This manuscript is an early and incomplete draft of a paper prepared for an invitational Conference on Organizations and Social Movements to be held the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor on May 11-12, 2001. This version should not be cited or quoted without permission of the authors.
Introduction

There is little question that two of the most active and creative arenas of scholarly activity in the social sciences during the past four decades have been organizational studies (OS) and social movement analysis (SM). Both have been intellectually lively and vigorous in spite of the fact that scholars in both camps began their projects during the early 1960s on relatively barren soil. Students of OS took up their labors alongside the remnants of scientific management, their human relations critics, and scattered studies of bureaucratic behavior. SM scholars were surrounded by earlier empirical work on rumors, panics, crowds and mobs together with a “smorgasbord” of theoretical perspectives, including the collective behavior, mass society, and relative deprivation approaches. (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988, p. 695) In both situations, prior work provided scant theoretical coherence and little basis for optimism. Moreover, in this early period no connection existed or, indeed, seemed possible between the two fields since the former concentrated on instrumental, organized behavior while the latter’s focus was on “spontaneous, unorganized, and unstructured phenomena.” (Morris 2000, p. 445)

OS began to gain traction with the recognition of the importance of the wider environment, first material resource and technical features, then political, and, more recently, institutional and cultural forces. Open systems conceptions breathed new life into a field too long wedded to concerns of internal administrative design, leadership, and work group cohesion. SM studies also began to revive because of increased recognition of the environment—not just as contexts breeding alienation or a sense of deprivation, but as the source of resources, including movement members and allies—as a locus of opportunities as well as constraints. In addition, SM scholars increasingly came to recognize the importance of organizations and organizing processes.
Resources must be mobilized and momentum maintained for movements to be successful, and both tasks require instrumental activities and coordination of effort: in short, organization.

Since the onset of the modern period, then, both fields have flourished and there has been some interchange and learning. The learning to date, however, has been largely uni-directional. SM scholars have been able to productively borrow and adapt organizational ideas to their own uses; OS scholars have been far less opportunistic in taking advantage of movement ideas. (We detail this imbalance below.) Recent developments in each field, to our eyes, suggest a pattern of complementary strengths and weaknesses. If this is the case, then increased interaction of the two sets of scholars, with heightened collaboration and diffusion/adaption of ideas and methods, should be especially beneficial.

Today, as we ease into a new century, we see signs of increased interest and interaction among participants in the two fields. We seek to encourage this interchange and to help to insure that the ideas flow in both directions. Both of us believe that the most interesting problems and greatest advances in the sciences often take place at the intersection of established fields of study.

In section I of this paper, we outline in broad strokes the development of the two areas, paying particular attention to weaknesses in one field that might be redressed by insights from the other, and we begin to sketch a general framework that draws on recent work from both fields of study. In section II, we pursue the development of concepts designed to move from an organization or movement focus to an organizational field approach and from a static to a more dynamic examination of change processes linking movements and organizations.
In section III, we illustrate the power and generality—and, inevitably, point up the limitations—of our schema by applying it to two “cases” on which each of us has previously worked. The first case involves contention over health care during the period 1945-1995, a situation that Scott and colleagues have studied (Scott, Ruef, Mendel and Caronna 2000). The second case involves contention over civil rights during the period 1946-1970, a set of developments that McAdam has examined (McAdam 1982/1999). Both cases occurred in the same country, the United States, and in the same general historical period, but beyond that they differ in many ways, as our analysis attempts to make clear. If the framework can be helpful in examining these varied situations, it is likely to find applications to other times and places.

Two Bodies of Work

No attempt will be made to provide detailed overviews of what have become two substantial, diverse literatures. Rather, our brief review is intended to identify broad trends as well as lacunae or weaknesses in each area that might be addressed by strengths and insights in the other. We conclude this section by noting some recent signs of convergence,

Social Movements

Beginning in the mid-1960s, a group of young scholars, including Gamson, Tilly, and Zald, began to formulate more explicit organizational and political arguments to account for social unrest, converting the earlier focus on “collective behavior” to one on “collective action”, “social movements”, and, even, “social movement organizations.” (Gamson 1968; 1975; Tilly and Rule 1965; Zald and Garner 1966). Some of this work usefully built on a theoretical perspective spearheaded by OS scholar Selznick (1948;
1952) and advanced by his students (including Zald), that employed an institutional perspective to examine the ways in which tensions between value commitments and survival concerns shaped the development of an organization. SM scholars reframed the view of protest and reform activities from one of irrational behavior—a flailing out against an unjust universe—to one involving instrumental action. Rather than stressing common grievances, SM theorists focused attention on mechanisms of mobilization and opportunities to seek redress. While sharing broad similarities, two somewhat divergent approaches gradually emerged.

Zald and colleagues, in crafting their resource mobilization perspective, privileged organizational structures and processes. (Zald and McCarthy 1987) Drawing on developments in OS, these theorists stressed that movements, if they are to be sustained for any length of time, require some form of organization: leadership, administrative structure, incentives for participation, and a means for acquiring resources and support. Embracing an open systems perspective, the importance of the organization’s relation to its environment—social, economic, political—was underscored. Following the early lead of Michels (1949 trans.), analysts were sensitive to the contradictory and complex relation between organizing and bureaucratizing processes and retaining ideological commitments. (McCarthy and Zald 1977). More so than in mainstream OS, this work stressed the central role of power and politics, both within the organization and in its relation to the environment. (Gamson 1975; Zald and Berger 1978)

A complementary political process perspective was pursued by Tilly and his associates. Though probably best known for its stress on shifting “political opportunities,” (and constraints), this “external” focus on the political environment was always joined with an “internal” analysis of the “critical role of various grassroots settings—work and neighborhood, in particular—in facilitating and structuring collective
action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, p. 4). In many situations, the seedbed of collective action is to be found in preexisting social arrangements that provide social capital critical to the success of early mobilizing processes when warmed by the sunlight of environmental opportunities that allow members to exploit their capital. (Tilly 1978; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975)

**Organizational Studies**

Foundational work by Simon (1945) and March and Simon (1958) provided important building blocks in identifying the structures and processes that undergird “rational” decision-making, supporting the systematic collective pursuit of specified goals. This seminal micro administrative behavior approach was soon joined by a number of more macro perspectives emphasizing the relation of the organization to its environment. An early and still widely employed modern, macro perspective on organizations, contingency theory, emerged in the mid-1960s as a widely-used guide for research on the adaptation of organizations to their environments. (Lawrence and Lorsch 1966; Thompson 1966) Organizations that were better able to match their structural features to the distinctive demands of their environments were expected to be more successful. Contingency theory continued to focus on those organizational features and processes that were thought to be most distinctive to organizations, allowing them to serve as rationally-constructed collective instruments for goal attainment.

Within a decade, however, a number of alternative theoretical perspectives were developed—we focus on developments at the macro level—that shifted attention to less rational, more “natural” political and cultural conceptions of organizations. The organizational ecology perspective, applied primarily at the population level of analysis, resembled contingency theory in its focus on the material-resource environment.
However, emphasis shifted to organizational survival, rather than efficiency or effectiveness, with analysts expressing skepticism regarding any straight-forward linkages between performance and persistence. (Hannan and Freeman 1977; 1989) Resource-dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and conflict theory (Collins 1975; Clegg and Dunkerley 1977) directly challenged rationality-based conceptions of organizational design and operation, arguing instead the central role played by power. Resource-dependence theorists directed attention to the political implications of asymmetric exchange processes while conflict theorists resurrected and refurbished Marxist arguments viewing organization as fundamentally structures of dominance and exploitation.  

Neoinstitutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983) emerged during the same period, calling attention to the role of wider cultural and normative frameworks in giving rise to and in sustaining organizations. These theorists asserted that organizations are evaluated in terms of their “social fitness” as well as their performance: legitimacy and accountability are as, if not more, important than reliability and efficiency.

In sum, OS experienced a highly creative period during the past four decades that witnessed the development and testing of several somewhat conflicting, somewhat complementary theoretical perspectives. Rational system models have been joined and challenged by political and cultural models; all embraced open systems assumptions. (Scott 1998) The general trend in theoretical frameworks and research designs has been both up and out: “up” to encompass wider levels of analysis and “out” to incorporate more facets of the environment.

Complementary Strengths and Weaknesses

Even this brief review begins to showcase some of the obvious strengths of past theoretical work in the two areas and to suggest important differences. First, many SM
theorists had the perspicacity to embrace OS concepts and arguments fairly early and adapt them for use in their own theories. But, in doing so, they retained their distinctive focus on social process. They have given particular attention to phenomena such as the mobilization of people and resources, the construction and reconstruction of purposes and identities, the building of alliances, and the crafting of ideologies and cultural frames to support and sustain collective action. By contrast, OS scholars have devoted more attention to structure, both informal and formal, within as well as among organizations. While there are important exceptions that feature process approaches—e.g., case studies such as Selznick (1949), Blau (1955), and Barley (1986); change-oriented analyses such as Fligstein (1990), Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), and Van de Ven et al. (1999); and ecological and evolutionary studies such as Hannan and Freeman (1989), Baum and Singh (1994) and Aldrich (1999)—the vast majority of OS works focus on structure. More so than SM, OS scholars have emphasized organizations over organizing, structure over process.

A closely related difference pertains to the origins of organizations. Only very recently have OS students concerned themselves with the creation of organizations—with entrepreneurship and organizational “genetics” (see Aldrich 1999; Suchman forthcoming; Thornton 1999). SM scholars, in contrast, have spent much time and effort in attempting to discern the conditions under which new (movement) organizations arise and do or do not succeed in gaining sufficient mass and momentum to survive and flourish.

A third difference pertains to the scope or level of analysis employed by the two sets of scholars. Although there are important exceptions, most SM scholars have been relentlessly movement-centric in their research designs, focusing either on a single movement organization—e.g., the Knights of Labor (Voss 1993) or on organizations of the same type (an organizational population), such as chapters of Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (McCarthy 19xx). Even though McCarthy and Zald (1977) were quick to appropriate the concept of industry (or organizational field) from OS, they and others have generally employed it to examine the effects of other, alternative and rival, movements on a focal movement organization and population rather than consider the industry or field itself as the subject of analysis. Exceptions to this generalization include McAdam's (1982/1999) study of the civil rights movement, which included an examination of the major movement organizations and their sources of resistance and support, and Clement's (1996) analysis of the alternative forms utilized by groups active in the American labor movement during the period 1880-1920.

While OS scholars have conducted many studies of individual organizations and organizational populations, they also in recent years have expanded their concern to the industry or organizational field level. In this respect, the concept of organizational field developed by OS students represents a valuable new analytic lens. As defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 143), a field refers to:

those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services and products.

(See also, Scott and Meyer 1983; Scott 1992) The concept of field identifies an arena—a system of actors, actions, and relations—whose participants take one another into account as they carry out interrelated activities. Rather than focusing on a single organization or movement, or even a single type of organization or movement (population), it allows us to view these actors in context. Representative studies include DiMaggio's (1991) analysis of the high culture field, Fligstein's (1990) study of the transformation of corporate forms in the US during the 20th century, and Dezalay and Garth's (1996) examination of the emergence of an institutional framework for transnational commercial arbitration.
A fourth difference pertains to the treatment of power in the two literatures. SM scholars have from the outset emphasized the crucial role of power and politics in social life. These studies are replete with discussions of activitists, bloodshed, conflicts, contentious uprisings, challenges to authority, polarization, rallies, repression, riots, sit-ins, strikes, and tactics. For their part, thanks to the enduring legacy of Max Weber and Karl Marx, OS scholars also recognize that organizations are systems of domination, so that issues of centralized decision making and control loom large. However, with only a few exceptions—e.g., scholars such as Clegg and Dunkerley (1980), Perrow (1986) and Pfeffer (1981; 1992)—OS students have opted for the Weberian rather than the Marxist framing. Their subject has been institutionalized power: power coded into structural designs and bolstered by widely shared cultural norms and ideologies. They have attended less to the ways in which power in and among organizations operates in unintended or unconventional ways to challenge or change existing structures. In general, the benign frameworks of administration and management—of authority, technology, and rational design—or those of institutionalists—of taken-for-granted beliefs, normative systems, and entrenched routines—have trumped naked power and politics in OS.

Thus, while both camps attend to power, they focus on different aspects of power, on different moments of power processes. SM scholars have tended to limit their purview to what McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) term “transgressive contention”—change efforts that require the conscious mobilization of marginalized or disenfranchised elements. By contrast, OS students have largely restricted their attention to “prescribed politics” (McAdam 1999), involving the activation and reproduction of institutionalized authority.

One final difference between the two scholarly areas can be identified. While SM students have focused on incipient or nascent power to the neglect of established power
they, somewhat paradoxically, have concentrated on collective action aimed at influencing official governmental policies and systems—the authoritative structures of public order—to the neglect of more localized and specialized regimes. Their preferred subjects of study have been broad, society-wide movements aimed at affecting politics with a capital “P”. OS students have been more willing to examine the operation of governance activities and structures that are targeted to specific sectors of the polity involving more delimited policies and players, such as professional and trade associations. Wholey and Sanchez (1991, p. 743) develop a closely related distinction, differentiating between “social” and “economic” regulation. Social regulation pertains to governmental policies that “cut across industries,” affecting all workers, the environment, civil rights. Economic regulation tends to be “industry specific, focusing on market structure and firm conduct within markets.” SM theorists have focused their studies on movements aimed at influencing social regulatory policies; OS scholars have emphasized forces and factors affecting economic regulation. We view this distinction as congruent with our own but slightly narrower, since its exclusive concern is governmental policies. We, of course, attend to governmental policies, but also to the actions of what Selznick (1969) has termed “private governments”: organizations and associations that are empowered to exercise governance functions in specified arenas—e.g., professional or trade associations.

In sum, OS and SM arrived on the scene at about the same time, but have tended to go their own ways, rather like twins separated at birth. OS has concentrated on stability; SM on change; OS on existing forms, SM on emerging forms; OS on prescribed politics, SM on contentious politics; OS on sector-specific, SM on society-wide systems. Finally, OS has been more hospitable to employing field-level approaches while SM has favored movement-centric models.
**Looking Forward**

Our objective in this review is not to diminish past efforts or to take sides but, drawing on the strengths of each camp, to discern promising directions for future work. Learning from the SM scholars, we are convinced that future approaches will benefit from embracing a process framework. Studies of structure need to be augmented by greater attention to structuration. Learning from OS scholars, we believe that the organizational field level represents a particularly promising vantage point from which to view organization change. If treated longitudinally, the field level is particularly hospitable to the study of dynamic systems. As the boundaries of single organizations (including movements) and organizational populations become more blurred and permeable, as new forms arise and as linkages are forged between existing forms, a field-level conception becomes indispensable to tracing the complexities of contemporary changes.

