

GOOD COP/BAD COP

*Environmental NGOs and their
Strategies toward Business*

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CHAPTER 2

WHO IS PART OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT?

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Who is in the environmental movement? This is not such an easy question to answer in today's political and market climate. Although we could identify the movement simply in terms of the NGOs that set agendas on protecting the environment, that category of actors includes many organizations that may not share similar interests and excludes others that fall outside such a singular definition. Consider the following:

- In 2000, law enforcement officials documented more than 30 acts of sabotage against genetic research. Activists trampled experimental grass fields in Oregon, pruned pinot noir vines and uprooted strawberry fields in California, and hacked down cornfields in Maine. On New Year's Eve, arson destroyed a suite of offices and laboratories in Michigan State University's Agriculture Hall. An environmental

group, the Earth Liberation Front, claimed responsibility, saying it had focused on the building because of the labs' work on biotechnology. Should groups identified by the FBI as terrorist organizations be considered part of the environmental movement?

- In 2006, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) was invited to help broker a \$45 billion leveraged buyout of Dallas-based TXU by two private equity firms, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Company and the Texas Pacific Group. Lawsuits to block the planned construction of 11 coal-fired power plants were filed by a consortium of environmental NGOs as well as several ad hoc business organizations and a coalition of mayors and officials in 24 cities and counties organized by Dallas mayor Laura Miller. To get EDF and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to sign off on the deal, the equity firms promised to eliminate plans for eight of the plants, reduce carbon output to 1990 levels by 2020, devote \$400 million to energy efficiency and alternative energy sources, and support a federal cap-and-trade system for greenhouse reductions. Is a group that brokers business deals part of the same environmental movement as a group that commits arson?
- In 2000, environmental activist groups such as World Wildlife Fund and Amnesty International joined 50 multinational corporations, including DaimlerChrysler, Nike, Royal Dutch Shell, Bayer, and Unilever, as well as labor unions and the United Nations, in signing the Global Compact on environmental protection and human rights. Are the corporations in this example part of the environmental movement?
- In 2007, the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), a consortium of 10 blue-chip corporations and 4 NGOs, called for federal standards on greenhouse emissions. Other corporations derided these companies as "Kyoto capitalists" and the "carbon cartel," and an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* (2007) castigated these "10 jolly green giants" for pursuing a regulatory program "designed to financially reward companies that reduce CO₂ emissions and punish those that don't." Are the goals of the corporations of the USCAP consistent with the goals of the environmental movement?

In short, are all the groups and corporations in these examples part of the same environmental movement? Among them, which are part of the

environmental movement and which are not? This chapter sets the stage for the others that follow by delimiting the environmental movement. How is it different from other social movements? Where are its boundaries? Who is in and who is out? Although at first glance these may seem to be simple questions, in this chapter we use the tools of social network analysis (Borgatti et al. 2002; Wasserman and Faust 1994) to depict the environmental movement as an intertwined constellation of networks, each with multiple and differentiated constituencies. We challenge the simple classifications of nongovernmental organization or corporation as accurate descriptors of who is or is not part of the movement. In the end, such classifications may be misleading, lumping many organizations or clusters of organizations with varied interests into one category.

BREAKING DOWN THE CONSTITUENCY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

When discussing the constituency of the environmental movement, one would naturally begin with the nongovernmental organizations that identify themselves as such and constitute a social movement industry (Campbell 2005; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Strang and Soule 1998). These activist organizations comprise constituent groups that connect the values of their causes with their personal identities, creating a value congruence that is a potent force for social change. They have little material stake in organizational output yet influence that output through ideological activism. They become what may be described as cultural or institutional entrepreneurs (Troast et al. 2002), driving change in the norms, values, and beliefs of organizational systems.

In 2005, the number of organizations that described themselves as environmental NGOs reached 6,493 (Gale Research 2005). But are all of these organizations part of same the environmental movement? The fact is that the term *environmentalist* was not chosen by the organizations that find themselves branded by it. It was a term coined by the press in 1970 to make sense of the 20 million activists that participated in the first Earth Day. As this was an unprecedented event with obvious popular appeal and representative of a new movement, the media used the term in press accounts, and it has remained as a definitive label. But Evernden (1985, 125) warns that the term may be a misnomer for such a large group of actors, with negative implications.

