-
lation with a mainstream consensus.
pends more on local efforts and organizational structure. This pattern suggests that other things being equal, local unaffiliated social movement organizations and other voluntary associations may overcome the disadvantages of the lack of pre-existing legitimacy by being well organized and working harder.

John D. McCarthy is Ordinary Professor of Sociology and a Member of the Life Cycle Institute at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. He continues his research on protest events, the policing of protest and the role of social movement organizations in the mobilization of citizen action. He spent the 1995-1996 academic year as a Senior Fulbright Research Scholar at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. He is co-author (with Jim Castile) of Power Organizing (Helen Holt, forthcoming) and co-editor (with Doug McAdam and Mayer N. Zald) of Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Mark Wolfson is Assistant Professor in the Division of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, at the University of Minnesota. His research focuses on the interaction of collective action by citizens and professional groups and the work of state actors in shaping public policy on alcohol and tobacco use. A second focus of his research is the unintended and untested effects of alcohol and tobacco policy. His recent work has appeared in Social Science Quarterly, Addiction, and the American Journal of Public Health. He is currently working on a book about the tobacco control movement.

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