Rather than choosing between the other two dimensions—established vs. emergent power and society-wide vs. sector-specific arenas—we prefer to propose a framework that encompasses both. If we cross-classify them, we can characterize in broad strokes the fundamental division of labor that has developed between OS and SM scholars. (See Figure 1) Generally speaking OS analysts have concentrated their energies in quadrant 1: the study of established organizational forms operating in specialized sectors or arenas, such as education or the automobile industry. For their part, SM scholars have focused primarily on quadrant 4: the study of emergent and challenging social movement organizations targeting society-wide concerns, such as women’s or worker’s rights. What of the two remaining quadrants? Quadrant 2, established society-wide governance structures would seem to be more the realm of general and political sociologists, although SM theorists must take these systems into account, as context, since they provide the background of opportunity and constraint for
any social movement. Quadrant 3, emergent industries, has received relatively little attention until recently but is currently a growth area in OS and economic sociology, as detailed below.

This division of labor appears to be serviceable enough although, on reflection, it can be seen to be too tidy and overly simplified. First, societal sectors and broader societies are not air-tight containers, but interdependent and interpenetrated. A social movement originating in a specialized arena—e.g., consumer safety concerns in the automobile industry—can be generalized—as consumer rights—and diffuse into other specialized sectors as well as national debates. Second, all the quadrants are composed of both established and emergent organizational forms, although their numbers and influence will vary greatly over time. The so-called “established” arenas—whether entire societies or sectors such as healthcare services—can undergo fundamental change, as prevailing conventions are questioned and entrenched interests challenged. In such situations, attending to the structure and actions of both established and emergent players is critical to understanding subsequent processes and outcomes. Relatedly, it is wrong to concentrate on either contentious or prescribed politics as if they were mutually exclusive. Transgressive contention occurs in established organizational settings, as Zald and Berger (1978) have insisted. And social movement organizations clearly confront and themselves utilize prescribed politics. In short, OM scholars need to be more attuned to the suppressed or emergent forces at work while OS scholars, for their part, need to sensitive to the actions and reactions of established organizations as well as to the increasing institutionalization of power within SM organizations. And, of equal importance, may there not be other types of power processes, currently overlooked or understudied, that would be illuminated if the lens of SM and OS scholars were employed in combination?
Returning to Figure 1, and focusing on those quadrants that do not represent the natural territories of either SM or OS scholars, there has been promising recent work in both quadrants 2 and 3. A number of scholars have drawn freely on both organizational and movement ideas to consider organizational change at the societal level (quadrant 2). Important studies by Fligstein (1990), Davis and colleagues (Davis and Greve 1997; Davis and Robbins 2001), and Palmer and colleagues (Palmer et al., 1995; Palmer and Barber, forthcoming), among others, depict changes over time in the structural forms and strategies pursued by major American corporations as a consequence of contests between owners and various breeds of managers, the networks in which they embedded, and shifting norms and cognitive models. These studies all focus on the largest U.S. corporations, treating them as a single, society-wide organizational field.

As for quadrant 3, a growing number of organizational scholars—primarily evolutionary and institutional sociologists—have examined the multiple forces at work—technological, economic, political, institutional—in creating and sustaining a new type of product or a new industry. (See Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Powell 1999; Suchman 2001; Van de Ven et al. 1999). All of this work recognizes the importance of both established and challenging actors with their contending interests, as well as established and challenging ideas and norms that inform, motivate and constrain action.

We applaud this work and can learn from it, but our primary interest is in strengthening research in the more conventional areas of OS and SM—quadrants 1 and 4. It is our hope, then, that these two research arenas can be combined—or, at least, brought into close juxtaposition enabling more productive intercourse between the two fields. Our aim is to begin to craft a broader and stronger foundation for describing and explaining organizationally mediated social change processes in modern societies.

**Constructing a Framework**
To illustrate and advance a growing convergence between OS and SM scholarship, we draw on our own recent writings that, we believe, exhibit surprising and promising synergies and parallels. We begin with the framework proposed by Scott and colleagues, then turn to review that developed by McAdam and associates. The two schemas were developed at about the same time, but were independently conceived.

In an attempt to develop a framework to guide the comparative and longitudinal study of institutional change in U.S. healthcare systems, Scott and colleagues (Scott, et al., 2000) differentiated among three components of institutions:

- **Institutional Actors**—(both individual and collective) that “create (produce) and embody and enact (reproduce) the logics of the field.” (p. 172)

  Actors serve as both agents who are capable of exercising power to affect and alter events and rule systems and as carriers, who embody and reflect existing norms and beliefs.

- **Institutional Logics**—the “belief systems and associated practices that predominate in an organizational field.” (p. 170)

  As Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 248) note, institutional logics provide the “organizing principles” supplying practice guidelines for field participants. It is possible and useful to identify dominant logics that reflect the consensus of powerful actors as well as secondary and/or repressed logics representing other, subordinated interests.

- **Governance Structures**—refer to “all those arrangements by which field-level power and authority are exercised involving, variously, formal and informal systems, public and private auspices, regulative and normative mechanisms.” (Scott et al., 2000, p. 173)

  “Jurisdiction has not only a culture, but also a social structure,” as Abbott (1988:59) has pointed out. Some of the most interesting recent work in political sociology has explored
the wide variety of governance structures at work at the level of societal sectors or organizational fields. (See, e.g., Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1991.)

Scott and colleagues view institutions as being comprised of these components, and, as we detail below, gathered data on each as a way of assessing change processes linking institutional arrangements and organizational systems. Unbeknown to them, SM scholars had constructed earlier a remarkably comparable framework to guide comparative research on social movements. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996, p. 2) identified three broad factors as important in examining “the emergence and development of social movements/revolutions”:

- **Mobilizing Structures**—the “forms of organization (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents” (p. 2)

The structures include all those “meso-level groups, organizations, and informal networks that comprise the collective building blocks of social movements” (p. 3). As is apparent, the focus is on emergent organizations rather than established ones.

- **Political Opportunities**—the “structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement” (p. 2)

This concept points to the clear linkage between “institutionalized politics”, which define the structure of opportunities and constraints, and social movements that arise to challenge and reform existing systems.

- **Framing Processes**—the “collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action.” (p. 2)

Symbolic elements mediate between structural parameters and the social actors, as actors collectively interpret their situation and devise remedies and proposed lines of action.
We detect a strong affinity between these two conceptual schemas. Scott and associates’ concept of institutional actors corresponds closely to McAdam and colleagues’ notion of mobilizing structure. Note, however, that the concept of institutional actors tends to privilege established actors whereas the concept of mobilizing structure favors emergent actors. Scott and associates were developing lens to examine changes in a highly institutionalized field, while McAdam and associates were crafting frameworks to assist them to explain the emergence of new forms that challenge the existing order. The concept of institutional logics connects to that of framing processes. Both refer to ideas and belief systems, and recognize the role they play in providing direction, motivation, meaning, and coherence. However, the former tends to emphasize the power of dominant ideologies and shared cognitive frameworks whereas the latter stresses challenging ideologies and conflicts in beliefs and values. The strategic framing of ideas and frame-alignment processes are particularly salient to groups that are suppressed or that attempt to challenge dominant logics. (Snow et al. 1986)

The concept of governance structures relates to that of political opportunities. In examining governance structures, OS scholars, including Scott and colleagues, tend to emphasize the constraints imposed by existing arrangements. By contrast SM theorists, including McAdam and colleagues, stress the presence of opportunities afforded by weaknesses, contradictions, or inattention by governing authorities. (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996) In fewer words, OS institutionalists stress “structures” while SM scholars stress “structural holes” (with connotations broader than those associated with the related work of Burt [1992]).

Collecting these ideas—both the areas of convergence and divergence—we begin the construction of a common framework by provisionally stressing the following seven analytic conventions:
1. Following OS insights, we replace the individual organization or social movement with organization field as the fundamental unit of analysis.