The term “environmentalist” was not chosen by the individuals so described. It was seized upon by members of the popular press as a means of labeling a newly prominent segment of society In fact, the act of labeling a group may constitute an effective means of suppression, even if the label seems neutral or objective. For in giving this particular name, not only have the labelers forced an artificial association on a very diverse group of individuals, but they have also given a terse public statement of what “those people” are presumed to want. Environmentalists want environment—obviously. But this may be entirely wrong, a possibility that few environmentalists have contemplated even though many have lamented the term itself. For in the very real sense there can only be environment in a society that holds certain assumptions, and there can only be an environmental crisis in a society that believes in environment.

Environmental NGOs are, in fact, a diverse and heterogeneous group. While they share common attention toward issues regarding the natural environment, they differ in how that issue is operationalized or framed (e.g., ecosystem protection, diversity loss, climate change, energy efficiency, ozone depletion, and many other concepts), with implications for the goals they strive to attain and the location of their supporters within the social structure (Zald and McCarthy 1987). Each of these frames draws in differing and interconnected constituencies.

For example, some NGOs use completely nonconfrontational means to achieve their goals of protecting ecosystems for conservation purposes (e.g., The Nature Conservancy). Some seek to protect habitats for the purposes of sport (e.g., Trout Unlimited, Ducks Unlimited). Some are staffed with lawyers and scientists and work within existing institutions to bring about corporate and social change (e.g., the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife Fund). Others choose to remain outside those institutions, relying on less professionally oriented staff and working in a more confrontational style (e.g., Greenpeace USA, Rainforest Action Network). Still others prefer to engage in acts of sabotage and deliberate violation of the law, leading government agencies to label them terrorist groups (e.g., the Earth Liberation Front, Earth First!).

Membership in the environmental movement is indeterminate (Beck 1992). Within the environmental movement, no demographic or well-structured political constituency exists among proponents or opponents of particular environmental policy initiatives. Opposition to environmentalism on the grounds of threatened material interests or aversion to state intervention would be easier to explain than environmental advocacy (Buttel 1992).

A high-quality environment tends to be a public good that, when achieved, cannot be denied to others, even to those who resist environmental reforms. In the case of many issues, those who act to protect the environment can expect to receive no personal material benefits (Buttel 1992), so the targets of their actions are left to decide who is a legitimate representative for environmental concerns.

The indeterminate nature of many environmental policy issues and solutions means that they attract a wide range of supporters cutting across social, economic, and demographic lines. Environmental supporters may include employee groups, labor unions, community groups, consumers, environmental activists, investors, insurers, the government, industry competitors, internal managers, and religious groups (Brulle 2000; Detomasi 2007; Gottlieb 2006; Hoffman 2000; Morrison 1991; Rockefeller and Elder 1992; Selsky and Parker 2005; Warner and Sullivan 2004). All of these constituents have to some degree become active environmental advocates (Hoffman 2000).

Of particular note has been the growing collaboration between NGOs and various corporations (De Bruijn and Tukker 2002; Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006; Orti 1995; Pearce and Doh 2005; Rondinelli and London 2003; Westley and Vredenburg 1991) and foundations (Brulle and Jenkins 2005; Parker and Selsky 2004; Prewitt 2006; Westhues and Einwiller 2006). Although such interaction is not new—philanthropic giving between businesses and NGOs began in the nineteenth century, with the U.S. Congress allowing a federal income tax deduction for such activity in 1953—such collaboration became more strategic, commercial, and political in the 1990s (Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006). At that time, environmental NGOs began to form more structured alliances with corporations and foundations. These collaborations can take many forms, including philanthropic (giving money to NGOs), strategic (event sponsorships, donations of products or equipment), commercial (cause-related marketing, licensing of names and logos, scientific collaborations), or political (policy marketing, lobbying) (Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006).

Beyond this breadth of engaged constituencies, the movement dedicated to environmental issues is more than just a constituency of social advocates and is distinct for its inclusion of two unique actors. The first is decidedly nonsocial: the environment itself is also a force to reckon with. The prominence and power of environmental changes act as a form of social pressure, placing demands on social, political, economic, and technical institutions

that are unlike other demands societies face. Events or phenomena such as climate change, species extinction, acid rain, ozone depletion, and the collapse of fisheries focus attention without clarity and sometimes without warning, imposing demands for action and change. While open to social interpretation and enactment (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001), environmental events nonetheless force organizational and institutional interests to devote resources and attention to the issues. Thus in essence, the environment itself is a social movement constituent.

The second unique movement participant is a social constituent that is not yet social. Environmental issues such as those listed above typically raise basic issues of intergenerational goods, boundaries, and resource claims (Wade-Benzoni 1996). The vast geographic scales and long time horizons involved to preserve the long-term viability of the ecosystem on the behalf of future generations are difficult to represent adequately in policy discussions. Because future generations cannot express their interests in contemporary social debates, their needs are open to social interpretation and enactment by cultural and institutional entrepreneurs, much like the interpretation of environmental events.

The inclusion of these two unconventional actors expands the range of social movement participation and creates greater challenges for both organizational actors and researchers. In the end, the ambiguity of what is considered an environmental activist necessitates a more critical analysis of the boundaries and makeup of this group of organizations (Zald 2007).

THE NETWORK OF NGOS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Recent analysis (Hoffman 2009) uses empirical measurement of social network ties (Borgatti et al. 2002; Wasserman and Faust 1994) among NGOs to examine the form of networks within the movement. Drawing boundaries between and linkages among various actors in the movement in terms of network dynamics is important for explaining how the behavior of one set of actors influences the beliefs and actions of another (Powell et al. 2005). A sample pool of the 72 largest environmental groups by budget was gathered from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (Gale Research 2005). These groups range in size from 100 to 1.2 million members (average 136,000), in budget from \$1 million to \$245 million (average \$18.5 million), and in date of formation

from 1875 to 1995 (average 1958). Overall, although the sample is biased toward large national and international groups, it is useful for developing a picture of one piece of the NGO movement related to the environment and how that sample is clustered into smaller populations.

Mapping of this sample was conducted using subject keywords. Within the encyclopedia, the Gale editorial staff works in conjunction with a content development vendor to create new or updated content on a continual basis throughout the year. The categories and keywords are assigned by the vendor based on a list created by Gale Research and reviewed by the editorial staff when a new entry for an organization is keyed. Information is obtained and updated through direct contact with the organization, typically via e-mail or their website. Once the categories and keywords are assigned, they generally do not change. In the rare instance that an organization requests a particular keyword, the editorial staff will oblige as long as it makes sense.

Within the sample set of this study, 28 total keywords were identified by members, with a range of 1 to 5 per NGO. Keywords included *agriculture, bird, conservation, deer, education, energy, environmental protection, fish, forestry, health, international development, law, marine biology, natural resources, nuclear weapons, paper, parks and recreation, politics, pollution control, primates, rain forests, rangeland, tropical studies, water, wetlands, wildlife, wood, and world affairs.*

Using these keywords as network ties among NGOs, a network map was created to identify clusters of organizations, as shown in Figure 2-1a. The nodes in the figure represent the 72 NGOs in the sample set. The ties represent common keywords among them.

Within this network map, three dominant populations capture 96 percent of the sample. Each term reflects a different field frame (Hunt et al. 1994) of the population's goal and purpose. The term *pollution control* refers to the direct control of emissions and effluents into air, water, or soil from consumption, heating, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transportation, and other human activities that, left unchecked, will degrade the environment. *Environmental protection* is a broader term, addressing actions at international, national, and local levels to prevent and, where possible, reverse environmental degradation of ecosystems. This term often has a legislative component to it. *Conservation* refers to groups that seek the preservation and protection of the environment and the natural things within it, some for its own sake, others for the benefit of human beings. These clusters represent three overlapping but distinct movements within what we call the environmental movement. There are many more.




Figure 2-1a. Network Map Based on Keyword Ties: Three Dominant Populations

Looking further at the dataset reveals that smaller sectors emerge around specific issues and species, as shown in Figures 2-1b and 2-1c.

It becomes evident from these network maps that the constellation of the largest NGOs in the environmental movement is, in fact, an interconnected series of smaller networks based on issues of relevance to the individual members. So although they may be identified as part of the same movement, they are diverse and heterogeneous in their makeup.