2. As the starting point for the analysis of any episode of field-level change, the analyst is urged to identify the relevant period of interest and to define the composition of the field in terms of three classes of actors:
   - **Dominants** – those individuals, groups, and organizations around whose actions and interests the field tends to revolve
   - **Challengers** – those individuals, groups, and organizations seeking to challenge the advantaged position of dominants or fundamental structural-procedural features of the field.
   - **Governance units** – those organizational units that exercise-field-level power and authority. Governance units can be field-specific or components of broader political systems. Equal attention should be accorded the strengths and weaknesses, the constraints and the opportunities associated with these units.

3. All fields exist within a wider social environment containing:
   - **External actors** – those individuals, groups, and organizations that, at the outset of the episode under study are not recognized to be participants in the focal field, but in some manner influence the course of action
   - **External governance units** – the authority and power structures operating broader societal levels, providing opportunities and constraints affecting field-level action

4. Social actors are constituted by and their behavior guided by diverse institutional logics – including values, norms, and beliefs regarding means-ends relations. Logics may be primary—the ideas guiding and legitimating the actions of dominant actors as well as secondary logics, the ideas associated with emerging or suppressed actors. Events occurring in fields and their environments are differentially interpreted
by actors holding divergent logics, providing contrasting frames of reference. The extent of alignment among these frames signifies possible sources of support or opposition.

Derived primarily from OS, we are nonetheless convinced that this basic kitbag of concepts has broad relevance for OS and SM analysts alike who seek to describe periods of significant conflict and change within whatever field they are studying. What this tool kit cannot explain, however, are the origins of such periods. For that, we need more dynamic, process oriented, concepts. Borrowing from recent conceptual work in SM (McAdam 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), we offer the following, additional concepts:

5. Under ordinary circumstances, we believe that fields tend toward stability. This is not to reinvoke the disembodied notion of “social equilibrium” from traditional structural functional analysis. The stability we have in mind is rather a hard fought and fragile state of affairs—what Zysman (1994) terms an “institutional settlement”, owing largely to the efforts of field dominants (and their internal and external allies) to preserve a status quo that generally serves their interests. Given this presumption, we think most periods of significant field contention/change begin with destabilizing events or processes that often have their origins outside the narrow confines of the field. (This is likely to be truer in the case of social regulatory than economic regulatory fields, the latter being characterized by destabilizing market pressures and ecological dynamics that the former are generally spared.)

6. But it is generally not the destabilizing events/processes themselves that set periods of field contention and change in motion. Rather it is a process of reactive mobilization defined by the following set of three highly contingent mobilizing mechanisms that mediate between change pressures and a significant episode of
field contention. Reflecting the contingent nature of these mechanisms, we pose each in terms of a question:

- **attribution of threat or opportunity** - do field actors respond to potentially destabilizing events/processes by interpreting those events as representing new threats or opportunities to or for the realization of their interests?

- **social appropriation** - having successfully fashioned a new more threatening (or opportunistic) understanding of the field or its environment, are the authors of this view able to establish it as the dominant institutional logic of the group in question?

- **new actors and innovative action** - once insinuated as the institutional logic of a given group, do these new attributions of threat or opportunity lead to the emergence of new types of actors and/or to innovative action with the potential to destabilize the field all the more?

7. If the answer to all three questions turns out to be “yes,” then we can expect that field dominants and challengers alike will begin to act and interact in innovative and increasingly contentious ways. The end result is likely to be a significant shift in the strategic alignment that had previously structured and stabilized the field, leading to a new institutional settlement.

Armed with this mix of static structural and more dynamic change-oriented concepts, we are now ready to revisit our two cases, with an eye to assessing the utility of this synthetic framework in handling what otherwise might seem to be quite disparate cases.
Two Cases

The Emergence, Institutionalization and Restructuring of the Healthcare Field

Scott and colleagues (Scott et al. 2000) conducted an empirical study of changes occurring in the healthcare delivery system serving one large metropolitan area in the U.S., the San Francisco Bay area, concentrating their data collection on the period 1945-1995. While the geographic region was selected for convenience, the sector and time period were chosen to represent an instance of profound institutional change. The question of interest was: how did it happen that a sector long noted for its unique and stable institutional arrangements became destabilized and moved in directions more isomorphic with other service industries? We recognized that although we could limit our examination of changes in the delivery system to one localized area, to account for these changes we would need to attend to structures and forces operating at wider, state and national levels. Three phases (or eras) are identified to highlight important changes in actors, logics, and governance structures.

I. Origins, early decades of 20th century to 1964: Era of Professional Dominance

The early history of the structuration of the healthcare field is largely one of success of the “professional project” pursued by allopathic physicians: MDs. This history has been recounted in detail by Freidson (1970a) and Starr (1982), among others. Early in the 20th century, physicians were able, with the help of the Carnegie Foundation, to set their own house in order by standardizing training requirements and restricting access to physicians meeting minimal standards. Securing legitimation via licensure by state bodies, which they controlled, physicians acted to successfully exclude or restrict the opportunities available to alternative types of practitioners. Other healthcare
professionals, such as nurses, pharmacists, and various types of ancillary therapists, quickly learned the advantages of cooperating with physicians to develop their skills and define their spheres of operation in ways compatible with and subordinate to physicians. (Friedson 1970b)

To secure and advance their interests, physicians created (in 1846) what became arguably the most successful and powerful professional association in history. (Editors, Yale Law Journal 1954) The American Medical Association (AMA), organized to operate at country, state, and national levels, was for the first half of the 20th century the primary de facto governance structure of healthcare in the U.S.

In addition to their success in mounting internal reforms and overcoming the challenges mounted by other types of providers, physicians also were effective during this period in controlling the number of physicians, the conditions of their work, and the nature of financial systems. Physicians strengthened their guild by controlling the size and quality of training programs and overseeing licensing systems, thus restricting competition. Insisting on the overriding value of the physician-patient relation, physicians successfully resisted organizational authority, denouncing medical groups as “the corporate practice of medicine.” (Starr 1982) In the same fashion they were able to maintain their access to but independence from the only major organizational form that had emerged for the delivery of complex services—the community hospital—by creating professional staff structures that were autonomous from administrative hospital structures. (White 1982) And, throughout this period, physicians successfully retained their independence from financial structures by insisting on direct fee-for-service payments or insurance plans that provide indemnity or service benefits. (Starr 1982)

Hence, the situation found at the time when our study commenced (1945) can be characterized as a highly stable institutional settlement involving the following principal features:
Actors

- Physicians are the dominant actors.

(Earlier challengers, such as homopathic physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors, have been successfully suppressed or contained.)

- “Voluntary”, nonprofit community hospitals are the major organizational form for the delivery of complex services.

- The AMA is the primary governance body, allied with state-level licensure agencies.

External Actors

- Employers and labor unions are increasingly involved in providing employees with healthcare insurance coverage, but are not active in directly attempting to control healthcare prices or delivery systems.

- The federal government remains largely on the periphery of healthcare delivery, several proposals for national health insurance having been defeated. After the end of World War II, however, it becomes increasingly active in providing infrastructural support: for basic medical research, hospital facility construction, and physician training (see below).

Institutional Logics

- Physicians espouse the sanctity of the doctor-patient relation as the logic by which they resist organizational and financial controls, and insist on the overriding value of quality of care, which is the doctor’s prerogative to define.

- A “voluntary ethos” legitimates the dominance of nonprofit, community-based healthcare systems.

Destabilizing events and processes

With the advantages of hindsight, it is possible to identify several important processes and events occurring late in the first era that paved the way for disruptive change. Scott and colleagues (2000) emphasize that the unitary front provided by
physicians and underlying the power of the AMA began to erode. They document the
dramatic rise of medical specialties—by 1960, half of practitioners were specialists--
together with their corresponding associations, and a parallel decline in AMA
membership. Starr (1982) points to another developing source of fragmentation: the
growing size and significance of medical schools, teaching hospitals and allied
institutions meant that an increasing proportion of physicians were no longer engaged in
independent, community practice. A third force that worked over time to weaken the
market power of physicians was the passage, in 1963, of the Health Professions
Education Act that provided public funds to create new medical schools and expand
existing ones. This act and subsequent amendments and renewals aimed at shaping
the geographical and specialty distribution of doctors, increased the ratio of active
physicians from just under 120 per 100,000 in 1970 to over 206 in 1990. (Scott et al.
2000, p. 140; see also, Thompson 1981) This legislation, along with increases in public
funding for research and facilities, provided early warning signs of a new institutional
logic that had begun to surface indicating that “there was a public interest in both the
quality and availability of medical care.” (Scott et al. 2000, p. 189)

Two other developments, one intrinsic to the healthcare field, the other a broader
societal-level change, provided fuel for major restructuring of this arena. The
endogenous development was the gradual, but continuous, increase in the costs of
healthcare—increases that, from the early 1950s, regularly exceeded the consumer
price index. The broader trend was demographic: the aging of the American population
and the increasing proportion of US citizens demanding healthcare services.


Wider political developments during the mid-1960s trumped professional
prerogatives that had long held sway. Following the assassination of President
Kennedy, a liberal, democratic majority took power in 1964, controlling both the Presidency and the Congress. Following many failed attempts in succeeding decades, legislation was successfully passed in 1965 under the leadership of President Lyndon Johnson to provide governmental financing for healthcare services for the elderly and the indigent. How did these ideas gain support? Why did they succeed in the 1960s rather than earlier? A liberal administration and Congress were vital, but it appears that the framing of the issues was of great importance. Among social movement theorists, Snow has emphasized the importance of framing processes in efforts to mobilize ideological support. (Snow and Bensford 1988; Snow et al., 1986) The 1960s witnessed the mobilization of formerly suppressed interests resulting in the “rights revolution” in the U.S., [see Case 2] and it is hence not surprising that parties engaged in healthcare reform couched their concerns in terms of every individual’s “right” to healthcare.

With the launching of the Medicare Program, the federal government overnight became the single largest purchaser of health services. Medicare was strongly supported by the growing ranks of elderly Americans through their increasingly effective lobbies—in particular, the American Association of Retired Persons, who were just beginning to discover their political clout. Popular support was readily marshaled since “the aged could be presumed both needy and deserving.” (Starr 1982, p. 368) A companion program, Medicaid, to be administered by the states, broadened coverage for the indigent. In combination, this landmark legislation gave dramatic expression to the new institutional logic of providing “equal access to care” for all citizens.

Although organized medicine and its allies were not sufficiently strong to derail the liberal juggernaut, their reactive mobilization was sufficient to allow them to exclude governmental influence from physicians’ clinical decision-making and from the setting of hospital and physician charges. Wanting to secure the cooperation of doctors and
hospitals, the framers of the legislation practiced the “politics of accommodation” and created numerous “buffers between the providers of healthcare and the federal bureaucracy.” (Starr 1982, pp. 374-5)

**Attribution of threat, opportunity**

Fearing the worst, hospitals and physicians suddenly found themselves in a beneficent environment in which they were able to determine what services were required and to set “usual and customary” fees for reimbursement from financial intermediaries, who remained both distant and respectful. The security of public reimbursement encouraged a variety of entrepreneurial healthcare professionals to develop more elaborate delivery systems. Medical groups—important foundation blocks for subsequent organizational forms—began to increase rapidly, and a variety of more specialized forms began to appear and multiply (see below). An opportunistic framing of the new situation confronting physicians was associated with the emergence of new actors and innovative actions.

Healthcare professionals exploited these perceived opportunities with such energy so as to threaten the long-term viability of the new public programs. The relaxation of financial constraints on demand resulted in a rapid escalation of healthcare services and costs and, because public monies were now involved, provoked a perceived crisis in public finance. Political actors, in turn, reacted to the crisis by rapidly constructing a range of new administrative agencies to exercise regulative oversight, treating healthcare services as a public utility. Scott and colleagues document that, in the Bay area, the number of health-related regulatory bodies increased from less than 10 in 1945 to nearly 100 in 1975.

**Effects on healthcare delivery populations**

Following decades of “dynamics without change” (Alford 1972), the healthcare field had entered into a period of creative turbulence. As one important indicator of such
change, Scott and colleagues systematically charted foundings and failures occurring, between 1945 and 1995, in five organizational populations providing healthcare services in the San Francisco Bay Area. The five populations selected were: hospitals, home health agencies (HHAs), health maintenance organizations (HMOs), renal disease centers (RDCs), and integrated healthcare systems (IHSs). At any given time, there exists only a limited repertory of organization forms—cognitive models and the associated relational structures and operational strategies—in a given organizational field. (Greenwood and Hinings 1993; Clemens (1996) Hospitals represent the most traditional organizational form while the other populations reflect newer templates. HHAs involve a reinvention of an earlier organizational model—visiting nursing associations; while RDC’s reflect a growing tendency for specialized units within hospitals to be reconstituted as self-standing organizations. IHSs capture the opposite impulse of independent healthcare units to band together, through horizontal and vertical mergers as well as via alliances, forming broadly differentiated systems. HMOs, the most novel form, will be discussed below.

An important indicator of institutional change, we argue, involves changes over time in the relative numbers of organizations exhibiting a given form. Although the organizations studied are not identical in the work performed, they are in a broad sense all competitors, supplying acute patient services. Our data reveal that, prior to 1965, hospitals were virtually the only type of organizational provider of healthcare services. Their numbers peaked in the Bay Area in 1965 and have slowly but steadily declined since that date. After 1965, all of the other, more specialized forms exhibit significant increases, from two- to five fold. (Scott et al. 2000, chap. 3)

Between the beginning and end of the second half of the 20th century, then, a number of new (reinvented, modified, hybrid) healthcare delivery forms appeared on the scene, each associated with relatively innovative healthcare practices. None of these,
however, was the direct result of social-movement-type mobilization processes. Some, like the RDC were the product of entrepreneurial efforts, particularly by physicians, who recognized the profit-making possibilities of renal dialysis facilities and took advantage of Medicare provisions extending coverage to its chronically ill patients. (Rettig and Levinsky 1991) Others, like the HHA, revitalized an earlier healthcare delivery form and took advantage of new technologies and developing institutional logics emphasizing the advantages of home-based over institutional care. Medicare funding was also instrumental to the development and growth of this form. Thus, it is important to recognize that mobilization activities occur at other than the grass-roots level. In addition to these new service delivery forms, very one of them—HMOs, HHAs, RDCs, IHSs—developed a federation or association to represent and advance its interests.

Taking stock, we find a changing cast of actors and governance structures and altered logics dominant during this second era:

**Actors**

- **Physicians** remain central actors, but are increasingly involved in some type of organizational unit, such as medical centers or medical groups.
- **Hospitals** remain important delivery sites, but are increasingly challenged by the appearance of more specialized forms.
- **The AMA** and related professional associations increasingly share governance functions with public actors.
- **Public officials and agencies**, at both the federal and state levels, are active participants in healthcare governance, including financing, quality assurance, planning, and cost-containment.

**External Actors**
- Employers and labor unions continue to provide employees with healthcare insurance coverage, and, while they are rarely involved in directly negotiating costs and services, call for greater efforts by public officials to regulate costs.