LINKAGES BETWEEN NGOS AND CORPORATIONS OR FOUNDATIONS

Further analysis of board interlocks (Hoffman and Bertels 2007) looks more deeply at the patterns of interconnections between these NGOs and corporations or foundations, focusing on situations where at least one member on an NGO's board of directors is from one of these institutions. Boards are charged with oversight of the NGOs and serve as important channels for interconnection of the institutions to the greater context (Ostrower and Stone 2006). Board interlocks are mechanisms for gaining access to critical resources such as information and, of particular importance to NGOs, funding, "both because individual board members will influence their corporations' giving and because the closer connections they have to others will also raise overall giving levels" (Marquis et al. 2007, 936). But they also become mechanisms for influence by incorporating representatives from other institutions in the NGOs' decisionmaking process or advisory structure (Scott and Davis 2007, 235). As such, they provide a significant measure of interconnection between NGOs and other constituencies.

Using a new list of the 54 largest environmental organizations from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (Gale Research 2005), we collected the names of the boards of directors from IRS 990 forms for the years 2000 and 2005. Then we cross-referenced the resulting list of names with the membership of public U.S. companies found in Compact Disclosure, a database that provides access to SEC-filed financial and other information contained within annual reports, proxy statements, and 10-K/20-F filings for more than 12,000 companies. Next, we generated a list of foundations that had donated more than \$100,000 in any given year between 1999 and 2004 to any of the 54 NGOs, using GuideStar, a database that compiles financial information from




Figure 2-1b. Network Map Based on Keyword Ties: Issue Sectors





Figure 2-1c. Network Map Based on Keyword Ties: Species Sectors

the IRS Business Master File of exempt organizations and IRS forms 990, 990-EZ, and 990-PF (Philanthropic Research 2007). Finally, we found the names of the board members for each of these foundations on their websites, in annual reports, or on 990 forms, and cross-referenced them with the database of NGO board members.

Using the aggregate network data from the sample set creates a depiction of an interconnected constellation of actors: 54 NGOs, 425 corporations, and 156 foundations sharing communication ties through 422 common board members for the combined years 2000 and 2005 (361 common board members in 2000 and 383 in 2005). A comparison of the 2000 and 2005 data shows that the overall number of board level ties increased by 3 percent, while the average distance between reachable pairs decreased, suggesting that the individual actors in the field are becoming more closely tied. But this increase in connections is not uniform or homogeneous. Centralization within the field increased by 54 percent, suggesting that clustering among organizations is growing more acute in certain areas within the field.

Looking more specifically at the types of changing tie patterns in the sample set, we can differentiate between the number of organizations that are tied and the number of ties that create those links. Overall, we can see that NGOs are becoming more interconnected with other members of the field—an 18 percent increase in the overall number of board level ties. This increase manifested primarily in a 44 percent increase in board ties between NGOs and a 25 percent increase between NGOs and foundations. Similarly, the density of ties between NGOs increased by 44 percent, and the corresponding measure between NGOs and foundations increased by 23 percent. The number of NGOs tied with corporations dropped slightly, but the number of ties between these NGOs and corporations increased modestly, by 4 percent (NGO to corporation tie density increased by 5 percent).

With this conceptualization, we can think of the movement as forming at the intersection of common channels of dialogue and discussion among three populations: NGOs, corporations, and foundations, as shown in Figure 2-2. The percentages in this figure represent the number of organizations in each domain, not the number of ties that bind them. In domain A, we find an increasing number of NGOs that were isolates or had ties only with other NGOs. In domain B, the number of NGOs tied strictly to foundations increased. In domain C, the population of NGOs tied to both foundations and corporations remained somewhat stable. And in domain D, we can see a



| | 2000 | 2005 |
|-------|--------|--------|
| A | 40.74% | 48.15% |
| B | 7.41% | 11.11% |
| C | 25.93% | 27.78% |
| D | 25.93% | 12.96% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |

Figure 2-2. The Environmental Movement as an Intersecting Domain of Organizational Population

decline in the number of NGOs tied strictly to corporations. This explains, in part, the increasing centralization in the field. Although the number of NGOs tied to corporations is decreasing, those that maintain those ties are strengthening them. This suggests that NGOs are differentiating themselves more strongly with regard to their corporate ties.

This is a critically important finding, as it demonstrates a distinction beyond keywords among NGOs in the environmental movement. It suggests a differentiation in terms of whom NGOs consider to be valid partners for engagement and the tactics used to engage them. Some groups define their identity in opposition to corporations and corporate activities. For them, alliances with corporations are anathema. This makes it easy to mobilize action against a clear target. Other groups define their identity in conjunction with business and the capitalist system. For them, alliances with corporations are a useful means to further their agendas.