- Policy experts, politicians, and public officials are less apt to believe that healthcare issues can be left in the hands of healthcare professionals, and to regard it as an area requiring public controls.

Institutional logics

- While the logic of healthcare quality continues to be of central importance, it is now joined by a new logic stressing the importance of equity of access for all citizens.

Destabilizing events and processes

Scott and colleagues (2000) identify several forces at work affecting the direction of change into the subsequent period. One of these involved a revision in the locus and type of training of healthcare managers. Until mid-century, hospitals were administered primarily by lay administrators, at which time training programs had developed in numerous schools of public health. Beginning in the 1960s, however, an increasing number of programs offered degrees in business administration rather than public health, several business schools developed special programs and other business schools offered joint programs with schools of public health. The generic rather than the specialized health attributes of management of healthcare organizations began to be emphasized, and a stream of professional managers began to enter the field.

Quite early, during the 1950s and early 1960s, academic economists had begun to question the value of regulation—of price, firm entry or exit—as a tool of governmental intervention in the economy. The academic critique, supported by accompanying research on a number of key industries, began to spread to public policy circles during the early 1970s; and the efforts of Ralph Nader and the political movement that he
formed, roused consumer interest in the issues. By 1975, deregulation had developed into the “new religion in this town: …much of Washington was doing it or professing to do it.” (Derthick and Quirk 1985, p. 29) During this period, the cause was championed by individuals as diverse as Senator Edward Kennedy, on the grounds that it protected consumer interests, and President Gerald Ford, because it served business interests, free enterprise, and reduced governmental interference.

Deregulation connected to and gained momentum from the development of a broad-based consumer movement during the 1960s. This movement entered the healthcare arena during the late 1960s to challenge the notion that “the doctor knows best” and to insist that health maintenance and improvement were not the responsibility of the provider but the consumer. (Scott and colleagues [2000] track the entry of the consumer movement into the healthcare arena by charting the increasing number of popular periodicals devoted to health matters.) Healthcare was increasingly viewed as similar to other personal services. An even broader challenge questioned physicians’ claim to an exclusive base of knowledge pertaining to health and healing when, during the late 1960s, an interest in and tolerance for “alternative” providers began to develop among the public.

3. Era of Managers and Markets: 1983-present

This third era is marked primarily by the ascendance of a new logic—that of improving healthcare efficiency—together with the development of new organizational forms and governance mechanisms designed to achieve it. Economists cast doubt on the efficacy of many medical procedures, but more generally, insisted that economic criteria and calculations were applicable to healthcare as to other areas: whatever benefits were forthcoming had to be weighed against the costs and alternatives forgone.
Since these costs were rapidly escalating, politicians and the wider public were inclined to listen.

Following the new policy fashion, economic advisers and political leaders called for the replacement of “regulatory and administrative agencies with private markets operating under suitably designed incentives.” (Malhado 1988, p. 41) The approach was determined suitable for a wide variety of arenas, and, notably, healthcare was not treated as an exception, as in past decades. Early attempts targeted consumers, focusing on various cost-sharing mechanisms, such as co-payments, that increased costs to consumers. Later programs were aimed at providers, rewarding them for providing earlier and less care rather than late and more care. An important new instrument for this purpose was the HMO form.

The HMO was the brainchild of one reform-minded physician, Paul Ellwood, who advocated the model for its preventive (health-maintenance) features. However, its success was rather due to its ability to restructure physicians’ incentives, rewarding them for rationing services. This feature endeared it to the health policy designers of the Nixon administration, who embraced the model in the battle to reduce healthcare costs. (Brown 1983) However, its rapid adoption and diffusion did not occur until the early 1980s.

HMOs represented the most novel form of health delivery to emerge in the second half of the 20th century. Embodying an older model of pre-paid group practice, HMOs grafted on the insurance function so that the new organizations and their providers are more directly exposed to financial risk. Two functions formerly insulated from one another, housed in separate organizations, were brought under the same roof. We have here an instance of bricolage, the cobbling together of pieces of familiar forms and routines to embody new logics and support new modes of action. (See Clemens 1996; Haveman and Rao 1998; Stark 1996.) Such hybrid creations are particularly
likely to appear in organizational fields during times of rapid change. They combine the strengths of the old and familiar with the advantages of the novel and unusual. By employing a recognizable structural vocabulary and action schemas so that change is perceived to be incremental rather than discontinuous, they enable more radical changes than would otherwise be possible.

Insurance functions (health plans) were joined with varying combinations of providers—a medical group, collections of groups, networks of independent physicians, physician-hospital partnerships—giving rise a dizzying variety of forms: HMOs, IPAs, PPOs, POSs, among others. Competition among these provider systems on the basis of price, quality and consumer amenities meant that entrepreneurial and managerial skills were much in demand. Indeed, informed observers, such as Robinson (1999, p. 213) regard the contemporary scene as one involving “continued innovation in forms of organization, ownership, contract, finance, and governance.”

Taking stock of these developments, we find, in summary:

**Actors**

- **Physicians** remain central actors in care delivery, but now exercise much less influence in policy and design decisions.
- **Hospitals** continue their decline in influence and in numbers. Most are no longer independent but are components of IHSs.
- A variety of new types of **managed care organizations** have entered the arena and, by mid-1990s account for most acute care services.
- The **AMA and other professional associations** share governance functions with **public** and **corporate** actors.
- **Professional managers** have increased power and are much more active in the design and coordination of professional activities.

**External Actors**
- Employers are playing a more active role in healthcare governance, often entering into coalitions to negotiate plans and oversee performance.

- Policy experts, especially economists, politicians and public officials regularly and actively participate in governance of healthcare affairs.

- Corporations increasingly own and manage healthcare delivery organizations.

Logics

- While the logic of health care quality is espoused, the logic of equal access has become much less salient. A significant proportion of the population lacks adequate health insurance.

- Efficiency and cost-containment have become important new values; and the use of market mechanisms and competitive pressures are the favored governance mechanisms.

Destabilizing Processes

But, as we enter the 21st century, we seem far from attaining stability in the field. The initial governance structure, dominated by an occupational association, has not disappeared but now must share power and legitimacy with other professional and trade associations, public agencies, corporate organizations, and market processes. Consumer movements have been revived, but now, in addition to promoting patients’ “bill of rights” seek increased discretion for physicians to make medical decisions unconstrained by either big government or big business. “Patients over profits” is a rallying cry heard as often as “reducing bureaucratic interference.” Many reimbursement programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, fail to fully cover the costs of care with the consequence that hospitals and other organizational providers are forced to cut back on staffing and services. Faced with such constraints, nursing groups have more frequently resorted to protest strikes, and physicians are actively exploring unionization. The population continues to age, and new technologies boost demands and costs. A
shrinking proportion of US firms provide healthcare benefits to their employees, and 44 million Americans currently lack health insurance. The healthcare field has been transformed, but no end is in sight.

The Emergence, Development, and Institutionalization of the “Rights Revolution”

McAdam has written extensively about the origins and subsequent development of the civil rights period of the African-American freedom struggle (McAdam 1982, 1983, 1988, 1998, 1999). Here we want to revisit that history but through the lens of the synthetic framework sketched above. If the framework has merit, it should add texture and new emphases to the movement-centric account offered in the earlier work. There are really four phases to this history, the first three of which are familiar to movement scholars. Reflecting much more the emphases of OS than SM, the fourth phase has largely been glossed in movement accounts of the civil rights struggle. We take these phases in chronological order.

1. Origins, 1946-1955

This period presents the sharpest contrast between our two cases. While the earliest phase of the health care case involved the de-stabilization of an established field or fields, heightened conflict over race in the immediate post-War period occurred in the absence of any well defined “social regulatory” field with respect to racial issues. Instead, the onset of the latter conflict marked the beginning of a process that would eventually give rise to a number of established fields. Despite this difference, however, we think the analytic framework sketched above enables us to understand the origin of both of these cases. Reflecting the dynamic change elements inherent in the origins of contention, our analysis of the initial phase of the civil rights case is structured around the final three elements of our synthetic framework.
a. destabilizing events or processes - until recently, the consensual account of the rise of the civil rights movement focused almost exclusively on domestic change processes thought to be responsible for ending the federal “hands off” policy with respect to southern race relations. That tacit policy held for nearly 75 years, from the withdrawal of federal forces from the South in 1877 until the civil rights reforms of the Truman presidency. Among the domestic change processes argued to have undermined the federal/Southern “understanding” on race are: the marked decline in the cotton economy (especially after 1930), the massive northward migration of blacks set in motion by the decline of “King Cotton,” and the growing political/electoral significance that attached to the black vote as a result of the migration (McAdam 1982; Sitkoff 1978; Wilson 1973).

Without discounting the importance of these domestic factors, a spate of recent works on race and the Cold War has offered a very different account of the origins of the civil rights struggle (Dudziak 1988, 2000; Layton 1999; McAdam 1998, 1999; Plummer 1996; Skrentny 1998). The strong claim advanced by these authors is that the key to understanding the developing conflict lies, not in the domestic context so much as the new pressures and considerations thrust upon the U.S. and the White House in particular by the onset of the Cold War. Writing in 1944, Gunnar Myrdal (1970: 35) described these “new pressures and considerations” with eloquent prescience.

The Negro Problem . . . has also acquired tremendous international implications, and this is another and decisive reason why the white North is prevented from compromising with the white South regarding the Negro . . . . Statesmen will have to take cognizance of the changed geopolitical situation of the nation and carry out important adaptations of the American way of life to new necessities. A main adaptation is bound to be the redefinition of the Negro’s status in American
In short, the Cold War exposed the U.S. to withering international criticism of its racial policies prompting Truman and other federal officials to embrace limited civil rights reforms for their foreign policy, rather than domestic political, value.

b. reactive mobilization - Though substantively quite limited, the embrace of civil rights reform by certain federal officials following the War signaled such a clear break with the previous policy regime that it was almost immediately defined as significant by the established parties to the conflict. In turn, this emerging definition of the situation set in motion reactive mobilization efforts by dominants and challengers alike. These efforts featured all three mobilization mechanisms noted previously. For their part, southern segregationists—led by their representatives in Congress—saw in the new reform efforts a clear threat to their political power and to “the Southern way of life,” more generally. To counter this threat, segregationists appropriated a host of established organizations (e.g. church, and civic organizations) and created new forms (e.g. The State’s Rights Party, Mississippi’s State Sovereignty Commissions, White Citizen Council) as vehicles for mounting innovative action designed to preserve the social, political, and economic status quo. These actions included the “Dixiecrat Revolt” of 1948 (in which South Carolina’s Democratic Senator, Strom Thurmond, ran against his Party’s incumbent President in the 1948 presidential race), resurgent Klan activity in the mid-50s, and the flood of anti-integration statutes passed by southern state legislatures in the wake of the 1954 Supreme Court’s decision in the Brown case.

Civil rights forces also mobilized during this period, seeing in Truman’s efforts and the philosophy of the Warren Court an unprecedented opportunity to challenge Jim Crow on a number of fronts. A host of established organizations, such as the National Council of Churches and the YWCA, embraced integration in the postwar period. Existing civil rights groups—especially the NAACP—experienced dramatic growth in
membership in the same period (Anglin 1949; NAACP 1948; Wolters 1970). Finally, new groups emerged during the period to press the fight through more innovative action. These groups included the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1942, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund in 1946, and, following the stunning success of the Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955-56), Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1957.

With respect to Montgomery and King, however, it is worth noting that this account marks the temporal beginnings of renewed racial contention in the U.S. nearly ten years before the mass movement phase of the struggle. The broader analytic framework sketched above helps place Montgomery and King in context by alerting us to the important role played by established dominants (e.g. southern elected officials), challengers (e.g. NAACP), and, most importantly in this case, external governance units (e.g. the U.S. Supreme Court, Truman) in setting the conflict in motion. Montgomery then represents a crucial escalation of the conflict—one that signals the onset of phase 2 of the struggle—but not its point of origin. Indeed, rather than Montgomery making the movement, the reverse is actually true. It was the prior onset of the national conflict that granted the local struggle in Montgomery so much significance. Without its embedding in the existing national episode, it is not at all clear that Montgomery would have had the impact it did, or perhaps that it would have happened at all.

c. shift in strategic alignments - this period also saw a significant restructuring of the strategic relationships that had previously sustained the federal-Southern "understanding" with respect to race. The key rupture in these years occurred within the Democratic Party, as Dixiecrats reacted with alarm and open revolt to the reform policies pursued by Truman and the liberal/labor wing of the Party. The emerging division between these two crucial components of the New Deal coalition thoroughly destabilized
electoral politics in the early Cold War period (and beyond) and in so doing, decisively shaped the direct action strategies of civil rights forces.

2. Heyday, 1956-1965

If Montgomery did not actually trigger the episode of interest here, it certainly represented a significant escalation and qualitative shift in the nature and locus of the struggle. The rise of the mass movement served to shift much of the action out of Washington and to the streets and statehouses of the South. Emergent *challengers* pioneered or adapted sit-ins, mass marches, and other forms of public protest and civil disobedience to supplement the legal and institutionalized political battles that had characterized the earlier period. The result was extraordinarily high levels of sustained contention—both institutionalized and non-institutionalized—and further deterioration in the *alignment* of the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party.

The period also marks the clear emergence of a civil rights *field*, the evolution of which would powerfully shape the conflict well into the late 1960s. The field was a fluid conflict or action arena comprised of at least five major sets of actors: movement and counter-movement groups, federal officials, southern officials, and the national media. The gradual mastery and exploitation, by movement forces, of a recurring strategic dynamic involving these five actors accounts for much of the action—and resultant policy victories—that we associate with the period. The dynamic can be described simply. Lacking sufficient power to defeat southern officials in a local struggle, movement groups sought to broaden the conflict by inducing counter-movement forces to engage in dramatic disruptions of public order which, in turn, compelled media attention, generated public outcry in the north, and forced otherwise reluctant federal officials to intervene in ways generally supportive of movement aims.
The central new population of actors within this field was the *social movement industry* (SMI) comprised of the major civil rights organizations active during the period. Dubbed the “Big Five” by movement analysts, this well defined aggregation of collective actors proved highly effective as a source of concerted movement action during the movement’s heyday. The strength of this SMI owed, in part, to profitable *resource linkages* established during the period between the groups and liberal northern foundations, church groups, and individual donors. These highly functional linkages did, however, create a serious *resource dependency* that would come back to haunt several of the key organizations as they embraced more radical goals and tactics after 1965.

3. **“Black Power” and the Decline of the Movement, 1966-1970**

   The mass movement phase of the civil rights struggle wound down during the latter half of the 1960s. The decline of the movement owed to six principal factors.

   - At the broadest level, the international pressures that had prompted the federal government to embrace civil rights reform in the Cold War era eased considerably in the late 1960s. President Nixon’s historic overture to China and simultaneous embrace of *détente* with the Soviet Union marked the beginning of an extended Cold War hiatus. This coupled with the rise of Vietnam as America’s dominant issue—internationally and domestically—robbed civil rights forces of the public attention and criticism that had helped leverage policy gains in the early 1960s (McAdam 1999 [1982]; Skrentny 1998).