Looking more closely at the specific actor types within the domains, we can see in Figure 2-3 that organizations in domains B, C, and D (e.g., Environmental Defense Fund and World Wildlife Fund) have strong networks of ties, whereas those in domain A (e.g., Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network) have no such ties.

THE RADICAL FLANK EFFECT: "DARK GREENS" OR "BRIGHT GREENS"

The distinction between NGOs with business ties and those without is representative of a schism that seems to be developing between two camps in the




Figure 2-3. NGO Networks of Ties with Corporations and Foundation

environmental movement. Some groups define their identity in terms of a conflict orientation to corporations and corporate activities, others in terms of a consensus orientation with business and the capitalist system (Schwartz and Shuva 1992). Still others lie somewhere between these poles.

But all postures exist within the same interconnected environmental movement, and this creates awkward tensions as the actions of one group are tied to and influenced by the actions of another. Both how they are positioned and how they are viewed is central to their ability to effect change. Movement positioning falls along a continuum, as depicted in Figure 2-4a. NGOs and corporations can position themselves on this spectrum, with the left side representing more of a conflict orientation, and the right more of a consensus orientation. More recent popular terminology within the environmental movement has also emerged to highlight these differences: “dark greens” move further to the left of the continuum and seek radical political change in the dominant market system, whereas “bright greens” focus on engaging within the market system to develop better designs and technologies that will ameliorate contemporary environmental problems. Conner and Epstein (2007) describe the core of this schism as the tension between purity and pragmatism and suggest that the gulf between the two camps is widening.

One reason for the widening gulf is funding. NGOs with ties to corporations and foundations have more money. Using least squares regression indicates a strong correlation between the number of corporate and foundation ties and the size of an NGO’s budget in both 2000 ($p < 0.001$) and 2005 ($p < 0.01$). This effect was much stronger for corporate than for foundation ties. Some within the environmental movement feel, however, that this funding co-opts those who receive it. A recent book by Christine MacDonald (2008), former media manager at Conservation International, expresses outrage at environmental NGOs for accepting donations from oil, lumber, and mining industries without holding them accountable for ongoing pollution practices. She charges that the association between these NGOs and corporations has led to a system of co-optation, where the outcome is assisted *greenwashing*, a term that implies presenting misleading information to conceal an organization’s abuse of the environment and present a positive public image.

But others argue that these different strategies are critical for the overall impact of the movement, and that both camps are needed for the environmental movement to achieve its objectives (Conner and Epstein 2007). The ability of more moderate, consensus-oriented NGOs to operate as change

agents is influenced by the presence of more radical, conflict-oriented groups through the radical flank effect (Haines 1984). This is a mechanism triggered by the bifurcation of a social movement into radical and moderate factions, and the effect of this polarization within the same movement can have both negative and positive outcomes (Gupta 2002).

Negative Radical Flank Effect

The more radical organizations in the movement may have a negative radical flank effect on moderate groups by creating a comparison effect and a backlash among opposing groups (Haines 1984). In such cases, all members of the environmental movement are viewed in the same way as the more visible radical members: "Even if moderates and radicals embrace considerably different goals and tactics, their coexistence and common identification as members of the same movement field reflects badly on the moderates and harms their ability to achieve their objectives" (Gupta 2002, 6). So, for example, when an environmental extremist group creates headlines for a terrorist act, all environmental groups may be viewed in the same light, thus limiting their ability to operate as legitimate members of social debates. Evidence of this effect can be seen in some public opinion polls. For example, the number of Americans who agree with the statement "most people actively involved in environmental groups are extremists, not reasonable people," increased from 32 percent in 1996 to 41 percent in 2000 (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004).

Positive Radical Flank Effect

Conversely, the more radical organizations in the movement may have a positive radical flank effect on moderate groups by creating a contrast (Haines 1984). All members of the environmental movement are viewed in contrast to other members, and extreme positions from some members can make other organizations seem more reasonable to movement opponents (McAdam 1992). For example, many have argued that Martin Luther King Jr. was seen as more moderate by the American public in the 1960s because he was viewed in contrast to the more radical Malcolm X militancy. As a result, radicals in the civil rights movement in the 1960s caused the level of funding for moderate groups to increase (Haines 1984). Examining this effect in respect to the environmental movement, we can see radical groups pushing organizations

toward engaging with moderate groups. For example, when the Rainforest Action Network threatened to protest at Staples over its limited offerings of recycled paper, the company solicited the assistance of what were perceived as more moderate groups, such as EDF. Although still part of the same movement, EDF was seen as more moderate and therefore more palatable and legitimate for a partnership. In the 1970s, Russell Train, second administrator of the EPA, once quipped, "Thank God for the David Browsers of the world. They make the rest of us seem reasonable" (U.S. EPA 1993).

The Strategy of Flank Effects

Positioning on the continuum in Figure 2-4a becomes critical for understanding the dynamics of social change and the players that promote it. This consideration is important for funding, membership, partnerships (with companies and other NGOs), media attention, and the ability to mobilize people—in short, power to play the role of institutional entrepreneur. Further, it is important to understand where one's constituency lies and the positioning it is willing to support. Earth First! or the Earth Liberation Front, for example, find that culturally (and legally) illegitimate activities on the far left of the continuum can further their goals and bolster their support within the narrow segment of society that endorses such controversial action (Elsbach and Sutton 1992). Other groups, such as The Nature Conservancy or EDF, prefer to work more toward the right, within the institutions of society, and use legitimate market-based activities to achieve their ends. When the position matches their constituency's expectations, resources flow. But if NGOs drift too far from their core positions on the continuum, they may find this has an impact on their membership and donations. For example, in the mid-1990s, Greenpeace found that its reputation suffered for its efforts to work with corporations in a less confrontational style. They were moving more to the




Figure 2-4a. NGO Populations on a Continuum

right on the continuum. When the group staged an “eco-commando” action on the Brent Spar oil rig in 1995, being sure to have the media alerted and on hand, it was arguably done at least in part to correct this repositioning. This action reestablished the group’s more confrontational image and moved it back to the left of the continuum.

Application of this continuum is not restricted to NGOs; it also applies to corporations. As shown in Figure 2-4b, a corporation’s position can range from conflict to consensus orientation with respect to NGOs. This has been illustrated most vividly in the debate within corporate circles around the issue of climate change. In 1997, BP was the first to shift its position on the issue and acknowledge that climate change was a problem that needed to be addressed. It is doubtful that this moderate consensus-oriented position could have been as effective if ExxonMobil had not staked out the more radical, conflict-oriented position of disputing the science. Even more recently, as some companies have begun taking proactive steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and calling for federal regulation, other companies have openly resented these actions and derided them with such terms as “Kyoto capitalists” or the “carbon cartel.” For example, when General Electric announced plans to publish its first Citizenship Report, the *Wall Street Journal* was again critical that environmentalists had made their “biggest catch yet” and pondered whether “capitalists are abandoning capitalism” (Murray 2005). To mirror the popular terminology among environmental NGOs, we might refer to the more radical corporate organizations as “dark blue” and the more moderate ones as “bright blue.” Such terminology can be helpful in understanding the positioning of players on these issues and the interaction effects among them.

The radical flank effect is in place in both the corporate and NGO continuums. And we can hypothesize that, while both negative and positive effects can be seen in various populations, the negative flank effect should be most




Figure 2-4b. Corporate Populations on a Continuum

prevalent at the most extreme conflict-oriented positions, as the actions of the most radical groups generate negative projections on the entire community. The positive flank effect should be most prevalent in groups toward the consensus-oriented positions on the continuum, as these organizations—whether corporate or NGO—will likely have a more nuanced understanding of the breadth of the continuum, given their experiences through engagement.

CONCLUSIONS

When attempting to answer the question of who is in the environmental movement, it is best to think of the movement as a series of intertwined networks composed of a diverse array of actors. As such, they form “a web-like structure of informal, unorganized relations of cooperation and communication among local cells” (Zald and McCarthy 1987, 162). In addition to NGOs, these cells include corporations, foundations, and other organizational actors. The presence within the movement of such diverse groups is a signal not only of convergence of ideas between change agents and change targets, but also of co-optation and conformity. Through steady interaction, NGOs can find themselves aligning more with the corporations they are trying to influence than the cause to which they were originally attached (Michels 1962). By understanding the network configuration of the “web-like structure” that is the environmental movement, we can better assess the form their agenda takes, the resources that are brought to bear, and the channels of influence that are employed.

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