   - Then too, those gain—reflected in the effective dismantling of Jim Crow—also contributed to the decline of the movement, both by removing the symbols of American racism that had fueled criticism, and by forcing the movement to confront forms of institutional inequality that would prove far more difficult to attack.
In confronting these more difficult targets, the strong consensus with regard to goals (integration, voting rights) and tactics (non-violent direct action) that had characterized the social movement industry during the movement’s heyday collapsed, ushering in a period of divisive conflict and change in SMO relations. The institutional logic of civil rights clashed with that of black power, effectively ending the prospects for organizational coalition that had made the movement such a formidable and unified force in the early 60s (McAdam 1999 [1982]: chapter 8.)

The embrace of more radical goals, tactics, and rhetoric by two of the Big 5—Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)—exposed both to the dangers of external resource dependence, leading to the wholesale withdrawal of liberal financial support. Neither group was able to offset this loss with stronger resource ties to the black community, thus depriving the movement of much of the tactical energy and innovation that had fueled action campaigns in the early 60s. With King’s assassination in 1968, the direct-action wing of the Big 5 was completely gone (Haines 1988; Jenkins 1986; McAdam 1999 [1982]: chapter 8).

When combined with the northern riots of the period, the movement’s growing militancy during this period prompted state officials at all levels to take increasingly repressive action against insurgent groups, further weakening the organizational structure of the movement.

This repressive impulse was further strengthened by Nixon’s strident embrace of a “law and order” rhetoric during his presidential campaign. More importantly, Nixon’s successful “southern strategy” left him with no electoral debt to African-Americans and deprived moderate civil rights leaders of the kind of White House access they had enjoyed since Roosevelt.
The irony in all this is that even as the mass movement was declining in the late 1960s, at least two social regulatory fields embodying the central goals of the civil rights phase of the struggle was beginning to take shape in the U.S. However, the full institutionalization of the rights revolution would have to wait until the 1970s.


Reflecting the preoccupation of movement scholars with periods of non-institutionalized contention, research on the civil rights struggle all but ignores the years after 1970. But as John Skrentny’s work (1996; forthcoming) shows, this ignorance comes at considerable cost. What is lost is any real understanding of the institutionalization of the “rights revolution” after 1970. This “march through the institutions” worked through two processes. The first was the rapid expansion of social regulatory fields embodying many of the central aims of the civil rights movement. The second was the powerful impact that the policy and more amorphous cultural changes we associate with the “rights revolution” had on other established fields during this later period.

a. creation/expansion of social regulatory fields - There exist two highly elaborated social regulatory fields with clear origins in the civil rights struggle. These we will term the employment opportunity (EMOF) and educational opportunity fields (EDOF). Even a cursory history of both fields is beyond the scope of this article. To illustrate our perspective, we focus only on the evolution of EMOF. It is a fiction to say that either of these fields was created after 1970. Both existed, at least in embryonic form, much earlier than this. The EMOF dates back to at least 1941 when Roosevelt, acting under pressure from the March on Washington Movement, issued his one and only civil rights measure creating a Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to investigate charges of discrimination in wartime defense industries. Truman nominally expanded
the field during his term by creating a fair employment board within the Civil Service Commission (1948) and a Committee on Government Contract Compliance (1951). None of these agencies, however, had any real reach to them or were backed by effective enforcement mechanisms.

The same deficiencies were evident in regard to the major institutional expansions of the field mandated by the civil rights legislation passed during the 1960s. So in 1964 Congress established the Equal Employment Commission (EEOC) to enforce Title VII of that year’s Civil Rights Act. A year later Lyndon Johnson issued an executive order creating the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), designed to monitor equal employment in a sector—government contracts—not under the jurisdiction of the EEOC. But for all the laudable intentions and impressive bureaucratic machinery that attached to EEOC and OFCC, the regulatory reach of the field remained minimal. “Of the first [EEOC] 15,000 complaints received, 6040 were earmarked for investigation, and 3,319 investigations were completed. At the level of conciliation, only 110 were actually completed” (Skrentny 1996: 123). Through 1968 the OFCC had yet to cancel a single federal employment contract as a result of employment discrimination (Skrentny 1996: 134).

The real expansion of the field took place in the early 1970s through an initiative—the so-called Philadelphia Plan—offered by the Nixon administration. Skrentny (1996: 177) captures the irony in this. “Perhaps the greatest irony of all in the story of affirmative action is that this controversial model of justice owes its most advanced and explicit race-based formulation to a Republican president who based much of his campaign on appealing to the racially conservative South.” Proposed and enacted late in 1969, the Plan effectively replaced the “color blind” logic of earlier regulatory efforts with an explicit embrace of “affirmative action,” conceived as targeted percentages of minorities to be hired. Nixon’s motives for supporting the Plan make for
a fascinating story (Skrentny 1996: chapter 7). Even more interesting is the story of how a Republican backed plan that was initially opposed by liberal Democrats, came over time to be repudiated by the right—including Nixon himself—and embraced by liberals as the very symbol of racial justice. But these stories are beyond the scope of this article.

The crucial point for us has to do with the impact this fundamental shift in institutional logic had on the structure, operation, and reach of the EMOF. Whereas “color blind” approaches to employment regulation had put the onus to evaluate and challenge questionable hiring/firing practices on the employee (or job applicant), affirmative action required employers to meet explicit hiring targets. Though controversial from the start, this shift in the locus of regulation nonetheless granted institutional legitimacy to the social logic of affirmative action, prompting organizational actors in many institutional spheres to modify the structure and practice of their work settings.

b. de-stabilizing effects on established fields - The Plan applied only to firms negotiating government contracts. But its implementation and the legitimacy it granted the regulatory logic of affirmative action set in motion destabilizing change processes that would eventually reach into countless other organizational fields. As a field, American higher education was in no way subject to the Plan. Yet over time, most American colleges and universities came to embrace some version of affirmative action and to modify their organizational structures and practices accordingly (Bok and Bowen 199x). The history of major league sports in the U.S. over the past quarter century reflects a similar pattern. Lauren Edelman’s work (1992; Edelman and Suchman 1997) shows how these field or industry-level pressures play out in the individual firm, with organizational actors seeking to interpret and implement recent legislation or legal trends in light of field level competitive pressures. Even the previous case of health
care betrays both a direct and indirect impact of the institutionalized “rights revolution.” The direct effect is clear: large health care employers also came to embrace some version of affirmative action in their hiring/firing practices. Less directly, but more consequentially, the rights revolution afforded consumer rights and patient rights advocates both a frame for their claims making activities and a broader political/cultural credibility that strengthened their hand against field dominants.

This is by no means a full accounting of the emergence and subsequent development of the civil rights case. Having been given short shrift by movement scholars, the first and fourth periods in particular demand more systematic attention. But we do think this account is suggestive of the increased empirical leverage to be gained by wedding the perspectives and concepts of OS and SM. By doing so—even in this thumbnail fashion—we have highlighted the crucial conflict and change processes that bookend the mass movement phase of the struggle. Montgomery and the later sit-ins did not so much initiate the struggle as broaden it while introducing a host of new challengers to the action field. Nor did the struggle end with Martin Luther King’s death or any of the other events that movement scholars have seen as marking the temporal close of the case. Indeed, one of those events—Nixon’s ascension to the White House—helped, as we have shown, to usher in a dramatic expansion in a key civil rights regulatory field and a related period of unprecedented disruption to other established fields as organizational actors everywhere sought to react to the social logic of the “rights revolution.”

Concluding Comments

[To be written]
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Figure 1

Scope of Inquiry

Organizational Focus

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